Naval Battles
Operation FS - The Japanese plan to isolate Australia from the United States and force its surrender to Japan
The Imperial Japanese Navy had operational responsibility for the Pacific Ocean during World War II, including Australia and its two territories on the island of New Guinea. Japan's naval planners appreciated that the vastness of the Pacific would hamper an effective American counter-offensive in response to Pearl Harbor unless the Americans could use Australia as a base and springboard for an assault on the islands of Japan's southern defensive perimeter. The Japanese admirals appreciated that, with Australia providing a friendly and supportive base, the Americans would be able to use the islands of the South-West Pacific as stepping stones to recover the Philippines and threaten Japan's home islands.
To counter the perceived threat from Australia as an American ally, the admirals of Japan's Navy General Staff and Navy Ministry wanted to invade key areas of the northern Australian mainland in early 1942 to isolate Australia from American and British aid. To invade Australia, the Japanese Navy would require troops from the Japanese Army.
The generals of the Japanese Army General Staff, and the Prime Minister of Japan, General Hideki Tojo, appreciated that Australia posed a serious threat to Japan while it remained an ally of the United States. However, when the Japanese Navy requested troops for an invasion of Australia at a meeting of the Army and Navy Sections of Japan's Imperial General Headquarters on 4 March 1942, the generals refused. The Japanese generals did not see a need to commit massive troop and logistical resources to the conquest of the Australian mainland in the early months of 1942. The easy capture of Rabaul on 23 January 1942 and the first bombings of Darwin on 19 February 1942 had convinced the Japanese Army that Australia had little with which to defend itself from invasion. It was the sheer size of Australia that the generals saw as an immediate problem. The generals felt that their army resources had already been heavily overextended by Japan's rapid and massive territorial conquests, and that the Imperial Army needed time to consolidate its territorial gains.The Japanese Army was confident that Australia could be bullied into submission to Japan by isolating it completely from the United States and by applying intense psychological pressure.
By early March 1942, the Japanese Navy and Army had agreed that severing Australia's lifeline to the United States and bullying Australia into surrender to Japan were more important objectives than the limited invasion of Australia's northern coast that the Navy had earlier proposed. At the Imperial General Headquarters Liaison Conference on 7 March 1942, the Navy General Staff and Navy Ministry agreed to their limited invasion proposal being deferred in favour of the Army plan to sever Australia's lifeline to the United States and then press for Australia's total surrender to Japan. It is important to note that the Japanese generals did not rule out their support for an invasion by force if Australia did not surrender as they expected when the Japanese noose was tightened.
In public addresses to the Diet (Japanese parliament) on 21 January 1942, and on the occasion of the fall of Singapore (15 February 1942), Japan's Prime Minister, General Hideki Tojo, called on Australia to surrender to Japan. General Tojo suggested that Japan would be merciful to Australia if this happened. Tojo would repeat this demand for Australia's surrender in the Japanese parliament on 28 May 1942. To demonstrate Australia's vulnerability, Japanese midget submarines penetrated Sydney Harbour on 31 May 1942 and torpedoed the Royal Australian Navy depot ship Kuttabul, killing twenty-one sailors. Although Tojo suggested that Australia would be treated with leniency if it surrendered to Japan, I find it difficult to see how an Australian surrender to Japan could serve Japan's purposes without some form of Japanese occupation that would exclude access to Australia by the United States.
Although Tojo suggested that Australia would be treated with leniency if it surrendered to Japan, I find it difficult to see how an Australian surrender to Japan could serve Japan's purposes without some form of Japanese occupation that would exclude access to Australia by the United States.
On 15 March 1942, with Emperor Hirohito's approval, Japan's military high command formally resolved to extend Japan's southern defensive perimeter from Port Moresby in the Australian Territory of Papua to Fiji and Samoa for the purpose of isolating Australia from the United States. This plan was given the Japanese code reference "Operation FS", and was to be carried out as a matter of high strategic priority under the overall direction of Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye at Rabaul. Once completely isolated from the United States, the Japanese military leaders believed that Australia could be "neutralised" and bullied into surrender to Japan by threat of a military onslaught against major cities on the Australian mainland.
In Australia, Tojo's demands for surrender fell on deaf ears.
Operation MO - The Japanese plan to capture Port Moresby and Tulagi
The initial phase of Operation FS would involve the capture of Port Moresby and the island of Tulagi in the southern Solomon Islands. Both were garrisoned by Australian troops. The Japanese gave this initial phase the code reference "Operation MO".
The capture of Port Moresby was of vital importance to Japan's military leaders in 1942. Port Moresby was situated on the southern coast of the Australian Territory of Papua and separated from the Australian mainland by a 500 kilometre (310 mile) stretch of the Coral Sea. Its capture would enable the Japanese to block the eastern sea approaches to Darwin and deny the Allies a forward base from which to launch air attacks on Japan's newly acquired military bases in the Australian Territory of New Guinea. These bases included Rabaul, Lae, Salamaua and Kavieng. With the whole of the island of New Guinea and the Solomon Islands under Japanese control, Japan could establish forward air and naval bases on these territories from which it could strike deeply into the Australian mainland and sever the vital lines of communication between the United States and Australia. Port Moresby would also provide Japan with a springboard for an invasion of the Australian mainland when that became feasible.
Although Operation MO was intended to take place in April 1942, carrier-launched aircraft from USS Yorktown and USS Lexington had crossed the Owen Stanley Range on 10 March 1942 and destroyed and damaged Japanese warships and troop transports at Lae and Salamaua on the north coast of New Guinea. The troop transports were to have been used in Operation MO, and the successful American air strike forced a one month postponement of Operation MO to enable the lost and damaged transports to be replaced and deployment of Japanese aircraft carriers to protect the Port Moresby and Tulagi landings.
Admiral Yamamoto puts forward an alternative plan and calls for deferral of aspects of Operation FS
As noted earlier, on 15 March 1942 Imperial General Headquarters had accorded Operation FS top strategic priority. Preparations for implementation of Operation FS were put in train immediately. However, on 2 April, the Commander in Chief of Japan's Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, presented to Navy General Staff his own plan for a major offensive against America's Midway Atoll in the central Pacific. Yamamoto argued that an attack by Japan on the Midway Atoll would draw America's Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers to the defence of Midway where they could be annihilated by his Combined Fleet. Yamamoto also intended his Midway Operation to be the first stage of a subsequent major assault on Hawaii. Yamamoto's plan provided for the Midway offensive to begin early in June 1942, and for important aspects of Operation FS, namely, the capture of New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa to be deferred until after the completion of his Midway Operation.
When presented to Navy General Staff, the Combined Fleet plan received a cold reception. The admirals of the Navy General Staff had grave reservations about Admiral Yamamoto's proposed Midway Operation which they viewed as a high risk gamble of dubious strategic worth. They argued that the decisive confrontation with the American Pacific Fleet should take place in the South-West Pacific where the Japanese warships could receive powerful support in the battle from nearby Japanese air and naval bases. However, Admiral Yamamoto remained obstinate. He insisted that the Combined Fleet confrontation with the United States Pacific Fleet must take place at Midway, and that the capture of New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa should be deferred until the completion of his Midway offensive. Faced with a threat by Yamamoto to resign unless his plan was accepted, Navy General Staff reluctantly agreed to his demands on 5 April.
While agreeing in principle that the decisive confrontation with the US Pacific Fleet would take place at Midway Atoll, Navy General Staff insisted that the Midway Operation be coupled with a simultaneous operation designed to capture and occupy islands in the Aleutian chain off the coast of Alaska. Navy General Staff remained highly sceptical about the timing of Yamamoto's plan and refused to agree that the Midway-Aleutian Operations should begin on 3 June 1942. Navy General Staff doubted whether preparations for the complex Midway and Aleutian Operations could be completed by 3 June and insisted that they be deferred until late June. Navy General Staff was unwilling to permit resources already allocated to Operation MO to be reallocated to the Midway-Aleutian offensives.
The impact of the Halsey-Doolittle Raid on Operation MO
Haggling over respective priorities of the Navy General Staff and Combined Fleet offensive plans, and in particular, the timing of the Midway-Aleutian operations, continued until 18 April 1942. On that day, American carrier-launched medium bombers struck Tokyo and other Japanese cities.
The bold Doolittle hit-and-run carrier raid produced a swift revision of Japan's strategic priorities. After the raid, defence of Japan's home islands from attack by the United States Navy and isolation of Australia from the United States were both given the highest priority by Imperial General Headquarters. Admiral Yamamoto's Midway plan was designed to extend Japan's eastern defensive perimeter to the Midway Atoll; to draw the aircraft carriers of the United States Pacific Fleet to a decisive battle at Midway where they could be destroyed; and to prepare the stage for a major Japanese assault on the Hawaiian islands. In the expectation that Yamamoto's plan would succeed and lead to complete destruction of the American Pacific Fleet, Imperial General Headquarters gave its approval for the Midway-Aleutian offensives to be launched on 3 June 1942.
The Halsey-Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942 played a significant role in turning the tide of the Pacific War
against Japan. The USS Hornet launches B-25 medium bombers for a retaliatory raid on Japan.
Japan had now committed itself to simultaneous preparations for complex naval operations in the southern Pacific in May 1942 closely followed by even more complex naval operations in the central and northern Pacific in early June 1942.
Admiral Yamamoto agreed to provide Vice Admiral Inoue with two fleet carriers from Vice Admiral Nagumo's First Carrier Striking Force and one light carrier to support Operation MO. The higher priority accorded to Admiral Yamamoto's Midway-Aleutian Operations caused the timetable for Operation MO to be brought forward from late May to early May 1942. This was deemed necessary to enable the aircraft carriers supporting Operation MO to take part in the Midway-Aleutian offensives. Yamamoto pointed out to Admiral Inoue that he needed the three carriers for his Midway offensive, and that they must be released by 10 May to return to the Japanese naval base at Truk.
The planning for Operation MO
The capture of Port Moresby was to be preceded by seizure of the islands of Tulagi in the British Solomon Islands and Deboyne off the east coast of New Guinea. The Japanese intended to establish naval flying boat bases at both islands. The flying boats would then conduct patrols into the Coral Sea to monitor the eastern flank of the Port Moresby invasion force. The Japanese Tulagi invasion convoy would be supported by a covering force of warships under the command of Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto. The covering force would comprise the light aircraft carrier Shoho, four heavy cruisers, and one destroyer. After Admiral Goto's warships had covered the Tulagi landing, he would be required to withdraw his ships to the west and cover the Port Moresby invasion convoy of eleven transports, one light cruiser, and several destroyers as it moved towards Port Moresby. To deal with any attempt by an Allied naval force to oppose the Port Moresby and Tulagi landings, a powerful fleet aircraft carrier striking force would be present in the Coral Sea to support the Japanese invasion forces. This carrier force would be under the command of Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi.
These Japanese invasion plans directed against Australia would produce in the Coral Sea the first major fleet to fleet engagement between the American and Japanese navies following Pearl Harbor, and for the first time in naval history would see a major naval battle decided by opposing aircraft carriers.
British and American Code-breakers learn about Japan's Operation MO
In March 1942, British and American code-breakers intercepted Japanese Navy JN25 radio signals which indicated a forthcoming Japanese offensive towards Australia. On 3 April 1942, the American code-breakers at the HYPO Station in Hawaii, led by the brilliant cryptanalyst, Commander Joe Rochefort, intercepted a signal which indicated that an offensive would be mounted from the Japanese base at Rabaul in Australia's Territory of New Guinea. At Pearl Harbor, Commander Rochefort became convinced that the two targets of the impending Japanese offensive were Port Moresby and the British Solomon Islands which lay immediately to the east of the island of New Guinea.
Commander Rochefort's prediction was confirmed on 9 April when an intercepted JN25 signal revealed the presence of an "Operation MO" aircraft carrier strike force at Truk in Japan's Caroline Islands and an "RZP" invasion force ready to be launched from Rabaul. The British and American code-breakers already knew that "RZP" was the Japanese code reference for Port Moresby. In mid-April, British code-breakers in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) intercepted JN25 naval signals which revealed that two aircraft carriers from Vice Admiral Nagumo's powerful First Carrier Striking Force, Shokaku and Zuikaku, had been detached from his carrier group for action related to Operation MO. The Allies now knew that the focus of the Japanese offensive would be the Coral Sea to the east of Australia's Cape York.
An Allied naval Force prepares to resist the Japanese Landings at Port Moresby and Tulagi
To meet the danger posed by Japan's Operation MO to lines of communication between the United States and Australia, an Allied naval task force was assembled by Admiral Nimitz in the Coral Sea between 1 and 4 May 1942. Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch, commander of Task Force 11 centred on the carrier USS Lexington, was ordered to join Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher's Task Force 17, centred on USS Yorktown, in the Coral Sea. Yorktown arrived in the Coral Sea on 1 May after replenishing and maintenance at Tongatapu in the Tonga Islands. The two American carrier task forces were joined in the Coral Sea on 4 May by the former ANZAC Squadron commanded by Australian-born Rear Admiral John Crace of the Royal Navy aboard his flagship the heavy cruiser HMAS Australia. The ANZAC Squadron had been redesignated Task Force 44 for this Coral Sea operation, and now comprised HMAS Australia, the American heavy cruiser USS Chicago, the Australian light cruiser HMAS Hobart, and two American destroyers, USS Perkins and Walke. The ANZAC Squadron usually included the Australian light cruiser HMAS Canberra, but on this occasion Canberra was undergoing a refit in dry dock at Sydney. The three Allied Task Forces were combined under the designation Task Force 17. The combined Allied force, under the command of Rear Admiral Fletcher, was designated Task Force 17. Crace's cruiser squadron became Task Group 17.3 (Support Group).
The Japanese seize Tulagi
The movement of the Japanese Tulagi Invasion Group through the Solomon Islands was observed and reported by Australian Coastwatcher D. G. Kennedy on Santa Isabel Island. From intercepts of Japanese naval signals, Rear Admiral Fletcher learned on 3 May that the Japanese had landed at Tulagi after the small Australian garrison had been withdrawn. While Rear Admiral Fitch continued fuelling his ships, Fletcher moved Yorktown and her escort warships towards Tulagi for the purpose of attacking the Japanese invasion force.
The USS Yorktown (CV-5) is in the Coral Sea and preparing to launch aircraft.
When aircraft from Yorktown reached Tulagi at 6.30 a.m. on 4 May they found that Rear Admiral Goto's warships supporting the Tulagi landing (the covering force) had already withdrawn. Yorktown's aircraft attacked the remaining Japanese naval force and sank a destroyer and four landing barges. Yorktown's aircraft also destroyed five floatplanes, and damaged a destroyer and minelayer. The destruction of the floatplanes was important, because it denied the Japanese long range reconnaissance capability out of Tulagi.
A Japanese Carrier Force enters the Coral Sea to support their Port Moresby Invasion Force
From intelligence intercepts of Japanese naval signals, it became clear to Admiral Fletcher that the Japanese intended to move their Port Moresby invasion force through the Jomard Passage which separates the eastern tip of Papua from the islands of the Louisiade Archipelago. He left Tulagi and steamed south to rejoin the main Allied task force. After rejoining the task force on 5 May, Fletcher spent most of that day refuelling Yorktown from the American tanker Neosho .
On the morning of 6 May, the odds against the Allied task force increased significantly when the separate Japanese carrier striking force under the command of Rear Admiral Takagi entered the Coral Sea to support the Port Moresby invasion.
This powerful striking force comprised the fleet aircraft carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku, which were supported by two heavy cruisers and six destroyers. Admiral Takagi's first objective was to destroy any Allied naval force that he might find in the Coral Sea. His second objective was to support Japan's Port Moresby invasion force by bombing Australian military airfields between Townsville and Thursday Island.
Lacking the signal decoding capabilities of the British and Americans, the Japanese had no certain knowledge of the presence of American aircraft carriers in the Coral Sea, but after the devastating raid by American carrier-launched aircraft on their invasion transports at Lae and Salamaua on 10 March 1942, Admiral Takagi's carriers were in attendance to prevent a similar fate befalling Japan's Port Moresby invasion force.
Steering a south-easterly course across the Coral Sea, Admiral Takagi's carrier strike force quickly began to close the distance between it and Admiral Fletcher's carriers. At one point, the American and Japanese carrier forces were only 70 miles (112 km) apart, although both admirals were unaware that their enemy was within striking distance.
The Port Moresby Invasion Force approaches the eastern Tip of Papua
At midday on 6 May, American bombers from Australia located Rear Admiral Goto's light carrier Shoho and its supporting warships south of Bougainville where the Japanese ships had been refuelling. The covering force was half way between Tulagi and the Jomard Passage when located. Late on the afternoon of 6 May, with a view to ensuring its safety from Japanese attack, Admiral Fletcher ordered the tanker Neosho to withdraw to the south with a destroyer escort. He then ordered the Allied task force to set course for the Jomard Passage. Fletcher's strategy was to intercept the second and larger Japanese invasion force moving towards Port Moresby as it traversed the Jomard Passage. By midnight on 6 May, the Japanese Port Moresby invasion transports were approaching the northern entrance to the Jomard Passage, and Fletcher hoped to be within striking distance of these transports by daylight on 7 May.
The American and Japanese Carrier Forces search for each other in the Coral Sea
Rear Admiral Fletcher was aware that the coming battle between the American and Japanese fleet carrier forces could end in the two forces neutralising each other. This would leave the Jomard Passage unguarded, and open the way for the Japanese invasion convoy to reach Port Moreby. To guard against such a disaster, Fletcher decided early on the morning of 7 May to dispatch Rear Admiral Crace's cruiser Support Group to block the southern exit of the Jomard Passage. While Crace was moving his cruiser squadron, which included HMAS Australia, HMAS Hobart, USS Chicago, and three American destroyers, to the Jomard Passage, Fletcher's aircraft searched for Rear Admiral Takagi's aircraft carrier strike force which was in fact approaching his own task force under cover of a storm front.
During the morning of 7 May 1942, scout aircraft from the American and Japanese carriers both thought they had found the enemy fleet carriers, but both sides were mistaken.
The Japanese light carrier Shoho is under attack by American carrier aircraft.
Japanese scout aircraft located the American tanker Neosho and its destroyer escort USS Sims well to the south of Fletcher's carriers at about 8.00 am. Reported to Admiral Takagi as "a carrier and a cruiser", Neosho and Sims twice came under attack by Japanese high-level bombers during the morning without a hit being scored. At about noon, however, a formation of Japanese dive bombers attacked the tanker and destroyer. Sims was sunk with heavy casualties and Neosho was reduced to a drifting wreck.
A scout aircraft from USS Yorktown located Rear Admiral Goto's Port Moresby covering force, including the light Japanese carrier Shoho, south of the island of Bougainville. The sighting was incorrectly reported to Admiral Fletcher as a finding of "two carriers and four heavy cruisers". Believing that he had located Takagi's carrier strike force, Fletcher launched massive air strikes from Yorktown and Lexington against Goto's covering force warships. Fifty-three dive bombers, twenty-two torpedo planes and eighteen fighters fell upon Shoho at 11.15 am. The Japanese light carrier received numerous bomb and torpedo hits and sank at 11.35 am. Lt Cdr Robert E. Dixon of Lexington's Scouting Squadron Two (VS-2) recorded the sinking of Shoho with the memorable words: "Scratch one flat-top".
Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher commanded the Allied task forces at the Battle of the Coral Sea and inflicted on Japan its first defeat at sea.
The Allied Cruiser Squadron comes under Attack from both Sides
Having no air cover, the situation facing Rear Admiral Crace's cruiser squadron as it approached the southern exit of the Jomard Passage was precarious. At 12.40 pm, Vice Admiral Inoue had been led to believe that Crace's cruiser squadron was far more powerful than it really was. This belief had been produced by a Japanese seaplane pilot who mistakenly identified Crace's small force as comprising a battleship, two heavy cruisers and three destroyers. Concerned for the safety of his invasion force that was now approaching the northern entrance to the Jomard Passage, Inoue ordered land-based air attacks on Crace's warships.
At about 2.30 pm on 7 May, Crace's squadron was attacked by twelve land-based Japanese torpedo bombers from Rabaul. By skilful manoeuvring, the cruisers evaded all torpedo attacks. Immediately after the torpedo bomber attack, the cruiser squadron was attacked by twenty Japanese high level bombers. The bombing was very accurate, and HMAS Australia was straddled by bombs, which although very close, missed the cruiser. However, the bomb explosions close to the ship produced huge columns of water that crashed down on Australia and hid her briefly from the view of the rest of the squadron. The eruption of water was so massive that other ship commanders believed Australia had been destroyed. The skill of the ship commanders again saved the cruiser squadron from damage.
The next attack on the Allied cruiser force came from three American high-level B-17 bombers whose pilots mistakenly thought that they were attacking Japanese warships. Fortunately, all of the American bombs missed their target. When confronted with the actions of his B-17 pilots, General Douglas MacArthur refused to admit that the bombs had been dropped by aircraft under his command. An eye witness account of these air attacks on the Allied cruiser squadron is provided by Commodore Dacre Smyth, AO at the end of this history of the Battle of the Coral Sea.
With an Allied warship squadron blocking the Jomard Passage and the Shoho sunk, Vice Admiral Inouye became deeply concerned for the safety of his Port Moresby invasion convoy. He ordered the invasion convoy not to enter the Jomard Passage but to withdraw temporarily to the north and await the outcome of the impending carrier battle.
Late on the afternoon of 7 May, Admiral Takagi launched a strike group of twelve Val dive bombers and fifteen Kate torpedo bombers to search for and attack Admiral Crace's cruiser squadron which was still blocking the southern exit of the Jomard passage. It was a serious error of judgment by Takagi. The Japanese strike group was picked up on Yorktown's radar while on route to its target, and Wildcat F4F fighters from Yorktown and Lexington were sent to intercept. Having no radar at this stage of the war, the Japanese pilots were taken by surprise when the Wildcat fighters pounced on them. Takagi's strike group was not escorted by Zero fighters, and the Japanese bomber pilots responded to the sudden American attack by abandoning their mission and dispersing in all directions.
The dispersal in panic of the Japanese strike group led to one of the bizarre incidents of the Pacific War. With night approaching fast, the disoriented Japanese pilots lost their way and found themselves over the American carrier task force. The pilot of the leading Japanese plane failed to appreciate that these were the enemy and he signalled Yorktown that he was about to land. He only realised his mistake as he was drifting in to land on the carrier's flight deck. When he saw that he was about to land on an American carrier, the horrified Japanese pilot frantically veered away, and was followed by the other Japanese pilots. Having already ditched their bombs when they abandoned their mission, the Japanese pilots were unable to extract a measure of honour from an embarrassing situation by attacking the American task force. Some nervous American gunners responded to the incident by firing at any aircraft above the task force, including friendly returning Wildcat fighters.
One of the Japanese pilots involved in this attempted landing on USS Yorktown gives his account of the incident:
"Our aircraft soon fell victim to the delusions and 'mirages' brought on by exhaustion. Several times the pilots, despairing of their position over the sea 'sighted' a friendly aircraft carrier. Finally, a carrier was sighted, and the remaining eighteen bombers switched on their signal and blinker lights as they swung into their approach and landing pattern.
"As the lead aircraft, with its flaps down and speed lowered, drifted toward the carrier deck to land, the pilot discovered the great ship ahead was an American carrier! Apparently the Americans also had erred in identification, for even as the bomber dropped near the carrier deck, not a single enemy gun fired. The Japanese pilot frantically opened his throttle, and at full speed, swung away from the vessel followed by his astonished men.
"Our aircrews were disgusted. They had flown for gruelling hours over the sea, bucked thunder squalls and, finally, had lost all trace of their positions relative to their own carriers. When finally they did sight the coveted American warship, cruising unsuspecting beneath eighteen bombers, they were without bombs or torpedoes.
"Only eighteen out of the twenty-seven planes that had flown out that afternoon made it back. All the dead were veteran pilots, and could not be easily replaced by the Japanese."
Bill Surgi was aboard USS Yorktown at the time and he recalls this very unusual incident:
"It happened at sunset. There was light in the western skies, and it was dark to the east. We on Yorktown were preparing to land our CAP (Combat Air Patrol) of F4F Wildcat fighters when a group of aircraft circled the task force sending blinker light signals that we did not recognise. This group of aircraft joined our landing pattern. Our LSO (Landing Signal Officer) would have been expecting to bring aboard the F4Fs of our CAP because they were the only aircraft expected at this time. The F4Fs had close in, retractable landing gear. The LSO sees an aircraft with wide spread, fixed landing gear coming into the landing pattern. It was a Japanese Aichi Type 99 "Val" dive bomber, so he waves it off, and the Japanese pilot took the wave off. Our skipper, Capt. Buckmaster, passed the word 'stand by to repel boarders'. As the Japanese plane went by the port side, and the "meat ball" * was seen, all guns took him on. It was like fireworks, with tracers going into any aircraft that went by. I guess they got the idea we were not theirs! It was unusual to say the least, and we were on edge. In the general confusion, some of the F4Fs of our CAP flew through friendly fire. Ensign William. W. Barnes landed with his oil cooler shot up. He was ready to fight the plane handlers, wanting to know why we shot at him."
* Service slang for the Japanese national insignia on aircraft.
Otis Kight was also aboard Yorktown at this time and he recalls:
"I remember there were two Japanese aircraft I personally saw trying to land on us. Our F4F fighters were preparing to land on Yorktown at the same time. I can recall extremely colorful language - even for an experienced sailor- from our Yorktown pilots (VF-42) concerning getting the crap shot out of them by our own gunners. This all happened within the space of about twenty minutes. It was almost at sunset. They (the Japanese) both made it the heck out of there. I don't remember anyone trying to claim credit for shooting them down. Maybe up, but not down!"
Nine Japanese aircraft were either shot down or lost their way back to their own carriers in the darkness. Three Wildcats failed to return to the American carriers.
At 8.40 pm on 7 May, Vice Admiral Inoue responded to confusing reports that he had received concerning the strength and locations of enemy warships by postponing the Port Moresby landings from 10 May to 12 May. Admirals Fletcher and Takagi spent that night preparing their respective carrier forces for battle on the following morning.
The American and Japanese Carrier Forces make Contact and Battle is joined
Before dawn on 8 May 1942, the commanders of the American and Japanese carrier forces launched scout aircraft to search for the enemy's carriers. Between 8.15 and 8.20 am, the American and Japanese scouts located the enemy's carriers. Rear Admiral Fletcher began launching his strike aircraft shortly after 9.00 am, and then turned over tactical command to Rear Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch who had more experience of aircraft carrier operations. At about the same time, the Japanese launched their strike aircraft towards the American carriers.
USS Lexington
Built on a battle-cruiser hull, Lexington was one of the largest aircraft carriers in the world at this time. The "
Lady Lex" was one of the best loved ships in the US Navy.
At this time, Yorktown and Lexington were operating under clear skies whereas Admiral Takagi's carriers were partially concealed by low rain clouds. Owing to the poor weather conditions over the Japanese carriers, the strike forces launched from Yorktown and Lexington , comprising in total twenty-one Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers, forty-six Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers, and seventeen Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters, were only able to locate the fleet carrier Shokaku . Rear Admiral Takagi had skilfully exploited a rain squall to screen his other fleet carrier Zuikaku from Admiral Fletcher's aircraft. The American aircraft attacked Shokaku and the dive bombers inflicted heavy damage on its flight deck. Unable to launch aircraft, Shokaku was withdrawn from the battle and headed for its base at Truk in Japan's Caroline Islands. Shokaku's airborne aircraft were transferred to Zuikaku.
The Devastator torpedo aircraft launched torpedoes, but caused no damage to Shokaku. None of the air-launched torpedoes that struck Shokaku exploded. The failure of twenty-one American torpedo bombers to inflict any damage on Shokaku should have alerted the American naval leadership to the very real possibility that the Devastators were armed with defective torpedoes, and produced swift action to resolve this serious problem. However, those responsible for this grave deficiency in American naval weaponry took no action to correct it before the great naval battle at Midway in early June 1942.
The Loss of the "Lady Lex" - USS Lexington
While the American carrier aircraft were attacking Shokaku, and searching for Zuikaku, Admiral Takagi's aircraft found Lexington and Yorktown steaming under clear skies. Admiral Fletcher had only a small number of fighters left to defend his two carriers when sixty-nine Japanese carrier aircraft pressed home their attack at 11.18 am. The slower and heavily outnumbered American Wildcat fighters were overwhelmed by the Japanese Zero fighters, and were unable to play any significant role in the defence of the American carriers.
Despite an intense anti-aircraft barrage from the American carriers and their escorting warships, the Japanese pilots resolutely pressed home their attack. Shigekazu Shimazaki, commander of Zuikaku's air strike, described the intensity of the anti-aircraft fire:
"When we attacked the enemy carriers, we ran into a virtual wall of anti-aircraft fire. The carriers and their supporting ships blackened the sky with exploding shells and tracers. It seemed impossible that we could survive our bombing and torpedo runs through such incredible defences . . I had to fly directly above the waves to escape the enemy shells and tracers. In fact, when I turned away from the enemy carrier, I was so low that I almost struck the bow of the ship, for I was flying below the level of the flight deck. I could see the crewmen of the ship staring at my plane as it rushed by."
From Chris Coulthard-Clark, "Action Stations Coral Sea", Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991 page 119.
The USS Lexington is rocked by a massive explosion after the Japanese attack
Stanley Johnston, newspaper correspondent aboard USS Lexington, described the Japanese attack from his own perspective:
"The forward 1.1 battery has the range on that first Jap. I see their shells, bright crimson tracers, tearing through the wings and fuselage. This plane wavers, begins a slow roll to its left and veers off just enough to pass in an inverted position just under our bow. As it glides by, I see flames coming from the tail, and the machine smashes itself into the water fifty feet off our starboard bow. The port forward 5-inch battery manned by marines concentrates its fire on the second Jap. As this plane zooms to cross almost directly over these guns, they hit it squarely with a shell. The explosion blows it to bits, its engine plunging into the water almost at the foot of the battery. Shreds of its wlngs and tail surfaces slither along the carrier's deck like sheets of paper swept in front of a gale."
By skilful manoeuvring, the smaller carrier Yorktown was able to evade several air-launched torpedoes. The Japanese dive bombers then took their turn to attack Yorktown, and an 800 pound (362 kg) bomb penetrated to the carrier's fourth deck. The blast and resulting fires killed and injured dozens of crewmen. Yorktown was severely damaged by the bomb hit, but the fires were quickly brought under control and the carrier remained fully operational.
Although skilfully handled also, Lexington was attacked by torpedo bombers from both sides simultaneously. Her evasive manoeuvres were hampered by her greater size, and she was struck by two air-launched torpedoes and two bombs.
The Japanese attack was over by 11. 27 am, and despite severe damage and the loss of many lives, it appeared at first that Lexington would remain operational. A seven degree list caused by the torpedo hits was corrected by shifting oil ballast, and her returning aircraft were recovered safely. However, at 12. 47 pm a large explosion caused by petrol vapour rocked the Lexington and spread fires throughout the ship.
About two hours later, a second large explosion tore through the aircraft hangar deck and produced fires that raged out of control. At 5. 07 pm the crew were ordered to abandon their beloved " Lady Lex", and they did so, although reluctantly. The fires were now roasting torpedo warheads stored in the hangar, and shortly after Lexington's commander, Captain Frederick C. Sherman, left his blazing ship at 5.27 pm, the warheads detonated in a massive explosion. The stricken Lexington could not be saved, and the great carrier was sent to its grave on the bed of the Coral Sea by torpedoes fired from an American destroyer. 216 dead crew members accompanied their ship on her last journey.
The doomed USS Lexington after massive explosions have blasted the carrier. The "Lady Lex"would soon be resting on the bed of the Coral Sea with 216 dead crew members who accompanied their ship on her last journey.
A number of American aircraft failed to return to their carriers. Some were shot down; some ran out of fuel, or lost their way home to their carriers across the trackless ocean. Their sad farewells were heard by crewman Mervyn Johnston aboard HMAS Australia:
"We could hear..... the comments of various pilots . . . (who) in some cases were running out of fuel or could not land on the Lexington or the Yorktown as they were either damaged or on fire. Many messages were goodbyes to friends or loved ones."
From Chris Coulthard-Clark, "Action Stations Coral Sea", Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991, page 125
With his task force reduced to one damaged fleet carrier, Rear Admiral Fletcher decided that Yorktown should be withdrawn from further action in the Coral Sea. The damaged Yorktown set course for Pearl Harbor, where it would be quickly repaired and would play a vital role in the Battle of Midway in June 1942.
Vice Admiral Takagi breaks off the action and withdraws to the north
The Japanese strike leader, Lieutenant Commander Kakuichi Takahashi, had reported at 11.25 am that the Japanese had sunk a Saratoga class carrier (he was actually referring to the Lexington) and severely damaged a Yorktown class carrier. However, the cost to the Japanese in lost aircraft and experienced pilots had been very high. When the survivors of the Shokaku and Zuikaku air strikes landed on the flight deck of the still unscathed Zuikaku, Rear Admiral Chuichi Hara found to his horror that he could only muster thirty-nine operational aircraft for a second strike, and twenty-four of these were Zero fighters. Faced with a serious shortage of operational strike bombers, and a critical fuel situation, Vice Admiral Takagi decided at 3.00 pm to break off the action and retire to the north to refuel his ships. There is no evidence to suggest that Takagi had any intention at this stage to resume the battle.
Back at Rabaul, Vice Admiral Inoue rejoiced at the news that one American carrier had been sunk and a second one crippled. Although the path to Port Moresby appeared to be now blocked only by Rear Admiral Crace's cruiser squadron (mistakenly reported to Inoue as including a battleship), Inoue decided on the evening of 8 May to postpone Operation MO entirely. His decision was influenced by the loss of Shoho, the heavy damage to Shokaku, and the serious shortage of strike bombers left on Zuikaku. He felt that the MO invasion force would be too vulnerable to attack by Allied land-based bombers without adequate carrier support.
The Japanese withdrawal produces the first major Allied naval victory in the Pacific War
By nightfall on 8 May, the withdrawal of all Japanese naval forces from the Coral Sea left Rear Admiral Crace's Australian-American Support Group in sole possession of the battlefield. A powerful Japanese invasion force had been repulsed and Port Moresby had been saved. Japan had suffered its first major defeat in the Pacific War.
Crace's cruiser force continued to faithfully block the Jomard Passage until it was recalled to Australia on 10 May.
Despite clear evidence that Japan suffered a major defeat at the Battle of the Coral Sea, some writers of naval history have suggested that the outcome was inconclusive or an American tactical defeat. These views are wrong, and I will explain why this is so in the next section.
A furious Admiral Yamamoto demands that Takagi pursue and destroy the Allied warships
When the withdrawal of Zuikaku from the battle and the cancelling of Operation MO were reported to Admiral Yamamoto late on 8 May, he was furious. At 10.00 pm, he tersely ordered Inoue to "destroy the enemy". When he gave this order, Yamamoto was not aware that Vice Admiral Takagi had lost almost two thirds of his aircraft or that his task force was desperately short of fuel when he withdrew from the battle. It took all of 9 May for Vice Admiral Takagi to refuel his carrier task force, and by the time his ships returned to the Coral Sea and began the hunt for Allied warships, Yorktown and her escort warships were well beyond his reach on their way to Tongatapu in the Friendly Islands. When Takagi reported that his air patrols could find no Allied warships in the Coral Sea, Admiral Yamamoto accepted the postponement of Operation MO and recalled his ships on the afternoon of 10 May.
Admiral Yamamoto appears to have been far more concerned about the escape of Allied warships than about Vice Admiral Inoue's postponement of the capture of Port Moresby. However, this could well be explained by Yamamoto's preoccupation with destruction of the US Pacific Fleet. He intended to achieve this at Midway in early June 1942, and Admirals Inoue and Takagi had already deprived him of the carriers Shokaku and Shoho for that major naval operation.
The strategic significance of Port Moresby for Japan and the United States
Histories of the Battle of the Coral Sea variously describe it as being inconclusive, a tactical draw, a tactical defeat for the United States, or a strategic victory for the United States. The distinguished British naval historian Richard Hough described Coral Sea as "a strategic American victory" in The Longest Battle: The War at Sea 1939-45 (at page 173). In A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), American naval historian Professor Paul S. Dull notes the fact that Rear Admiral Fletcher deprived Admiral Yamamoto at Coral Sea of two of his best fleet carriers for the crucial Battle of Midway (4-6 June 1942) where even one additional carrier might very possibly have swung the battle in favour of the Japanese (1978 edition at page 129). However, in concluding his brief account of the battle, Professor Dull comments: "It is difficult to say who won the battle of the Coral Sea" (ibid).
Only one of these descriptions is correct. The Battle of the Coral Sea was in fact a crucial strategic victory for the United States and Australia. Differences of opinion between military historians require me to explain why this is so.
Professor Dull's book is a study of a series of naval battles and actions that took place in the Pacific and Indian Oceans between Pearl Harbor and the Japanese surrender. His use of Japanese naval sources makes his book a useful resource for students of Pacific War naval history. However, taking the Battle of the Coral Sea as an example, Professor Dull fails to place this battle in its correct historical context and fails to relate its outcome to achievement or non-achievement by the United States and Japan of their respective strategic aims in 1942. He incorrectly states (at page 116) that Operation MO (the capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi) was a Japanese Army initiative when it was in fact an initiative of Navy General Staff, prompted by Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, commander of the 4th Fleet or South Seas Force. I find it particularly unfortunate that Professor Dull does not appear to understand that the failure of the Japanese Operation MO at Coral Sea was a devastating blow to Japan's strategic aims in the Pacific in 1942. If he did not understand that Coral Sea was a vital strategic victory for the Allies, then this probably explains his inability to determine who won the battle.
It is important to appreciate that Japan's high command was determined to capture Port Moresby in 1942, and this was a top strategic priority. With Port Moresby in Japanese hands, their fortified bases in New Guinea would be separated from Allied bombers based in Australia by an additional 500 kilometre (300 mile) expanse of the Coral Sea. The Japanese intended to anchor their southern defensive perimeter on Port Moresby, and then extend it across the Pacific to Fiji with the purpose of isolating Australia from the United States, and denying the Americans their major base in the South-West Pacific.
If the Japanese had won the Battle of the Coral Sea (7-8 May 1942), they would have been able to capture Port Moresby on the southern coast of what was then the Australian Territory of Papua and the island of Guadalcanal in the British Solomons. Using Port Moresby as a base, Japanese Navy bombers would have been able to strike as far south as the coastal town of Bundaberg in Queensland (opposite Fraser Island). On the way, they could have bombed Cairns, Townsville, Mackay, and Rockhampton. Only the State capital Brisbane would have been beyond the striking reach of Japanese medium bombers taking off from Port Moresby airstrips. See "Author's Note" below. With Port Moresby in their hands, the Japanese would have been able to block the eastern sea approaches to Australia's northern port of Darwin. The capture of Port Moresby would have been an important first step towards severing Australia's vital lifeline to the United States. The second step would have been establishment of a major Japanese forward airbase on the island of Guadalcanal. Japanese land-based bombers on Guadalcanal could then strike far out into the Pacific to New Caledonia and intercept sea communications between the United States and Australia. Japanese demands for Australia's surrender would have been greatly strengthened as the noose around Australia was steadily tightened.
The capture of Port Moresby by the Japanese would have meant the loss by the Americans and Australians of their last base in New Guinea, and placed a large expanse of Coral Sea between Allied bombers in Australia and Japanese bases in New Guinea. Port Moresby was intended to be one of the springboards from which the Americans and Australians would launch their counter-offensive to drive the Japanese out of New Guinea and back to their home islands. The Commander in Chief of the US Navy, Admiral Ernest J. King, believed that it was much easier to hold territory than to recapture it after it had been lost to the Japanese and fortified by them. The extent of American concern to save Port Moresby can be gauged from the commitment of all four of the Pacific Fleet's precious operational fleet carriers to the Battle of the Coral Sea. As it turned out, the carriers Enterprise and Hornet failed to reach the Coral Sea in time to take part in the battle.
These facts explain why the Japanese were determined to capture Port Moresby and Guadalcanal throughout 1942, and why the United States Navy and the Australian Curtin government were equally determined to save both Port Moresby and Guadalcanal. The crucial Kokoda Campaign was fought between 21 July 1942 and 22 January 1943 to save Australia from the grave peril that would have arisen if Port Moresby fell into Japanese hands.
Finally, the capture of Port Moresby would have facilitated a Japanese landing on the Australian mainland when that became feasible.
Author's Note on the combat range of Japanese bombers in 1942
Most of Queensland's cities and towns would have been within striking range of Japanese land-based Navy bombers if Japan had captured the airfields of Port Moresby in 1942. The Mitsubishi G4M medium bomber (code-name "Betty") had an operational range that would have enabled it to reach and bomb Rockhampton. The Mitsubishi G3M (Allied code-name "Nell") had an operational range that would have enabled it to reach and bomb Bundaberg (opposite Fraser Island). If based on Guadalcanal, these Japanese Navy aircraft could easily have reached and bombed New Caledonia.
The inexplicable failure of Vice Admiral Inoue to exploit the American carrier withdrawal by capturing Port Moresby
Naval historian Richard Hough puts his finger on an important issue when he states: "..the American high command was puzzled to know why the Port Moresby invasion did not take place after the withdrawal of the American carrier force" (at page 172). Hough suggests that Vice Admiral Inoue would have been concerned about the threat to his invasion force from Allied land-based bombers and the loss of fighter cover for his transports when the carrier Shoho was sunk by American carrier aircraft on 7 May. The Shoho was carrying twelve fighter aircraft to cover the Port Moresby landing.
At first appearance, it appears to be a valid argument, and it was the one used by Vice Admiral Inoue himself to excuse his peremptory cancelling of Operation MO when, in terms of of tonnage sunk and irreplaceable offensive power lost, he could reasonably claim that Japan had achieved a tactical victory. Fearing that his invasion transports and their escort warships would be vulnerable to attack by land-based Allied aircraft without close support from Shoho's fighters, Vice Admiral Inoue decided on the evening of 8 May to withdraw the invasion fleet to Rabaul and postpone the capture of Port Moresby. That decision left Rear Admiral Crace's Australian-American cruiser squadron in sole possession of the battlefield, namely, the Coral Sea, from which the enemy had all departed by midnight on 8 May.
This decision by Inoue is difficult to understand because Japanese pilots had reported to him that one Lexington class carrier and a battleship had been sunk, and that a Yorktown class carrier had been almost certainly crippled. The reported sinking of a battleship may be a reference to the dramatic but failed bombing attack on HMAS Australia. In the context of the withdrawal of the surviving American carrier Yorktown from the battle on the afternoon of 8 May, this should have suggested to Inoue that Japan had won a significant tactical victory over the Allied naval forces at Coral Sea, and that the only remaining barrier between the still powerful Japanese invasion force and Port Moresby was Rear Admiral Crace's small cruiser squadron which faithfully maintained its blockade of the Jomard Passage until recalled to Australia on 10 May 1942.
The failure by Inoue to proceed with the Port Moresby landing after the withdrawal of Yorktown inevitably raises the question: Did the Japanese MO invasion fleet still have the capability to capture Port Moresby after the carrier battle had ended? In my view, the answer to that question would have to be in the affirmative if Inoue had been a more aggressive commander.
Although Shoho had been sunk, Inoue still had the use of the much larger carrier Zuikaku to cover the Port Moresby landing. Zuikaku was still fully operational even with an air group reduced from sixty-two to forty-five operational aircraft. About half of these aircraft had been recovered from the disabled Shokaku. After recovering both air groups, Zuikaku had twenty-four fully operational Zero fighters, whereas Shoho had only twelve fighters to cover the Port Moresby landing. By consolidating his various MO groups, Inoue would have had a powerful invasion force comprising the fleet carrier Zuikaku, six heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, thirteen destroyers, and seven submarines.
Inoue's warships could also have been closely supported by land-based bombers and Zero fighters from Lae and Rabaul. Rear Admiral Crace's squadron comprised only two heavy cruisers (HMAS Australia and USS Chicago), one light cruiser (HMAS Hobart), and three destroyers. Japanese reconnaissance seaplanes had mistakenly reported one of Crace's cruisers as being a battleship, but the sinking of the battleship Prince of Wales and battle-cruiser Repulse off Malaya on 10 December 1941had shown the Japanese how vulnerable battleships were to attack by land-based bombers. If the Australian admiral had seen fit to oppose the passage of the consolidated MO force, Inoue's warships and bombers should have been sufficient to sweep Crace's squadron out of the way and open a clear path to Port Moresby.
Having reached Port Moresby in this way, it is reasonable to question whether Inoue's MO force would have faced any significant difficulties in capturing the small Australian port. Japanese Rabaul-based aircraft had been bombing Port Moresby regularly since 3 February 1942. The Japanese airbase at Lae was only 300 kilometers (186 miles) from Port Moreby. Japanese bombers and Zero fighters from Lae and Rabaul could have supported the amphibious landing and, together with Zuikaku's twenty-four Zeros, should have been able to neutralise any opposition from Allied aircraft based at Port Moresby. MacArthur's B-17 heavy bombers based in northern Australia were notoriously inaccurate and unlikely to create any significant risk for the Japanese amphibious force.
The land defences of Port Moresby are unlikely to have been a major problem for the 5,000 combat toughened troops of Japan's South Seas Detachment. The Australian garrison comprised three battalions of Australian militia troops, or about 1,500 infantry. These militia troops were raw recruits with an average age of eighteen and a half. Their officers were mostly inexperienced. Instead of being trained to fight the Japanese, the militia recruits had been put to work as labourers on the docks and roads on their arrival in Port Moresby in 1941, and they lacked both military training and adequate equipment to defend the town. The fortifications of Port Moresby in April 1942 comprised two ancient naval guns, a field artillery regiment, a heavy anti-aircraft battery, and a few mobile anti-aircraft guns. At the time of the Battle of the Coral Sea, the militia defenders of Port Moresby had been graded and assigned the lowest combat efficiency rating of "F". The blame for this disgraceful neglect of the training and equipment of the Port Moresby garrison attaches inexorably to Generals MacArthur and Blamey who failed to acknowledge the Japanese threat to the town despite clear intelligence warnings. This neglect of the defences of Port Moresby by MacArthur and Blamey becomes even more difficult to understand in the light of evidence that both the Japanese and the Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, regarded Port Moresby as being of vital strategic importance.
I believe that we are left with only one plausible conclusion, namely, that Inoue abandoned the capture of Port Moresby on 8 May because he lost his nerve following the sinking of the light carrier Shoho and disabling of the fleet carrier Shokaku. Inoue's failure to seize the opportunity to capture Port Moresby after Lexington had been sunk and Yorktown withdrawn caused consternation in Japan's naval high command. The Battle of the Coral Sea was trumpeted to the Japanese public as a great victory for Japan, but privately, the admirals knew that Inoue's failure to capture Port Moresby when the prize was within his grasp had cost them one of Japan's most important strategic aims. Inoue was relieved of his command of the 4th Fleet and ordered back to Japan. He spent the rest of the war in relative obscurity as the commandant of a naval college.
The failure by Inoue to exploit the American carrier withdrawal at Coral Sea handed a strategic victory to the Allies
The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first of a series of vital battles in 1942 that would decide the fate of Australia and shape the course of the Pacific War. For the loss of the light aircraft carrier Shoho, and serious damage to the fleet carrier Shokaku, the Japanese had crippled the fleet oiler Neosho, sunk the destroyer Sims, inflicted serious damage on Yorktown, and caused the loss of Lexington which was one of the largest aircraft carriers in the world at that time. Having forced the withdrawal of the surviving American carrier Yorktown, Vice Admiral Inoue failed to exploit his advantage by capturing Port Moresby. His apparent failure of nerve threw away a tactical victory and handed a crucial strategic victory to the United States and Australia.
By failing to capture Port Moresby, the Japanese were denied the opportunity to extend their southern defensive perimeter to the edge of the Coral Sea. By failing to capture Port Moresby, the Japanese lost the base that was intended to be the anchor for a chain of fortified bases across the Pacific to Fiji. Those bases were intended to isolate Australia from the United States. Australia was spared intensified aerial bombardment from Port Moresby. The United States and Australia kept their vital foothold on the southern coast of the New Guinea mainland from which the Allied counter-offensive would be launched in 1943. These are the most readily apparent consequences of the failure by Inoue to exploit the American carrier withdrawal by capturing Port Moresby, but there were at least four more important gains for the Allies from the Battle of the Coral Sea.
Vice Admiral Inoue's apparent failure of nerve gave Australia time to deploy its best troops to defend Port Moreby
The withdrawal of the Japanese amphibious invasion force, and a second postponement of the capture of Port Moresby, gave the Allies vital time in which to reinforce Australian militia units in New Guinea with battle-seasoned Australian Imperial Force (AIF) units recently returned from the Middle East. Every man would be needed when the Japanese eventually decided in July 1942 to move combat-toughened troops of the South Seas Detachment along the Kokoda Track to capture Port Moresby by land. With 13,500 Japanese troops committed to the capture of Port Moresby, the construction of a major Japanese forward airbase on Guadalcanal was relegated to lower priority.
Coral Sea almost certainly laid the foundation for a successful American landing on Guadalcanal in 1942
If the Japanese amphibious invasion force had not been withdrawn, and Port Moresby had been captured immediately following the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese timetable for occupying the whole of the Solomon chain of islands, including Guadalcanal, could have been brought back on track. With the Japanese timetable back on track, this would almost certainly have led to the Japanese airstrip on Guadalcanal becoming a heavily defended operational airbase before the end of July 1942. If that had happened, it is highly unlikely that the landing by US Marines on Guadalcanal could have taken place on 7 August 1942. If the Japanese had been able to fortify Guadalcanal and make it their own forward base, the course of the Pacific War would have been significantly altered and prolonged.
Coral Sea produced the Kokoda Campaign, and Kokoda kept 13,500 Japanese troops away from Guadalcanal
The Japanese naval defeat at the Battle of the Coral Sea led directly to the bloody battles between Australian and Japanese troops along the Kokoda Track and at Milne Bay between July and December 1942. The land battle for Port Moresby occupied at least 13,500 Japanese troops, including 5,000 crack troops of the South Seas Detachment, at the same time that US Marines on Guadalcanal were engaged in a struggle to hold their own against repeated and determined Japanese attempts to dislodge them. Kokoda and Guadalcanal were both bloody campaigns of attrition, and the Japanese lacked the military resources to maintain both campaigns simultaneously. The stubborn Australian defence of Port Moresby reduced Japan's capability to defeat the Marines on Guadalcanal, and the equally stubborn Marine defence of Henderson Field denied reinforcements for Major General Tomitaro Horii's South Seas Deatachment on the Kokoda Track.
Coral Sea laid the foundation for the great American naval victory at Midway
One very important aspect of the Battle of the Coral Sea has been overlooked by some historians. Shokaku and Zuikaku were two of Japan's six best front-line aircraft carriers. Although the Americans lost USS Lexington, Shokaku was badly damaged and both Japanese fleet carriers suffered significant losses of aircraft and experienced air crews. As a result, neither Japanese fleet carrier was able to participate in the crucial Battle of Midway in June 1942, where the presence of only one additional Japanese fleet carrier might have been sufficient to turn the tide of battle against the United States. If the United States had been defeated at the Battle of Midway, Japan would have achieved undisputed naval supremacy in the western Pacific Ocean and would have been able to invade the Australian mainland whenever it chose to do so.
The Battle of the Coral Sea was an important morale booster for the Allies. For the first time since Pearl Harbor, the seemingly unstoppable Japanese offensive had been checked, and a Japanese invasion force had been repulsed.
Source:
James Bowen
Battle for Australia Historical Committee