Naval Battles
Between 4 and 6 June 1942, a great naval battle took place between the United States Pacific Fleet and the Imperial Japanese Navy about 180 miles (288 km ) north-west of America's Midway Atoll. The two small islands that comprise Midway Atoll are located 1,120 miles (1,800 km) north-west of Hawaii and 2,250 miles (3,620 km) east of Japan.
Until this stage of the Pacific War, the Americans had been struggling to survive the powerful Japanese onslaught which began with the surprise attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. That attack destroyed or badly damaged eight American battleships, and left the United States Pacific Fleet greatly inferior in power to the Japanese Imperial Navy. The Battle of Midway would prove to be a decisive contest for naval supremacy in the central Pacific region between the United States Navy and the Japanese Imperial Navy.
In June 1942, the flat sandy islands of Midway Atoll were the focus of a decisive struggle for supremacy in the central Pacific region between the navies of Japan and the United States. Inside the reef, the island in the foreground is Eastern Island. The island furthest from the camera is Sand island.
While the great naval contest took place at Midway, the fate of Hawaii, Australia, and the chain of islands between them, hung in the balance . If the Commander in Chief of Japan's Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, had achieved his aim of destroying the United States Pacific Fleet at Midway, Japan's powerful aircraft carriers and battleships would have been able to strike Hawaii and Australia, and both Hawaii and the Australian mainland would have been exposed to a very real threat of Japanese invasion. The Japanese defeat at Midway destroyed the naval superiority of the Imperial Japanese Navy over the United States Pacific Fleet, freed Australia and Hawaii from a looming threat of Japanese invasion, and laid the foundation for Japan's ultimate defeat.
Location and physical characteristics of Midway Atoll
Viewed purely as a geographical feature of the Pacific Ocean, Midway Atoll was an unlikely focus for the most important battle of the Pacific War.
The atoll was reported and claimed for the United States by Captain N. C. Brooks of the Gambia in 1859. At that time, the treeless coral sand islands had no human inhabitants, but bird life was abundant. Initially called Brooks Island, the atoll acquired the name Midway when it was formally annexed by the United States in 1867.
Although located 1,300 miles (2,100 km) north-west of Honolulu, Midway Atoll is one of the many islands and atolls that comprise the Hawaiian archipelago. The main features of the atoll are two small, relatively flat, sandy islands lying adjacent to each other on the southern side of a lagoon almost completely ringed by coral reef. Sand Island is about two miles in length and reaches a maximum height of 39 feet above sea level. Eastern Island is one and one quarter miles long and reaches a maximum height of 12 feet above sea level. The total land area of both islands is only 1,500 acres (625 hectares). The tough indigenous brush (scaevola) that densely covered large areas of the two islands provided some relief from the harsh glare of the white coral sand. The scaevola brush was gradually augmented by Hawaiian ironwood and Australian eucalypt trees.
The nearest significant landmark to Midway Atoll is tiny Johnston Island, located about 850 miles (1360 km) south-east of Midway.
Midway Atoll acquires strategic importance
The strategic importance of Midway in relation to Hawaii was recognised by Congress as early as 1869 when $50,000 was appropriated for dredging an entrance channel through a break in the western side of the reef, known as the Seward Roads, and deepening an anchorage on the northern side of Sand Island known as Welles Harbor.
Following its defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines and Guam in the Mariana Islands to the United States, causing the latter to become a colonial power in the Pacific. The transfer of the Philippines to the United States was viewed with deep hostility in Japan where the development was viewed as a threat to Japan's territorial expansion in East Asia. Thereafter, the naval establishments in Japan and the United States prepared for the possibility of armed conflict between their two countries.
Midway is placed under the control of the United States Navy
Convenient access to the Philippines, and the need to protect it, required the United States to provide way stations between Hawaii and the Philippines where US Navy ships could refuel and obtain provisions. Guam joined Midway to become one of those way stations. In 1899, the United States completed its chain of way stations to the Philippines by annexing uninhabited Wake Island in the central Pacific. Technically an atoll, Wake lies 2,300 miles (3,700 km) west of Honolulu. In 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt placed Midway Atoll under the control of the United States Navy.
In 1905, the larger Sand Island acquired a cable station connecting Hawaii and the Philippines. In 1935, Pan American Airways began development of a seaplane base on Sand Island, and Midway became a regular stop on the San Francisco-Manila route.
In 1938, the US Navy's Hepburn Report recommended immediate development of Midway as a naval air and submarine base. The report recommended that facilities be established at Midway for two patrol plane squadrons; two divisions of submarines; and establishment of a pier, channel, and turning basin inside the lagoon for large auxiliary vessels. The report was accepted, and in 1939, a new southern entrance to the lagoon, known as Brooks Channel, was blasted and dredged by US Army engineers between Sand and Eastern Islands. Brooks Channel then became the usual means of entry to Midway by sea. The United States Navy established a seaplane base on Sand Island and an airfield on the smaller Eastern Island.
Following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the Japanese attacked and captured the American outposts of Guam and Wake Island. At the beginning of 1942, this Japanese aggression had left Midway Atoll as the westernmost American outpost in the central Pacific region. By May 1942, the atoll had become an important forward fuelling station for American submarines and an armed sentinel designed to protect the Hawaiian Islands against a repetition of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Land-based bombers and fighters were stationed on the Eastern Island airfield. Operating from Sand island, long-range PBY Catalina flying boats patrolled the sea approaches to Midway and the Hawaiian Islands. US Marines provided defensive artillery and infantry.
Placing the Midway Operation in its historical context
In March 1942, Japan's Navy General Staff and the Imperial Navy's Combined Fleet had conflicting strategic priorities in the Pacific region. The Navy General Staff wanted an immediate invasion of coastal areas of north-eastern and north-western Australia to deny the United States access to the Australian mainland as a springboard for a counter-attack on Japan's southern defensive perimeter, which Japanese military aggression had expanded to include New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.
Navy General Staff's plan to capture strategically important areas of the Australian mainland was opposed by the Commander in Chief of Japan's Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who wanted the highest priority to be given to drawing the aircraft carriers of the United States Pacific Fleet to a decisive battle at Midway Atoll in the central Pacific where they could be destroyed by the Japanese Navy. Yamamoto had fixed 4 June 1942 as the date for this decisive battle. At this stage, Admiral Yamamoto did not disclose to his colleagues at Navy General Staff that his Midway plan was the first step in a more ambitious Combined Fleet plan to attack and invade Hawaii.
Admiral Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of Japan's Combined Fleet, was the architect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He conceived the plan to use the Midway Operation as a means both to destroy the US Pacific Fleet and lay the foundation for an invasion of Hawaii.
Admiral Yamamoto's opposition to an early invasion of the Australian mainland was supported by Japan's army generals who argued that their forces were over-extended, and that time was needed for Japan to consolidate its massive territorial conquests. Army opposition forced deferment of the Navy General Staff plan to invade the Australian mainland. Navy General Staff then produced a compromise plan that involved isolating Australia from the United States by seizing and fortifying a chain of islands between New Guinea and Samoa. Being acutely conscious of the danger of a defence alliance between Australia and the United States, Japan's Imperial General Headquarters approved the compromise plan on 15 March 1942 as a means of "neutralising" Australia. The military dominated Japanese government believed that Australia could be bullied into surrender if it was compelety isolated from the United States.
Between 2 and 5 April 1942, discussions took place in Tokyo between senior officers of Navy General Staff and Combined Fleet. Admiral Yamamoto's operations officer, Commander Yasuji Watanabe, now disclosed the full scope of Yamamoto's Midway plan, including the fact that it was intended to be the first step towards an invasion of Hawaii. Combined Fleet had assigned the code reference Eastern Operation to its plan to attack Hawaii. Yamamoto's plan was opposed by two officers of the Plans Division of Navy General Staff, Captain Sadatoshi Tomioka, and his air expert, Commander Tatsukichi Miyo, but reluctantly accepted by Navy General Staff when Yamamoto threatened to resign if his plan was not adopted.
While agreeing in principle that the decisive confrontation with the US Pacific Fleet would take place at Midway Atoll, Navy General Staff insisted that the Midway Operation be combined with a simultaneous operation to capture and occupy American islands in the Aleutian chain off the western coast of Alaska. Navy General Staff wanted to anchor Japan's eastern defensive perimeter in the Aleutians to deny the United States military access to the islands in the event that the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Although reluctant to divide his massive naval force, Yamamoto agreed to combine the Aleutian and Midway operations. He saw some value in the Aleutian Operation as a means of diverting American attention from Midway.
Navy General Staff remained highly sceptical about the timing of Yamamoto's Midway plan and refused to agree that the Midway-Aleutian Operations should begin on 3 June 1942 as Yamamoto had demanded. Navy General Staff doubted whether preparations for the complex Midway and Aleutian Operations could be completed by 3 June and insisted that they be deferred until late June. Navy General Staff was unwilling to permit resources already allocated to Operation MO (the capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi) to be reallocated to the Midway-Aleutian offensives.
The Yamamoto plan was then put to Major General Shin'ichi Tanaka at Army General Staff who bluntly rejected it as an unwarranted extension of Japan's eastern defensive perimeter. Tanaka correctly suspected that one of the aims of the Midway Operation was to lay the foundation for an assault on Hawaii.
The Halsey-Doolittle Raid alters Japan's strategic priorities
The retaliatory air raid on military targets in Tokyo and other Japanese cities by Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle’s carrier-launched bombers on 18 April 1942 put an abrupt end to the dispute between Japan's generals and admirals concerning the Midway Operation and dramatically altered Japan’s strategic military priorities. When it became apparent that the Doolittle air raid on Japan had originated from Hawaii, Japan's generals accepted Admiral Yamamoto's argument that the Midway Operation should be directed both to destruction of the US Pacific Fleet and extension of Japan's eastern defensive perimeter to Hawaii and the Aleutians. The generals offered troops for the Aleutian Operation and a reinforced infantry regiment to participate in the capture of Midway Atoll. The generals also assigned three divisions to be trained for an amphibious assault on Hawaii in late 1942.
Despite misgivings about the limited time available for planning and preparing such a complex offensive, Japan's Imperial General Headquarters agreed that the highest priority should be given to the Midway and Aleutian operations.
The full scope of Admiral Yamamoto's Midway and Eastern Operations
The primary objectives of the Japanese attack on America's Midway Atoll in the central Pacific on 4 June 1942 were to complete the destruction of the United States Pacific Fleet, to capture Midway Atoll, and to establish Midway as a springboard from which Japan could launch an attack on the Hawaiian islands in late 1942.
After capturing Midway Atoll and destroying the US Pacific Fleet, the next Japanese target would have been Johnston Island which is located about 850 miles (1360 km) south-east of Midway and about 710 miles (1136 km) south-west of Pearl Harbor. Johnston Island already had an established US Navy airstrip in May 1942. The capture of Johnston Island would have enabled Japanese medium bombers based on the island to join carrier-launched aircraft in sustained attacks on American military and defence-related targets on Oahu. Johnston Island was also intended to be the springboard from which Japanese forces would invade and capture Hawaii, the largest island in the Hawaiian archipelago. Once entrenched on Hawaii, the Japanese intended to tighten a steel noose around the main island of Oahu and hoped to use the fate of its population as an inducement to draw the United States into peace negotiations that would recognise Japanese domination of the whole of the western and most of the central Pacific.
The warship component assembled by Japan's Admiral Yamamoto for the simultaneous Midway and Aleutian offensives included eleven battleships, eight aircraft carriers, twenty-three cruisers, and sixty-seven destroyers. Against this awesome armada, the Americans could only field three aircraft carriers, eight cruisers, and fourteen destroyers. One of the American carriers, USS Yorktown, would go into battle still bearing damage from the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942.
The first US Marines land on Midway
In early 1939, surveys of the defence requirements of Midway, Wake and Johnston Islands were undertaken by the US Navy. These surveys led to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold W. Starke, directing in December 1939 that a US Marine detachment be established as a garrison on Midway as soon as practicable. On 31 May 1940, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District (Hawaii), Rear Admiral Claude Bloch, ordered to Midway an advance reconnaissance party of two Marine officers, eight enlisted Marines, and two US Navy hospital corpsmen. Their primary tasks on arrival were to conduct detailed reconnaissance of the ground on both islands; to propose defensive plans and dispositions for a Marine defense battalion; and to carry out the exacting surveys required for accurate artillery fire. The senior officer of this advance party was Captain Samuel G. Taxis, then commanding the 5-inch seacoast gun batteries of the 3rd Defense Battalion.
On 11 June 1940, Lieutenant Commander Julian Love, USN, the 3rd Defense Battalion medical officer, arrived on Midway to carry out a sanitary and medical survey. He found the islands to be "very pleasant and beautiful", and noted the abundant bird life which he described as "a great source of amusement". It may be doubted whether the Marines who arrived later and laboured with hand tools to dig out gun emplacements and bunkers in the hot sun would agree with these enthusiastic descriptions of Midway.
The Marine Fighting Squadron 221 (VMF-221) on Midway was equipped with twenty-one of these fighters and only seven of the newer F4F-3 Douglas Wildcats. The Brewster F2As were obsolescent even before they reached Navy and Marine squadrons. On the morning of 4 June 1942, these elderly fighters fought a gallant but hopeless battle against the fast and nimble Japanese Zeros escorting Vice Admiral Nagumo's carrier-launched air strike against Midway Atoll. Only ten Marine fighter pilots returned to Midway. Only two of the Marine fighters were still airworthy.
In mid-July 1940, Captain Taxis and his party were relieved by Captain Kenneth W. Benner who commanded the 3-inch anti-aircraft gun batteries of the 3rd Defense Battalion. The tasks assigned to Captain Benner and his small party included surveys related to the anti-aircraft defence of Midway.
After these preliminary surveys had been completed, an advance echelon of the 3rd Defense Battalion sailed for Midway on 23 September 1940. The Midway Detachment, Fleet Marine Force, was commanded by Major C. Roberts and comprised nine officers, 168 enlisted men, and equipment that included one 5-inch battery (two guns). The Midway Detachment was landed on Midway by barges on 29 September 1940, and immediately set to work establishing a camp and setting up the atoll's defences. During the six months that followed, the Marines toiled at emplacing heavy weapons and fire control equipment, and digging holes in the sand for machine-gun bunkers, command posts, underground sleeping quarters, and ammunition magazines. The excavated sand was deposited in thick layers over the roof of each dugout, and the dugout was then camouflaged with brush removed when constructing the airfield.
Most of this arduous work was done with hand tools and no protection from the hot sun. Lieutenant Colonel Stuart M. Charlesworth recalls:
"Considerable effort was expended in filling and manhandling sandbags from the beach areas to the gun positions. This was necessary to preserve the limited camouflage furnished by the scaevola (indigenous brush). Much sweat and ingenuity was required to install the 5-inch guns on top of the 20-foot sand dune fringing Sand Island".
In addition to strictly military activities, the Marines were also required to load and unload cargo from military vessels visiting Midway. The ubiquitous "gooney birds", actually albatrosses, were found by the Marines to be more of a nuisance than "a great source of amusement". The tame birds would often fall into gun pits and then lack the intelligence to find their way out. For the Marines, there was little to relieve the monotony of garrison life on Midway. Recreation was mostly limited to swimming, some boating and fishing, and the occasional outdoor movie which proved an irresistible attraction to the island's teeming bird life. The sooty terns and moaning birds contributed their mournful accompaniment to the film's soundtrack.
Increasing tensions in relations between Japan and the United States during the early days of 1941 caused the Chief of Naval Operations to direct that the rest of the 3rd Defense Battalion be moved to Midway. Admiral Starke also directed that the 6th Defense Battalion, then undergoing training at San Diego, be transferred to Pearl Harbor as a rotational replacement pool for Marine garrisons on Hawaii's sentinal outposts of Midway Atoll, Johnston Island (715 miles or 1,150 km) south-west of Honolulu) and Palmyra Atoll (1,000 miles or 1,600 km south-west of Honolulu). The order was quickly implemented, and the rest of the 3rd Defense Battalion disembarked on Midway on 14 February 1941.
On 4 April 1941, Rear Admiral Bloch issued an operational plan for the defence of outlying Hawaiian islands. Premised upon the possible outbreak of hostilities (with Japan), the admiral emphasised the restricted status of the sea areas around these garrisoned islands and ordered US defence forces on these islands, without parleying, to fire on suspicious and unidentified aircraft, and to stop unidentified and suspicious vessels, if necessary, by firing a shot across the bow. Being aware of Japan's history of military aggression without a formal declaration of war, the admiral warned that air, submarine, or surface raids might precede a declaration of hostilities.
Throughout the summer of 1941, the Marines laboured to construct on Midway's tiny islands the infrastructure required to support a battalion-strength Marine garrison as well as the naval and civil airline populations.
The Marine 6th Defense Battalion arrives on Midway
In early August 1941, an advance detail of the Marine 6th Defense Battalion arrived on Midway to prepare for the relief of the 3rd Defense Battalion. This relief was effected on 11 September 1941, when the main body of the 6th Defense Battalion arrived on Midway.
Forty years after the Battle of Midway, John V. Gardner returned to visit Midway in 1992 with a number of his old comrades from the Sixth Defense Battalion, Fleet Marine Force. He was the Telephone Specialist for Battery C, and stands beside one of the 5-inch guns of that battery that has been relocated from its emplacement and established as a monument to the most important battle of the Pacific War.
The monotonous routine of garrison life was interrupted for the men of the 6th Defense Battalion in November when the Pan American Clipper delivered to Midway one Saburu Kurusu, Japan's special "peace" envoy to the United States. Kurusu was later to become infamous as a member of the Japanese diplomatic team whose function was to keep the American government distracted by the prospect of peace in the Pacific while Japanese aircraft carriers were positioned off Hawaii for the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. Bad weather prevented his seaplane resuming its flight to the United States, and Kurusu was forced to remain on Midway for three days as a resident of the Pan Air hotel. To prevent Kurusu becoming aware of how small the Marine garrison was, even cooks and messmen were armed and required to participate in a deceptive show of strength for the Japanese envoy.
The absence of "hardened" defences on Midway
Although Midway now appeared to bristle with defensive firepower, none of the gun emplacements or machine-gun bunkers were "hardened" with reinforced concrete. The large calibre gun emplacements, machine-gun bunkers, command posts, communication facilities, and underground sleeping quarters had all been simply dug out of the sand. The seacoast guns and anti-aircraft guns were protected against strafing, and air and off-shore naval bombardment only by sandbag walls. The machine-gun bunkers, command posts, and underground sleeping quarters were protected by sandbags and roofing comprised of slabs of wood supporting thick layers of sand.
The beaches were guarded against amphibious landings by machine-gun bunkers with overlapping fields of fire, but Sand and Eastern Islands were too small to provide defence in depth behind the beach defences. If a Japanese amphibious landing force breached the line of beach defences, there was little to stop them pouring more troops through that gap.
The establishment of a Marine Air Group on Midway
The Marine Corps concept of rounded defence of advanced bases required ground forces to be supported by Marine air units. A major step towards achieving that air support had occurred on 1 August 1941 when the Naval Air Station, Midway, was commissioned under the command of Commander Cyril T. Simard. Simard was a veteran naval aviator who would later play a key role in the defence of Midway against the Japanese attack on 4 June 1942. As soon as the airfield on Eastern Island was completed, Marine Air Group 21 would be transferred from Ewa Field on Oahu to Midway. On 19 November 1941, a Marine aviation advance detail arrived on Eastern Island to prepare the airfield for use by Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 231 (VMSB-231).
With the Japanese indicating no willingness to halt their brutal and unprovoked war against China, and the United States unwilling to raise trade embargoes on war-related exports to Japan until that happened, Washington was now preparing for the very real possibility of armed conflict with the Japanese. On 5 December 1941, the USS Lexington took aboard the aircraft of VMSB-231 for delivery to Midway. The young Marine pilots lacked combat experience, and had only received the bare minimum of training for war. These aircraft were scheduled to land on Eastern Island on 7 December 1941.
Pearl Harbor and the first Japanese attack on Midway - 7 December 1941
At 0630 hours (Midway Time), the first news of Japan's treacherous sneak attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor reached Midway. Midway was immediately placed on a war footing. The 6th Defense Battalion went to general quarters - ammunition was issued, foxholes were dug, communications were checked, and a total blackout was imposed. The arrival of VMSB-231 on Eastern airfield was postponed because Lexington had been diverted to search for the Japanese carrier strike force that had devastated the fleet at Pearl Harbor.
At 1842, with night closing in on the atoll, an alert Marine lookout on the south-west of Sand Island spotted lights flashing out to sea. The lights were almost certainly communications between the Japanese destroyers Ushio and Sazanami. These two destroyers had been designated the Midway Destruction Unit. Their mission was to neutralise the Naval Air Station on Midway.
At 2130 radar contact was made with moving surface objects to seaward and to the south-west of Sand Island. Lookouts with binoculars were able to discern dark shapes to seaward in the vicinity of the radar contacts. With their twin 5-inch guns trained on Midway, the two Japanese destroyers began their first firing run. At 2135, the first Japanese salvo shattered the silence and carried the war to Midway. Initially, the Japanese shells fell short of Sand Island, but as the range closed, the firing patterns began to creep up Sand Island towards the seaplane hangar and the power house. The 5-inch seacoast battery on the south-western end of Sand Island (Battery A) survived a close strike by one salvo.
A posthumous Medal of Honor awarded to First Lieutenant George H. Cannon, 6th Defense Battalion
A shell from another salvo hit the command post of Battery H. The Battery Commander, Marine 1st Lieutenant George H. Cannon, suffered grave injuries. Despite the seriousness of his condition, and continuing heavy loss of blood, Lieutenant Cannon refused medical evacuation. He remained at his post until his injured men had been evacuated and communications had been restored. Cannon was finally removed forcibly, but the gallant Marine died shortly afterwards at the battalion aid station from loss of blood. He was posthumously awarded the first Medal of Honor awarded to a Marine in World War II.
First Lieutenant George H. Cannon, was mortally wounded when a shell from a Japanese destroyer scored a direct hit on his command post on the night of 7 December 1941. He refused medical evacuation until his wounded men had been evacuated and communications restored. He was then forcibly removed from his post, but died shortly afterwards from massive blood loss. He was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously.
The Japanese destroyers now commenced their second firing run, moving in a north-easterly direction up the long axis of Sand Island. The seaplane hangar was hit, and the resulting flames illuminated fresh targets for the Japanese. Ashore, some confusion reigned. Telephone lines were jammed, and it was not until 2148 that Lieutenant Colonel Shannon was given permission to engage the enemy with his Marine shore batteries.
At 2153, orders were received by the Marine searchlight batteries to illuminate the Japanese ships. One Japanese destroyer was immediately illuminated under the guns of Battery A, but the 5-inch guns of this battery had been rendered ineffectual by an earlier salvo that had disrupted firing data and fire command communications. It is doubtful whether any incident on this night demonstrated more clearly the extreme vulnerability of the gun emplacements on Midway to damage from flat trajectory naval bombardment.
At this point only Battery D, located on the south-eastern shore of Sand Island, was able to bring its 3-inch anti-aircraft guns to bear on the Japanese destroyers. The destroyers were now close enough to the reef for Captain Jean H. Buckner to see the Japanese Navy battle flag flying from the foremast of the lead destroyer. Buckner ordered his gunners to fire. Battery D was then joined by the 5-inch guns of Battery B on Eastern Island. By 2158, as Marine fire intensified and became better coordinated, the Japanese destroyers ceased firing and withdrew under cover of their own smoke screen.
The very skilful Japanese night attack caused serious damage to the seaplane hangar, and damaged the power house and other buildings on Sand Island. The 6th Defense Battalion lost two killed and ten wounded. The Naval Air Station lost two killed.
This first Japanese attack on Midway provided the Marines with a foretaste of the well-honed night warfare skills of the Imperial Japanese Navy, and its willingness to carry out important naval activities during the hours of darkness.
The Japanese night attack on Midway on 7 December 1941 was limited to naval gunfire from two destroyers because Midway was not a high priority target for the Imperial Japanese Navy at that time. Guam and Wake Island were the high priority targets because their capture would effectively cut the American line of communications between Hawaii and the Philippines.
The Fall of Guam
On 10 December 1942, the five thousand troops of Japan's elite South Seas Detachment stormed ashore on Guam and quickly overcame the three hundred strong Marine garrison that was equipped with no weapons larger than .30 calibre machine guns.
The Japanese assault on Wake Island
The mission to capture Wake Island had been assigned to Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue's Fourth Fleet, and aircraft from the admiral's base at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands were on their way to bomb Wake while the attack on Pearl Harbor was underway. Wake had no radar, and the attack took the defenders by surprise. Eight of the Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats of Wake's Marine Fighting Squadron VMF-211 were destroyed on the ground. On 11 December 1942, a Japanese amphibious force comprising cruisers, destroyers and transports attempted a landing on Wake Island which was garrisoned by 450 men of the Marine 1st Defense Battalion. The Japanese force was greeted with a well directed barrage from the Marine 5-inch coastal batteries. The destroyer Hayate was blown apart, and three destroyers, a light cruiser, and a transport were damaged. The strength of the defence caused the shocked Japanese to withdraw hastily, and they suffered further heavy loss, including the loss of another destroyer, when attacked by the remaining four Wildcats of VMF-211. Thereafter, Wake was bombed continuously and effectively from the Japanese base at Kwajalein.
The SB2U-3 Vindicator dive-bomber was already obsolete when eighteen of them were assigned for front-line service with Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 231 (VMSB-231) on Midway. The Marine pilots jokingly called their elderly planes "vibrators". They were slow moving targets for the swarms of deadly Zero fighters that protected the Japanese carrier force that attacked Midway on 4 June 1942.
The Marines on Midway acquire a Scout Bombing Squadron
The defenders of Midway were aware that Wake Island had repulsed a Japanese amphibious invasion and was undergoing continuous air attack. The PBY patrol flying boats of VP-21 had all been withdrawn from Midway, and the daily food ration was reduced in case Midway was cut off from Hawaii. In the expectation that they could also face an amphibious assault, the Marines toiled to strengthen their defences.
On 17 December, the Marines were heartened by the arrival on Midway of the seventeen obsolescent SB2U-3 Vindicator dive-bombers of Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 231 (VMSB-231). This squadron had been aboard Lexington when the Japanese treacherously struck the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and had been diverted with Lexington to hunt for the Japanese carrier force. The seventeen elderly Vindicators were subsequently shepherded from Hickham Field on Oahu across 1,137 miles of open ocean to Midway by a PBY patrol flying boat. First Lieutenant David W. Silvey:
"The men stood on top of their gun emplacement and cheered when the planes droned overhead. They represented a real Christmas present."
The Marine squadron's full complement of eighteen dive-bombers would be achieved with the arrival of an eighteenth Vindicator ten days later.
On Christmas Eve additional welcome reinforcements arrived aboard USS Wright. These were Batteries A and C of the 4th Defense Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, equipped with 5-inch seacoast guns. The new arrivals also brought with them four 7-inch naval guns and four 3-inch naval guns.
The fall of Wake Island provides Midway with a fighter squadron
Wake Island now played a role in bolstering the defences of Midway. The Japanese launched a second and more powerful amphibious assault on Wake Island under cover of darkness on the morning of 23 December 1941. This attack was supported by aircraft from the fleet carriers Soryu and Hiryu. This time the Japanese warships stayed out of range of the Marine batteries, while one thousand Japanese marines in assault barges and patrol boats quietly approached the reefs surrounding Wake. Although two of the larger Japanese landing craft grounded on the reef, the Japanese were able to cross the reef at several places on smaller boats and rafts and establish themselves ashore. With most of his Marines manning seacoast and anti-aircraft guns, and widely scattered machine-gun positions around the lengthy coastlines of the three islands comprising Wake atoll, Marine commander, Major James P. Devereux, had less than one hundred Marines available as infantry to oppose one thousand Japanese troops. The beleaguered Marines were clearly doomed unless reinforcements arrived immediately.
The US Navy had been initially committed to the relief of Wake, and the carriers USS Saratoga and USS Lexington had been assigned to the relief, together with a Marine fighter squadron aboard Saratoga. However, the slow movement of the relieving force and indecision on the part of senior navy officers in Washington and Pearl Harbor permitted the Japanese to land while both American carrier task forces were too far away to lend their powerful assistance to the Marine defenders. When the acting commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral William S. Pye, heard that the Japanese had landed on Wake, he decided to abandon the Marines on Wake to their fate. Pye ordered the relief force, including Marine reinforcements aboard the seaplane tender USS Tangier, to withdraw. The recall was greeted with dismay and anger by many on board the American relieving force.
On learning that the relief force had been recalled, the Marines on Wake had no option but to surrender or face annihilation. On 23 December, Wake was surrendered to the Japanese.
Saratoga had been carrying Marine Fighting Squadron 221 (VMF-221), a squadron of fourteen obsolescent F2A-3 Brewster Buffalo fighters that were intended to reinforce the depleted Marine Fighting Squadron 211 (VMF-211) on Wake. On Christmas Day, a welcome gift arrived for the Marines on Midway in the form of these fourteen elderly Buffalo fighters.
On 26 December, the seaplane tender USS Tangier arrived at Midway. Tangier was carrying reinforcements that had been intended for Wake, but were now to be employed to strengthen the defences of Midway. These reinforcements from the 4th Defense Battalion included another seacoast 5-inch battery, twelve anti-aircraft machine-guns, machine-gunners, an aviation support contingent for VMF-221, and badly needed equipment, including radar.
The seaplane tender USS Tangier arrived at Midway on 26 December 1941 with Marines, guns, and equipment that were originally intended to reinforce the Marine garrison on Wake Atoll. When Wake and its Marine garrison were captured by the Japanese, these vital reinforcements were used to bolster the meagre defences of Midway.
At the beginning of 1942, Midway was now garrisoned by the 6th Defense Battalion, with substantial reinforcement from the 4th Defense Battalion, and one fighter and one scout bomber squadron. On Eastern Island the airstrip had now acquired facilities appropriate to a major airbase. Fortunately for pilot morale, the Marines on Midway were unaware that their elderly aircraft lagged far behind the combat performances of their Japanese counterparts, and especially, the nimble Zeke fighter, more commonly known as the Zero.
The Imperial Japanese Navy pays Midway more unwelcome visits
During twilight general quarters on 25 January 1942, the Japanese submarine I-173 quietly surfaced at 1748 hours off the entrance to Brooks Channel (the man-made channel between Sand and Eastern Islands), and opened fire on the radio masts on Sand Island. The submarine was clearly visible from shore in the afterglow from the sun, and the four 3-inch guns of Battery D on the south-eastern shore of Sand Island provided a quick response that bracketed the enemy intruder. Perhaps surprised by the speed and accuracy of the Marine return fire, the Japanese commander crash-dived his submarine at 1751. This brisk three minute action caused no damage on Midway.
The Japanese submarine that had shelled Midway did not escape unscathed. While under way on the surface on the morning of 27 January, I-173 was torpedoed by the American submarine USS Gudgeon.
The Imperial Japanese Navy visited Midway again on 8 February. On this occasion, a submarine surfaced at twilight off the southern shore of Sand Island and began firing at the radio masts. A fast response from the two 5-inch guns of Battery A on the south-western side of Sand Island caused the submarine to break off the action and submerge. Damage ashore was only slight.
Two days later, at twilight on 10 February, a Japanese submarine surfaced off the entrance to Brooks Channel. On this occasion, the Marine Air Group at Midway was prepared and waiting for the intruder. Two Marine Buffalo fighters had been flying the sunset anti-submarine patrol, and were above Midway when the submarine surfaced. The Japanese commander only had time to fire two rounds that splashed harmlessly into the lagoon before his submarine was bombed and strafed by the Marine pilots. The submarine broke off action and crash-dived. The hot receptions provided to unfriendly Japanese visitors were clearly effective. After this last visit, the Marines were afforded a lengthy respite from shelling by Japanese submarines.
The Marines on Midway learn to live underground
The risk of attack from the sea or air at very short notice required the Marines on Midway to adopt and adapt to a largely underground existence. Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. McGlashan, Operations Officer, 6th Defense Battalion:
"(On Midway)…underground living prevailed, except while in contact with the enemy or under attack… Breakfast, supper, and a midnight snack with hot coffee were served to all positions from the central galley in food containers by truck. Since we stood a morning and evening stand-by, there was not time to serve a noon meal during the day, as the process of distributing food to the widely dispersed gun positions by food container and getting them returned and cleaned for the next meal was a lengthy one. All food was prepared at the main galley in the newly completed barracks where the men would also go during the day in increments to bathe. The lack of a noon meal was quite disconcerting to new arrivals, but they soon became accustomed to it.."
All activities away from battle stations had to be carried on during the day, and after the evening stand-by, everyone went underground for the night except for the men on watch above ground. Sleeping underground has its good points as it is quiet, there is no early sun to bother one after a night on watch, and there is a great feeling of security from surprise submarine attack. It is true that the dugouts were often hot in the summer months and cold in winter, and at first were much too crowded and lacked proper ventilation, but by and large it was a very pleasant existence."
Marine Fighing Squadron 221 sees its first air combat
On 1 March 1942, the two Marine squadrons on Midway and their headquarters were reorganised and renamed Marine Air Group 22. No additional aircraft were assigned to MAG-22 which, for operational purposes ,still comprised one scout bomber squadron (VMSB-241) and one fighter squadron (VMF-221). On 20 April, Major Lofton R. Henderson arrived on Midway to take command of the scout bombers of VMSB-241.
On 10 March, pilots of VMF-221 saw their first air combat when radar detected an enemy intruder approximately forty-five miles west of Midway. Twelve Buffalo fighters under Captain Robert M. Haynes were vectored out to intercept the intruder which turned out to be a Japanese four-engined Kawanishi 97 "Mavis" patrol flying boat. The Japanese aircraft had almost certainly come from Wake Island. After several firing passes by Marine pilots, the Japanese flying boat fell into the sea. One American pilot was wounded in the engagement.
Apart from being the first enemy aircraft shot down by VMF-221, this action has particular historical significance. It is very likely that this was the Japanese flying boat that had been assigned to carry out a photographic reconnaissance of Midway to provide intelligence for the major Japanese assault on Midway planned for early June 1942. The Marines would first learn that they were the intended target of a major Japanese amphibious operation when the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, paid them a personal visit on 2 May 1942.
JAPANESE PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE MIDWAY OFFENSIVE
The very complex Japanese Navy plan for the Midway and Aleutian operations required careful cooperation by five separate groups of warships, and precise coordination of ship movements over a very large area of the Pacific Ocean stretching from Alaska to the central Pacific. All of this had to be achieved while maintaining strict radio silence. A huge fleet of about 200 Japanese warships, transports, and oilers was assembled for the Midway and Aleutian offensives. It included eleven battleships, five large fleet aircraft carriers, three light aircraft carriers, twenty-three cruisers, sixty-seven destroyers, and twenty-two submarines. The Japanese fleet was divided into five main commands: Main Force (Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, aboard the giant battleship Yamato ), First Carrier Striking Force, or Kido Butai, (Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, who led the carrier attack on Pearl Harbor), Midway Invasion Force (Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo), Northern Aleutians Force, and the Advance Submarine Force.
Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher was the commander of the American carrier task forces at the vital battles of Coral Sea and Midway. As senior tactical commander, he played an important part in securing Allied victories in both battles. In an extraordinary act of patriotism and generosity, he passed overall command of the American carrier task forces at Midway to Rear Admiral Spruance after his own flagship USS Yorktown had been disabled by Japanese dive bombers and after the Americans had already destroyed three of Japan's most powerful carriers.
The Japanese offensive against America's Aleutian Islands off the western coast of Alaska would take place on 3 June 1942, and was intended by Navy General Staff to provide a northern anchor for Japan's eastern defensive perimeter in the Pacific. Admiral Yamamoto hoped that the Aleutian operation would distract the attention of the United States from Midway Atoll which was the focus of his main attack.
Planning the attack on Midway Atoll
The Japanese had planned that their Midway offensive would take place in three separate phases. In the first phase, the large fleet aircraft carriers of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's powerful First Carrier Striking Force (Kido Butai ) would approach Midway Atoll from the north-west on 4 June 1942. In the pre-dawn darkness, Nagumo would launch aircraft from his four carriers to attack the American air and land defences on Sand and Eastern Islands. When the American defences on Midway had been neutralised by Nagumo's carrier-launched air attacks, the second phase would begin. Warships and transports of the Midway Invasion Force commanded by Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo would approach Midway from the south-west and land troops to crush all resistance, occupy the islands, and prepare the airfield to receive Japanese combat aircraft. Having neutralised Midway Atoll and prepared it for Japanese occupation, the third phase required Vice Admiral Nagumo to wait in ambush with his carrier force for the anticipated arrival of carriers of the United States Pacific Fleet on or soon after 6 June. When the American Pacific Fleet arrived from Pearl Harbor to defend Midway, Admiral Nagumo would destroy it. Admiral Yamamoto would hold the powerful battleships of his Main Force in reserve west of Midway to provide any support that Vice Admiral Nagumo might require to destroy the American fleet.
The man responsible for planning the Japanese amphibious landing on Midway Atoll was Commander Yasumi Toyama. Toyama laboured under a number of serious disadvantages. The only maps of Midway Atoll in his possession were old and likely to be unreliable. Toyama had no aerial photographs of the atoll because the pilots of Marine Fighter Squadron VMF-221 had intercepted and shot down a Japanese four-engined Kawanishi 97 "Mavis" patrol flying boat that had been approaching Midway on 10 March 1942. This Japanese flying boat had come from Wake Island and had been assigned to carry out a photographic reconnaissance of Midway to provide intelligence for the Japanese amphibious assault on Midway in June.
Toyama had no intelligence concerning the defences of Midway and the number of defenders. The Navy planners expected to face about 750 US Marines, and that would have been the pre-war strength of the Midway Detachment, Fleet Marine Force. The Army estimate was more realistic; they expected that the Marine strength would be closer to 2,000. It was anticipated that the Marines might have between 50-60 planes on the atoll.
Toyama planned a simultaneous attack on Sand and Eastern Islands from the southern side of the atoll where the two islands were close to the reef. The Japanese landing force would number about 5,000, and would be spearheaded by two elite assault units - Captain Minoru Ota's 2nd Combined Special Naval Landing Force numbering about one thousand five hundred marines, and the Army's Ichiki Detachment which numbered about two thousand men and was commanded by Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki.
Captain Ota's marines would land on Sand Island, and Colonel Ichiki's troops would land on Eastern Island. Both landings would require flat-bottomed landing boats, and the Japanese Navy had none. Toyama would have to swallow his pride and borrow landing boats from the Japanese Army.
Planning the destruction of the United States Pacific Fleet
The Japanese Navy planners believed that warships of the United States Pacific Fleet would be sent from Hawaii to defend Midway as soon as Admiral Nimitz became aware that America's vital military outpost was under Japanese attack. The warships of Admiral Nagumo's First Carrier Striking Force (Kido Butai ) would then destroy the American aircraft carriers and complete the work begun by him at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.
In planning the Midway offensive, the Japanese military leadership was influenced by a number of dangerous assumptions. Buoyed by easy initial victories produced by surprise attacks on British and American outposts in the Pacific region that were unprepared for war with Japan, many Japanese military leaders believed that Japan's samurai warrior tradition made their nation invincible in war. They believed that Americans lacked courage, fighting skills and discipline, and having inflicted heavy damage on the United States Pacific Fleet during their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, they assumed that the United States Navy would thereafter adopt a largely defensive posture in response to further Japanese military aggression.
The Japanese Navy planners believed that their Midway offensive would take the United States completely by surprise, and that Japan would retain the initiative throughout the complex offensive. The assumption that the Japanese attack would take the Americans by surprise led to Japan's First Carrier Striking Force (Kido Butai ) being assigned two major missions at Midway. The first was to neutralise the defences of the two Midway islands by aerial bombardment. When the first mission had been completed, the second, and more vital mission, was to lie in wait off Midway for the expected arrival of aircraft carriers of the United States Pacific Fleet on or soon after 6 June, and destroy the American fleet. The Japanese appear to have failed to appreciate that both missions could be seriously compromised if unforeseen circumstances forced them to be undertaken simultaneously.
The arrogant belief in Japan's invincibility, and the underrating of American military capabilities and response, would be reflected in the planning and execution of the Midway offensive with serious consequences for Japan.
American code-breakers learn of Japan's plan to attack Midway
As the Japanese invasion forces converged on the Aleutian and Midway islands, Japan's admirals were supremely confident that the Americans would remain unaware that Midway was their primary target until the first bombs began falling on the Midway islands. The confidence of the Japanese admirals was misplaced. American naval intelligence and Allied code-breakers had achieved considerable success in deciphering the Japanese Navy's signal code JN 25.
The commander of the US Navy's Combat Intelligence Unit (Station Hypo) at Hawaii, Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, had analysed Japanese signal intercepts and correctly predicted the Japanese attempt to capture Port Moresby that was frustrated in the Battle of the Coral Sea. In the second half of April 1942, Commander Rochefort was becoming convinced from aspects of intercepted signal traffic between major units of Japan's Combined Fleet that the Japanese were preparing to launch another major naval offensive in the Pacific. Rochefort also noticed that the code reference "AF" was increasingly appearing in Japanese Navy signal traffic as a destination. Rochefort and his team of code-breakers began to concentrate their efforts on identifying the location of AF. It was recalled that two Japanese flying boats had made an abortive attack on Pearl Harbor in March 1942. The flying boats had refuelled from a submarine at French Frigate Shoals, a tiny atoll lying between Pearl Harbor and Japanese-occupied Wake Island and south-east of Midway. An intercepted signal from the flying boats mentioned that they had passed near AF. The only significant land feature in that area was Midway Atoll, and Rochefort was now convinced that AF referred to Midway. He was also convinced that Midway was the target of the impending Japanese naval offensive.
The Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, was persuaded by Rochefort that Midway was the probable target of the next Japanese naval offensive. On 2 May 1942, Admiral Nimitz flew from Pearl Harbor to Midway and spent several hours examining its defences. Nimitz did not mention any specific threat to Midway but he asked the senior Navy and Marine officers, Commander Cyril T. Simard and Lieutenant Colonel Harold Shannon, what they would need to defend Midway against a major Japanese attack. When Simard and Shannon told Admiral Nimitz what they needed, he promised to provide it.
Some of Rochefort's superiors in Washington doubted the correctness of his conclusion that AF referred to Midway. They believed that Hawaii, Alaska, or even the American West Coast were more likely targets of a major Japanese naval offensive. The Commander in Chief US Fleet (COMINCH), Admiral Ernest J. King, shared their doubts about AF being a reference to Midway. Admiral King felt that AF was more likely to be a reference to Hawaii. Fortunately for Commander Rochefort, he had won the full support of Admiral Nimitz for his conclusion that AF referred to Midway. Despite that support, Washington remained sceptical, and Rochefort accepted that he could not offer concrete proof of the meaning of AF. Around 10 May 1942, Rochefort came up with a plan that he felt could identify AF beyond all reasonable doubt. Admiral Nimitz approved what was to become one of the most famous ruses of the Pacific War. Midway was instructed by undersea cable to transmit by radio in plain English a false message to the effect that the atoll's machinery for producing fresh water had broken down and that Midway was short of fresh water. Midway sent the fake message. It was picked up by a Japanese signal unit on a Pacific island, and the message was passed on by radio to Tokyo. The Japanese signal reported "AF is short of water". Rochefort now had his proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Nimitz began assembling whatever ships he could muster to meet the threat from Japan. Yorktown had been badly damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea and was undergoing repairs to hull damage at Tonga. The carriers Enterprise and Hornet had arrived too late to take part in that battle and were patrolling off the Solomons. This turned out to be fortunate. The two carriers were sighted by a Japanese patrol plane, and this sighting caused the Japanese to believe that they might be out of the way when the Japanese struck at Midway. Nimitz ordered the three carriers to return to Hawaii as quickly as possible.
Despite the overwhelming size and power of the Japanese Midway forces opposing them, and the significant advantages possessed by the Japanese Imperial Navy in number of aircraft carriers, training of pilots, battle experience, and superior equipment, advance knowledge of Japan's military plans gave the Americans a vital advantage. They would know the dispositions of the approaching Japanese invasion forces, the direction each force would take as it approached Midway, and the approximate time of arrival of each force at Midway. With this vital knowledge, the United States Navy could prepare its own ambush for Admiral Nagumo's First Carrier Striking Force even as it was still approaching Midway from the north-west.
The Americans prepare to ambush Japan's First Carrier Striking Force off Midway
Against the awesome Japanese Midway invasion armada, the Americans would only be able to field three aircraft carriers, eight cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and nineteen submarines. These warships were effectively all that remained to the United States Pacific Fleet for the looming confrontation at Midway after Japan's devastating sneak attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.
Admiral Nimitz decided to concentrate his three aircraft carriers in two task forces on the northern approaches to Midway Atoll. He knew that his warships would be outnumbered by the Japanese, and that many of his Navy aircrews had little or no actual combat experience. To reduce the heavy odds against his ships and men, the Admiral intended to ambush Vice Admiral Nagumo's First Carrier Striking Force while its aircraft were engaged in bombing Midway if surprise could be achieved. While awaiting the arrival of the Japanese, Nimitz strengthened the ground and air defences of Midway. Eastern Island was crammed with US Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Air Corps aircraft. Many of the pilots and aircrew members on Midway lacked experience with the aircraft they were flying, and few had combat experience. Many of the planes on Midway were discards from US Navy carriers whose performance fell far below that of aircraft Japanese fleet carriers.
The American carrier task forces were placed under the overall command of Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher, whose aircraft carrier USS Yorktown had only recently returned to Pearl Harbor carrying significant battle damage from Coral Sea. The integrity of the Yorktown's hull would need to be assured by repairs to external plating and, in particular, replacement of water-tight doors damaged when a 250-pound bomb penetrated several decks before exploding.
Task Force 16, comprising the carriers USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, six cruisers, and nine destroyers, was placed under the command of Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance. Admiral Spruance left Pearl Harbor and set course for Midway on 28 May 1942. Task Force 17 was delayed at Pearl Harbor for a further two days because Yorktown was still undergoing repairs to her battle damage. Task Force 17, comprising Yorktown, two cruisers and five destroyers, departed Pearl Harbor for Midway on 30 May with Admiral Fletcher aboard. On 2 June, the two American carrier task forces were about 200 miles (320 km) north of the Midway Islands, and Admiral Fletcher waited for news of the location of Vice Admiral Nagumo's carrier force.
The first Stage of the Japanese Offensive begins off Alaska, 3 June 1942
In furtherance of the Japanese Midway plan, carrier-launched aircraft of the Northern Aleutians Force struck at the Alaskan town of Dutch Harbor on 3 June 1942. Being aware that the real purpose of the Japanese offensive was the capture of Midway Atoll, the United States refused to allow its attention to be diverted to the northern Pacific.
The refusal of the Americans to be distracted by the diversionary offensive against Alaskan islands was the first of a series of breakdowns in the overly complex Japanese Midway plan. The Japanese could not decode American signal traffic, and they were forced to make educated guesses about the likely direction and nature of the American response to their attack on the Midway islands. They believed that a response would be mounted by the United States Pacific Fleet from Hawaii, but only after its commander learned of the Japanese attack on Midway planned to begin on 4 June. This scenario would give Japan's invasion forces at least two days, or until 6 June, to occupy the two Midway islands before Admiral Nagumo's carrier force would be likely to engage American warships. While awaiting the expected arrival of American warships at Midway, the Japanese would be able to employ this time usefully by crushing all resistance, occupying the Midway islands, and preparing the airfield for use by Japanese combat aircraft.
The underrating of American military capabilities and response would have unpleasant consequences for Japan. The Japanese Midway plan provided for deployment of three submarine cordons between Midway and Hawaii to detect and give warning of the approach of American warships. However, by the time the Japanese submarine cordon was in place on 3 June, the two American carrier task forces had already reached waters north of Midway, and the Japanese invasion forces converging on Midway were unaware of the reception that Admiral Fletcher was preparing for them.
On the Midway islands, American marines were hard at work strengthening fortifications, and Navy PBY Catalina flying boats and Army Air Force B-17s were conducting reconnaissance sweeps of the sea to the west and north of the islands in an attempt to locate the approaching Japanese. On 3 June, one of the Catalinas located the troop transports and covering warships of Vice Admiral Kondo's Midway Invasion Force approaching the islands from the south-west. Army Air Force B-17 bombers from Midway attacked the troop transports and the covering warships without inflicting significant damage. While this preliminary skirmish was taking place, Rear Admiral Fletcher was placing his three carriers in position to launch a flank attack on Vice Admiral Nagumo's carriers while they were occupied in attacking the American base on Midway.
Vice Admiral Nagumo's First Carrier Striking Force approaches Midway
During the day and night of 3 June, thick fog had shrouded Admiral Nagumo's First Carrier Striking Force as it approached the Midway Islands from the north-west. The Nagumo force comprised four of Japan's most powerful aircraft carriers- Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu - and was escorted by two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers (each capable of launching five seaplane scouts), one light cruiser, and twelve destroyers. This was not the same carrier striking force that had launched the devastating surprise attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. The commander was the same man, but two powerful fleet carriers were missing on this occasion. The carrier Shokaku had been severely damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea less than a month earlier, and the carrier Zuikaku had lost too many aircraft and aircrews in that battle to be capable of involvement in the Japanese offensive at Midway.
Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo commanded Japan's Carrier Striking Force at Midway.
On the bridge of Akagi, Admiral Nagumo was pleased to have thick fog screening his carrier force as it neared Midway, but the bad weather conditions had also prevented air reconnaissance sweeps by his seaplanes of areas of sea from which American warships might threaten his ships. While the Japanese Navy planners had been confident that the Americans would not learn of the Japanese presence until their first aircraft struck Midway at dawn on 4 June, Admiral Nagumo was a cautious commander and it troubled him deeply that Japanese intelligence had provided him with no information on the whereabouts of the American aircraft carriers. The reduction of his battle strength, owing to the absence of Shokaku and Zuikaku, was also weighing on Nagumo's mind as his ships approached Midway.
Aboard his giant battleship Yamato , several hundred miles to the west of Midway, Admiral Yamamoto was monitoring American radio traffic on the Midway islands, and noted a sharply increased volume as his ships approached the islands. He was also aware of American reconnaissance aircraft sweeping the western approaches to Midway. All of this activity raised a real possibility that the Americans had become aware of the approach of Japanese forces and a need to alert Admiral Nagumo that his arrival might be expected. However, Yamamoto chose to maintain radio silence. Being unaware that the Americans already knew about the impending Japanese offensive against Midway, this course may well have appeared the correct one from Admiral Yamamoto's viewpoint, but it left Admiral Nagumo completely unaware that his carriers might be sailing into danger as they approached Midway from the north-west.
Vice Admiral Nagumo launches his first attack wave at the Midway Islands, 4 June 1942
At 0430 hours (4.30 a.m.) on 4 June 1942, Vice Admiral Chuichu Nagumo's First Carrier Striking Force reached its launching point about 220 miles (354 km) north-west of America's Midway Atoll. The thick fog had cleared during the night, and the first attack wave of 108 Japanese warplanes was launched towards Midway in the pre-dawn darkness. Thirty-six Aichi D3A dive-bombers (Allied code-name "Val") were provided by carriers Akagi and Kaga. Thirty-six Nakajima B5N level bombers (Allied code-name "Kate") were provided by carriers Hiryu and Soryu. Nine Mitsubishi A6M2 fighters (Allied code-name "Zero") from each carrier provided an escort of thirty-six fighters. The commander of the first attack wave was Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga
LIEUTENANT ADY SIGHTS ADMIRAL NAGUMO'S CARRIERS
It is 0552 hours (5.52 a.m.) on 4 June 1942, and Lieutenant Howard P. Ady, piloting PBY Catalina flying boat Number 4V58 is about to report the sighting that Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher is anxiously waiting to hear aboard his flagship USS Yorktown: "Two carriers and main body ships, carriers in front, course 135, speed 35." Admiral Nagumo's powerful carrier force has been discovered as it approaches under cover of darkness to strike America's Midway Atoll from carrier Hiryu. The ever-cautious Nagumo held back twenty-seven Kate level bombers in the hangars of both Akagi and Kaga, eighteen Val dive-bombers in the hangars of both Hiryu and Soryu, and twelve Zero fighters on each carrier. The Kates would be armed with torpedoes instead of fragmentation bombs to protect his warships in case danger should threaten from American carriers.
Scout seaplanes had also been launched from the Japanese carrier force from 0430 to provide advance warning of any approach by an American carrier force. Scout seaplane Number 4, launched from the cruiser Tone, was destined to play a significant role in the events of that morning.
It does not appear to have occurred to Vice Admiral Nagumo that his carrier force would be better placed to resist a possible American carrier attack if all aircraft of the first Midway attack wave had been drawn from two rather than all four carriers. The course taken by Nagumo meant that all four Japanese carriers would have to keep their flight decks clear to recover returning aircraft from the first attack wave, and would delay strike bombers and fighters being brought up from the hangars to respond quickly if an American carrier threat materialised. This error would cost Nagumo dearly.
While Nagumo's first attack wave flew towards Midway, the First Carrier Striking Force was steaming to a point about 140 miles (224 km) north-west of Midway where the Japanese commander expected to recover the returning aircraft of his first attack wave shortly after 0800. The four fleet carriers were steaming at battle speed and in battle disposition that approximated a square box. The flagship Akagi led the formation on the right side of the box with Kaga following. Hiryu led on the left side followed by Soryu. The screen of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers was deployed around the carrier formation in a rough circle.
"Many planes heading Midway bearing 320 degrees, distance 150"
The first report of Vice Admiral Nagumo's approaching carrier strike force was received on Midway from a patrolling Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boat piloted by Lieutenant Howard P. Ady. At 0530, he spotted the Japanese carrier fleet through a break in heavy cloud cover, and immediately sent the following radio message to Midway: "carrier bearing 320, distance 180". This sighting appeared to place a Japanese carrier force 180 miles (288 km) north-west of Midway Atoll. The siren on Midway's Eastern Island airbase sounded its warning, and all Navy, Marine and Army aircraft on the island were ordered to start their engines. Captain Simard was not going to repeat the mistakes of Pearl Harbor where so many American aircraft were destroyed by the Japanese on the ground.
The minutes ticked by without any radar contact being made. Lieutenant (j.g.) William A. Chase had been patrolling in his PBY Catalina the sector adjacent to and south of Lieutenant Ady. At 0545, his observer sighted two large groups of aircraft headed for Midway. Time was of the essence, and without waiting to encode, Chase transmitted in plain English the famous warning:
"Many planes heading Midway bearing 320 degrees, distance 150".
After his initial sighting of the Japanese carrier fleet, Lieutenant Ady had sought cover in the clouds and circled the area. At 0552, another break in the clouds provided him with the sighting that Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher was waiting to hear aboard his flagship USS Yorktown:
"Two carriers and main body ships, carriers in front, course 135, speed 25."
At 0553, Navy radar on Midway reported: "Many bogey aircraft, bearing 310 degrees, distance 93, altitude 11,000 feet". The Japanese first attack wave had closed the distance to 93 miles (149 km). The US Army Air Corps B-17 heavy bombers had left Midway earlier to attack the Japanese invasion troop transports approaching the atoll from the south-west. Captain Simard radioed the heavy bombers and redirected them to attack the Japanese carriers approaching Midway from the north-west. The patrolling PBY Catalinas were ordered to avoid Midway on completion of their missions and land at French Frigate Shoals or any other part of the ocean that offered a comparatively safe landing. That left sixty-six operational fighters and bombers on Midway, and Captain Simard ordered all of them into the air. At 0555, 6th Defense Battalion radar on Sand Island reported: "Many planes, 89 miles, 320 degrees". Despite the slight difference in bearings reported by US Navy and Marine radar on Midway, it was clearly the same incoming Japanese carrier-launched air strike force.
At 0600, the twenty-four operational fighters of US Marine Fighting Squadron 221 (VMF-221) were scrambled from Midway to challenge Admiral Nagumo's incoming first attack wave. The fighters were immediately followed by an odd assortment of old and new aircraft. First came a detachment of six new US Navy Grumman TBF* torpedo bombers that had been destined to join USS Hornet's Torpedo Squadron VT-8. The orphaned TBFs had failed to reach Hawaii in time to fly aboard Hornet before it left Pearl Harbor for Midway. The TBFs were followed in quick succession by four US Army Air Corps B-26 Marauder medium bombers that had been hastily jury-rigged in Hawaii to carry US Navy aerial torpedoes, twelve lumbering obsolete Vought SB2U Vindicator dive-bombers of Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 241 (VMSB-241), and bringing up the rear, sixteen Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless dive-bombers from VMSB-241led by the squadron commander, Major Lofton R. Henderson. One of the elderly Vindicator soon returned with an engine cowling missing.
*Later to be designated "Avenger" in memory of Pearl Harbor.
Midway's eleven Navy torpedo boats cast off their moorings, and began to circle the lagoon to deny the Japanese fixed targets. The torpedo boats would supplement Midway's air defences with their machine guns, and stand by to rescue downed fliers.
US Marine Fighting Squadron 221 (VMF-221) earns an honoured place in history
US Marine Fighting Squadron 221 (VMF-221) comprised six recently acquired Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat and twenty obsolescent Brewster F2A-3 Buffalo fighters. All of these Marine fighters were cast-offs from US Navy carriers that had re-equipped their air groups with the best front-line Navy fighters available. Prophetically, the elderly Buffalo fighters had already acquired the unofficial designation "Flying Coffins" from Marine pilots. When the fighters of VMF-221were scrambled from Midway at 0600 hours on 4 June 1942, they were missing two F4F Wildcats that had been on patrol when the alert sounded. They would have to land and refuel before they could join their comrades in the air defence of Midway. Another fighter returned to Midway soon after take-off with engine trouble. That left the squadron commander, Major Floyd B. Parks, with only twenty-
THE BREWSTER F2A-3 BUFFALO - unofficial designation "Flying Coffin"
The US Navy called this obsolescent fighter a "Buffalo". The US Marines called it a "Brewster". Unofficially, pilots of both services dubbed them "Flying Coffins". They were no match for the deadly Japanese Zero fighter which was much faster and more agile in combat. The main strength of this stubby fighter was its ruggedness. On the morning of 4 June 1942, these elderly fighters fought a gallant but hopeless battle against the Zeros escorting Vice Admiral Nagumo's carrier-launched air strike against Midway Atoll.
three fighters to challenge the incoming Japanese bomber formation protected by thirty-six deadly Zeros. To guard against the Japanese formation separating and striking at Midway from different directions, Major Parks had earlier decided to divide his squadron into two groups of thirteen aircraft. One group, comprising the first, fourth, and fifth divisions, would be led by him. The other group, comprising the second and third divisions, would be led by Captains Daniel J. Hennessy and Kirk Armistead respectively. It had been agreed that Hennessey and Armistead would orbit at a designated location until it could be ascertained whether or not the Japanese strike force was being maintained as a single formation. If the Japanese did nor separate, Hennessey and Armistead would be directed to support Major Parks.
Major Parks led VMF-221 off Midway with his first division comprising six Buffalos. Captain Robert E. Curtin followed with his fourth division comprising only two Buffalos. Captain John F. Carey followed with his fifth division reduced to only three Wildcats. His wingmen were Captain Marion E. Carl and Second Lieutenant Clayton M. Canfield. These three divisions were vectored directly towards the incoming Japanese air strike force which was still approaching Midway from the north-west on a bearing of 320 degrees. Captains Hennessey and Armistead followed with twelve Buffalos and one Wildcat. As agreed earlier, Hennessey and Armistead headed out on a slightly more westward bearing of 310 degrees to allow for radar error and the possibility that the incoming Japanese formation would separate and attack the atoll from different directions. While orbiting about thirty miles out from Midway, Hennessey and Armistead were informed that radar was placing the Japanese bombers at seventy-four miles from Midway, and closing fast as a single formation at an altitude of 11,000 feet. They were ordered to support Major Parks immediately.
With the advantage of radar early warning and guidance, the Marine fighters were able to climb above the incoming Japanese formation. At 0612, Captain Carey was first to sight the Japanese aircraft when they were about forty miles out from Midway. Leading his three Wilcats at about 14,000 feet, Carey saw a large formation of Kate level bombers about two thousand feet below him. The bombers were being screened by several divisions of Zero fighters flying above and just behind them. Japanese carriers had no radar at this time, and the Japanese formation was clearly unaware of the presence of Marine aircraft in its vicinity.
At 0614, Carey transmitted the warning: "Tally ho! Hawks at Angels twelve supported by fighters."
Taking advantage of the Zeros trailing behind the bombers, Captain Carey put his plane into a steep dive to gain speed and caught one of the lead bombers in his gunsight. He fired a burst and saw the Kate bomber explode. He made a sharp turn to evade the Zeros but was caught squarely by a burst of fire from one of the Japanese bombers that raked his Wildcat and shattered both of his legs. Second Lieutenant Canfield had followed Carey's attack on the level bombers, and fired a burst that caused a second Japanese bomber to explode. Then the Zeros were on them like a swarm of angry hornets, and Canfield sought refuge in nearby cloud. When he emerged, there were no Zeros in sight and he was able to escort Carey's crippled Wildcat back to Midway. The landing gear on both Wildcats collapsed when they landed. Canfield was able to dive into a slit trench just before the Japanese bombs began to fall. Carey was too badly wounded to control his crippled plane and it crashed into a revetment. He was dragged to safety even as the bombs were beginning to fall.
Carey's other wingman, Captain Marion E. Carl, spent most of the battle fighting off Zeros that followed him tenaciously. He scored one probable that he last observed trailing smoke, but he could not shake off another Zero that raked his Wildcat. Finding his guns would not fire, Carl was forced to take cover in cloud until the battle was over.
The Marines shot down and damaged several Japanese bombers before the escorting Zero fighters struck viciously. The Marine fighters were not only heavily outnumbered, but completely outclassed by the faster and more agile Zeros. In quick succession, sixteen Buffalos and Wildcats were sent plummeting into the sea.
US Marine pilots stationed on the tiny Midway islands were required to defend this most westerly American outpost in the Pacific Ocean against a massive Japanese air attack on 4 June 1942. This image by artist John Greaves captures the moment when Marine pilot 2nd Lieutenant William V. Brooks, flying an obsolescent Brewster Buffalo F2A-3 hampered by defective landing gear, has engaged two agile Japanese Zeros and damaged one of them with his fire. More of John Greave's fine aviation and marine art can be viewed at his web-site.
Captain Kirk Armistead was one of the survivors and he provided an account of the attack by his division of six elderly F2A-3 Buffalos and one relatively modern F4F-3 Wildcat:
"At about 0620, I heard Captain Carey transmit "Tally-ho" followed by "Hawks at Angels Twelve, supported by fighters." I then started climbing, and sighted the enemy at approximately 14,000 feet at a distance of five to seven miles out (from Midway Atoll), and approximately two miles to my right. I immediately turned to a heading of about 70-degrees and continued to climb. I was endeavoring to get a position above and ahead of the enemy and come down out of the sun. However, I was unable to reach this point in time. I was at 17,000 feet when I started my attack. The target consisted of five divisions of from five to nine planes each, flying in division "Vs".
I figured this group to consist of from thirty to forty dive-bombers of the Aichi Type 99 (Val). I was followed in column by five F2A-3 fighters and one F4F-3 fighter, pilot unknown. I made a head-on approach from above at a steep angle and at very high speed on the fourth enemy division which consisted of five planes. I saw my incendiary bullets travel from a point in front of the leader, up through his plane and back through the planes on the left wing of the "V". I continued in my dive, and looking back, saw two or three of those planes falling in flames. Some of the planes in my division centered their attack on the fifth enemy division.
After my pull-out, I zoomed back to an altitude of 14,000 feet. At this time, I noticed another group of the same type bombers following along in their path. I looked back over my shoulder and, about 2,000 feet below and behind me, I saw three fighters in column climbing up toward me, which I assumed to be planes of my division. However, they climbed at a very high rate, and a very steep path. When the nearest plane was about 500 feet below and behind me, I realized that it was a Japanese Zero fighter. I kicked over in a violent split "S" and received three 20-mm shells, one in the right wing gun, one in the right wing root tank, and one in the top left side of the engine cowling. I also received about twenty 67.7-mm rounds in the left aileron, which mangled the tab on the aileron, and sawed off a portion of the aileron. I continued in a vertical dive at full throttle, corkscrewing to my left due to the effect of the damaged aileron. At about 3,000 feet, I started to pull out, and managed to hold the plane level at an altitude of 500 feet."
From "Marines at Midway" by Lieutenant Colonel R.D. Heinl, Jr., USMC.
At this point, Captain Armistead decided that it was time to nurse his damaged Buffalo back to Midway.
Major Parks and all of the pilots of his division were killed in the air defence of Midway. The manner of Major Parks' death was particularly galling to those watching on Midway. His Buffalo was an early victim of the swarming Zeros. As his fatally damaged Buffalo plummeted towards the sea, Parks bailed out of the burning aircraft and his parachute was seen to open. One ruthless Japanese Zero pilot was unwilling to allow an enemy pilot to escape, and he strafed the unfortunate squadron commander as soon as his parachute opened, and continued firing at his body when it landed on one of the outer Midway reefs. Two Navy torpedo boats that had been manoeuvering in the lagoon tried to reach his body but could not cross the reef.
No one saw how Captain Curtin died. His wingman, 2nd Lieutenant Darrel D. Irwin, had most of his left aileron shot away, and was pursued all the way back to Midway by two Zeros that took turns making firing passes at the already crippled Buffalo. He somehow managed to survive and land his crippled plane at 0650 in the middle of the dive-bombing attack on his airbase.
Captain Phillip R. White went into action with the Buffalos of Captain Hennessy's second division. He shook off a Zero with a violent manoeuvre and found himself following a Japanese bomber that appeared to be returning to its carrier. White shot it down and then pursued another level bomber that also appeared to be returning to its carrier. White was only able to fire one burst before he ran out of ammunition. The bomber appeared to lose speed but escaped when White had to return to Midway to rearm.
Of the second division, only Captains White and Herbert T. Merrill survived. Captain Merrill was more fortunate than Major Parks. After repeated Zero hits, his plane caught fire and he lost partial control. He tried to reach Midway and stayed with his crippled Buffalo so long that he was badly burned. When the flames eventually forced him to bail out, he was at 8,000 feet and very close to Midway. Captain Merrill was aware of the Japanese propensity to strafe enemy fliers descending by parachute, and delayed opening his parachute for as long as he thought it safe to do so. He landed in the Midway lagoon near one of the encircling reefs and inflated his Mae West. Luckily for him, his landing was observed from one of the Navy torpedo boats and it sped close to the reef to rescue him. Seaman Third Class E.J. Steward dived into the turbulent water close to the reef and hauled Captain Merrill to safety.
Sixteen Marine fighters were shot down in this gallant but hopeless defence of Midway, and fourteen pilots died in action. Of those that returned, four crash-landed on Eastern Island and six evaded the Zeros to land after the Japanese air raid ended. Only two of these fighters were fit to fly again. Marine Fighting Squadron 221 (VMF-221) was now effectively non-operational.
Marine Fighting Squadron 221 (VMF -221) had sacrificed itself in a gallant but hopeless air defence of Midway Atoll. The Marine pilots had been outnumbered and overwhelmed by the deadly Zero fighters escorting the bombers of Vice Admiral Nagumo's first attack wave. It was now the turn of the Navy and Marine anti-aircraft gunners to defend their base. They had been watching the uneven air battle, and when it ended with the Japanese bomber formation largely intact, they braced themselves to receive the Japanese onslaught on their two small islands.
From the recently installed large radar station near Colonel Shannon's command post on Sand Island, an operator counted off the range, height, and bearing of the Japanese strike formation as it neared Midway Atoll. At 0629 hours, this radar placed the incoming Japanese formation eight miles from Midway.
At 0630 hours, from Marine 6th Defense Battalion headquarters, Colonel Shannon issued the order "open fire when targets are in range". The Marines manning the 3-inch anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft machine-guns on Sand and Eastern Islands were protected in their emplacements and pits only by sandbags. The 5-inch seacoast gun batteries could take no part in air defence and they were screened from detection by camouflage netting. All personnel not manning anti-aircraft weapons, and whose duties did not require them to remain above ground, took shelter in dugouts or slit trenches.
One of those who remained above ground was the famous pre-war film director Commander John Ford. He took up a very exposed and dangerous position on top of the Sand Island power station and prepared to film the Japanese attack. That film would later achieve classic war documentary status. Ford marvelled at the calmness and quiet efficiency with which the Marines prepared to meet the deadly air assault.
The Nakajima "Kate" level bombers from carriers Hiryu and Soryu reached Midway first. The primary mission of Lieutenant Tomonaga's first attack wave had been to destroy the aircraft on Midway Atoll to protect the Japanese invasion transports approaching from the south-west against a Midway-based air attack. Tomonaga was dismayed to find the American air base on Eastern Island almost totally devoid of aircraft. He realised that the Americans had somehow been alerted to the impending Japanese air attack and had cleared the base of all aircraft. Never mind, he must have thought, those aircraft would have to return to Midway to refuel eventually and the Japanese would then destroy them. Meanwhile, there was other work for his first attack wave. The secondary mission of his level bombers was to neutralise Midway's anti-aircraft defences to clear the way for the following Aichi "Val" dive-bombers and strafing by the Zeros, and finally, to destroy installations. The Hiryu level bombers concentrated most of their attack on Sand Island. The Soryu level bomber group split into two separate squadrons. One squadron attacked Sand Island. The other squadron attacked airfield installations and anti-aircraft batteries on Eastern Island.
At 0631, Midway's anti-aircaft gunners opened fire on the enemy. The level bombers reported "vicious" anti-aircraft fire to Vice Admiral Nagumo, and two of these bombers fell victim to the intense ground fire. One of the Kate bombers crashed on Eastern Island. The other one burst into flames and splashed into the lagoon. Lieutenant Tomonaga's Kate was also a casualty, taking a direct hit in his left wing fuel tank. Although losing fuel, his aircraft would still be able to return to Hiryu.
Hiryu's Kates scored a direct hit on three oil storage tanks on the north-eastern tip of Sand island, sending a massive volume of oily black smoke streaming high into the air. Soryu's Kate squadron knocked out one of the Marine 3-inch anti-aircraft batteries on Sand Island. Captain Jean Buckner at 3-inch anti-aircraft D Battery sensed rather than heard the bomb that was plummeting towards his battery. His instinctive warning shout to "take cover" saved all but one of his men.
Damage to installations was less serious. A seaplane hangar was set ablaze and the Battalion laundry was heavily damaged.
The Aichi "Val" dive-bombers from Akagi and Kaga followed the level bombers. Their primary mission was to destroy aircraft hangars and other airfield installations on Eastern Island. Gordon Prange describes an extraordinary incident that preceded the dive-bomber attack:
The strike on Eastern Island opened with an incident which no one who saw it ever forgot. "Suddenly the leading Jap plane peeled off....He dove down about 100 feet from the ground, turned over on his back and proceeded leisurely flying upside down over the ramp." Some claim that he thumbed his nose derisively as he sailed by. A deliberate attempt to distract the defenders, a gesture of contempt for an enemy who had not shown the First Air Fleet much, or sheer bravado? Who can say? Whatever it was, for a few seconds it held the watchers too rigid with amazement to fire. Then "...suddenly some Marine said, 'What the Hell,' let go at him and then shot him down. He slid off into the sea."
From" Miracle at Midway", Gordon W. Prange et Al (1983) Penguin Books at page 201.
The performing flight leader was the only Japanese dive-bomber destroyed, but four dive-bombers returned to their carriers damaged by Marine ground fire.
RAISING THE AMERICAN FLAG DURING THE JAPANESE ATTACK
During the Japanese air attack on Midway Atoll, it was drawn to Colonel Shannon's attention that the American flag was not flying above the atoll. When asked if the flag should be flying, he replied: "Yes, run her up", Marines grabbed a flag and ran to the flagpole. Ignoring the Zeros that were still strafing their base, they raised their flag as shown in this famous image.
The most serious bomb damage was inflicted on vital Eastern Island airfield installations. From his exposed perch on the roof of the Sand Island power station, Commander John Ford captured on film the destruction of a nearby aircraft hangar. He continued filming as debris from the exploding hangar hurtled towards him, and this extraordinary incident is captured in his memorable official US Navy film "The Battle of Midway". Commander Ford was knocked off his feet and wounded by the flying debris but survived to continue his distinguished film career after the war.
At 0638, the Eastern Island power house received a direct bomb hit that demolished it and knocked out its electricity generator and water distillation plant. Another bomb cut the lines from the main fuel storage and the dock area. Until power was restored and fuel lines repaired, all aircraft had to be laboriously refuelled manually from drums fetched across from Sand Island.
The Marine sector commander, Major William W. Benson was killed instantly when his command post on Eastern Island took a direct hit from a dive-bomber.
One bomb dropped by a dive-bomber exploded in the rearming pit of Marine Fighting Squadron 221(VMF-221) and caused eight 100-pound bombs and 10,000 rounds of .50 calibre ammunition to explode. Four maintenance men were killed.
Although they damaged important installations and fuel dumps, the Japanese carrier bombers failed to put Midway's vital aircraft runways out of action.
When the Zeros came in at low level to strafe Midway, the anti-aircraft gunners almost invariably found the Japanese fighters too fast to hit. Only one Zero fell victim to anti-aircraft fire, and it crashed in flames near the VMF-221 Ready Room.
Circling above Midway to study the damage inflicted, Lieutenant Tomonaga now had to deal with two unpleasant facts. His priority targets, the American aircraft based on Midway, had evaded him, and Midway's anti-aircraft defences were still putting up a heavy volume of fire. Tomonaga realised that there was need for a second strike at the atoll. He informed Vice Admiral Nagumo by radio at 0700: "There is need for a second attack".
The Roll Call on Midway
When the "all clear" sounded on Midway at 0715, four VMF-221 pilots had already crash-landed their damaged aircraft after struggling back to Midway. The commander of Marine Air Group 22, Lieutenant Colonel Ira E. Kimes, broadcast this message to his surviving fighter pilots who were waiting to land: "Fighters land. Refuel by divisions. Fifth Division first." When he received no response, he repeated the order several times. After still receiving no response, the unpleasant truth sank in. Colonel Kimes changed his message to, "All fighters land and reservice." Only six pilots answered this last desperate summons. Fourteen of the original twenty-six Marine fighter pilots failed to return, and several were wounded. Ten fighters returned to Midway, and of these, only two were airworthy. Having regard to the overwhelming superiority in combat of the Zero, the fact that most of the Marine aircraft were obsolescent, and the fact that they were heavily outnumbered by the Zeros, it is a powerful tribute to the quality of the Marine fighter pilots that ten aircraft were able to return to base.
The defenders of Midway Atoll bury their dead with full military honours after the Japanese air attack on 4 June 1942.
The Japanese account of their own losses over Midway varied, but Vice Admiral Nagumo admitted in his official action report to five lost in air battle (three level bombers and two Zero fighters) and four lost to anti-aircraft fire (two level bombers, one dive-bomber, and one Zero). Nagumo also listed as damaged sixteen level bombers, four dive-bombers, and twelve Zeros. Two of the Zeros were so badly damaged that they could take no further part in the Midway action. Prange takes a different view of the Japanese losses:
"Counting only those aircraft which the returning pilots actually saw go down in flames, the (Japanese) score is eight bombers for certain, and one probable; three sure Zeros and one probable. This gives a much more reasonable total, not too far at variance from the official Japanese figures."
On Midway itself, twenty men had been killed. Camouflage had effectively protected the 5-inch coastal guns, and much of the damage to installations was repairable. The runways had received so little damage that the US Navy commander Captain Simard believed that the Japanese had deliberately spared them for their own use when the atoll had been captured.
Upon hearing the location of the Japanese carrier strike force approaching Midway, Rear Admiral Fletcher ordered his carriers to close with Vice Admiral Nagumo's carriers and prepare to attack. While the American carriers were steaming on a south-westerly course towards the enemy, four waves of US Navy, Army Air Corps, and Marine Corps torpedo and dive-bombers were launched from Midway at the Japanese carriers. US Army Air Corps B-17 bombers that took off before dawn to attack Japanese invasion transports approaching Midway from the south-west were redirected to attack Nagumo's carriers.
To understand how close to defeat the United States came at Midway in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds, and how important to the outcome of this momentous battle were American code-breaking expertise, astute planning, good luck, and the heroism of American aircrews, it is necessary to give some details of the initial disasters experienced by the Americans on this day.
Midway had only twenty-six operational fighter aircraft, and none could be spared to escort and protect four separate waves of Midway-launched bombers from the deadly swarms of Zero fighters that were guarding the Japanese carriers. It was not even
Author's Note
Between 0705 hours and 0837 hours on 4 June 1942, Midway-based US Navy, Army, and Marine bomber squadrons pressed home five separate and resolute attacks on Japan's First Carrier Striking Force as it approached Midway. None of these attacks inflicted significant physical damage on the Japanese carriers, and lacking their own fighter protection, the dive-bomber and torpedo bomber squadrons from Midway were savaged by Zero fighters and many planes failed to return.
The question is sometimes asked, "Did those lost aircrews make any significant contribution to the American victory at Midway?" The answer is: "Yes. Their sacrifices were not in vain". The question only appears to persist because some historians have failed to appreciate the significance of these initial attacks in laying the foundation for the American victory. The five separate bombing attacks from Midway Atoll formed part of a continuing sequence of American attacks that combined to throw Japan's First Carrier Striking Force off balance, and keep it off balance and vulnerable from 0705 to 1022 when the SBD dive-bombers from Enterprise and Yorktown were able to exploit that vulnerability.
One major purpose of this account of the Battle of Midway is to acknowledge the historical significance of the five attacks from Midway Atoll and three US Navy carrier-launched torpedo squadron attacks between 0705 and 1022 that laid the foundation for the American victory.
possible to coordinate the Midway bombing attacks because of the mixed nature of the aircraft involved and wide variations in speed and pilot training.
The first wave of American bombers from Midway comprised the six orphaned Navy Grumman TBF* torpedo bombers that should have been aboard the carrier USS Hornet. These bombers carried a crew of three and were part of a detachment of nineteen of these new dive-bombers that had arrived in Hawaii on 29 May 1942 to join Hornet's Torpedo Squadron Eight (VT-8). They found that Hornet had sailed for an unspecified destination on the previous day. When informed that six of of the new dive-bombers were required at Midway Atoll, there was no shortage of volunteers from the VT-8 aircrews left behind in Hawaii. None of them had experienced combat, and Ensign Albert K. Earnest had never before flown out of sight of land. None of them had known why they were going to Midway.
*Later to be designated "Avenger" in memory of Pearl Harbor.
Lieutenant Langdon K. Fieberling was commander of the six US Navy TBFs on Midway. At 0545 hours, he was receiving a last minute briefing from the commander of Marine Air Group 22, Lieutenant Colonel Ira E. Kimes, when the message came from Lieutenant Chase's patrolling PBY: "Many planes heading Midway bearing 320 degrees, distance 150". Fieberling gathered together his six aircrews and they climbed aboard their TBFs and started engines. A Marine orderly climbed onto Fieberling's wing to deliver the order to attack the Japanese carriers and provide details of bearing, distance, and speed of the carriers. The last Marine fighter of VMF-221 had barely cleared the airstrip when the first TBF followed it at.
The attack by six detached US Navy Grumman TBF torpedo bombers of USS Hornet's Torpedo Squadron VT-8
Lieutenant Fieberling's six TBFs had reached their cruising height of 4,000 feet when they passed close to the incoming Japanese carrier-launched strike force. Ensign Earnest's turret gunner, Aviation Machinist Mate Third Class (AMM3) J. D. Manning, spotted the Japanese formation and alerted Earnest to the enemy presence. The TBFs passed the Japanese formation very quickly and only one Zero fighter showed tentative and quickly stifled interest in the small group of American torpedo bombers.
The Navy TBFs were closely followed from Midway by a second wave comprising the four Army Air Corps B-26 Marauder medium bombers that had been hastily modified by the Navy at Pearl Harbor to carry an aerial torpedo. The Army Marauder bombers were led by Captain James F. Collins, Jr. It was an historic mission for the US Army Air Corps. No Army bomber had previously been fitted with torpedoes. None of the Army pilots had been trained to launch torpedoes aimed at an enemy warship.
The Midway TBFs and Marauders came upon Vice Admiral Nagumo's carrier fleet almost simultaneously. The two groups of American torpedo bombers were spotted first aboard Akagi. Nagumo's official Midway action report places this sighting at 0705. The Japanese flagship immediately assumed battle speed and turned directly towards the unwelcome arrivals to minimise its target profile. The TBFs and Marauders caused some confusion to observers aboard the Japanese ships who identified them variously as heavy bombers and PBY Catalinas.
It appeared to the Japanese, and it is recorded in Nagumo's action report, that the American torpedo planes divided into two groups at 0710. What was actually happening was that Collins and Fieberling were making independent attacks on the carriers. Fieberling led his TBFs in first. The swarming Zeros struck viciously before the TBFs and Marauders came within torpedo range of the Japanese carriers. The TBFs had opened their torpedo bay doors early to ensure damage to hydraulic systems did not prevent them being opened. Unfortunately, the open bay doors slowed their speed and made them easier victims for the deadly Zeros.
Ensign Earnest had never before seen a massive warship fleet from the air. The vast expanse of Japanese warships stretching from horizon to horizon presented an amazing sight. After taking in this unforgettable image, Earnest concentrated all of his attention on finding a target carrier. He saw Lieutenant Fieberling signalling for an attack on two carriers at the centre of the vast array of Japanese warships. Then his turret gunner, AMM3 James D. Manning, called a warning that the Zeros were upon them. As the Japanese fighters made their firing passes, Earnest could hear the sharp clunk of their bullets striking his plane and the clatter of return fire from his turret gunner. Fieberling led his small formation of TBFs down close to the surface of the ocean with the Zeros continually snapping at their heels. Earnest could no longer hear his turret gun firing, and upon checking, the radioman and tunnel gunner, Radioman 3rd Class Harry H. Ferrier, found the apparently lifeless turret gunner slumped over his gun. Earnest's TBF was hammered again as another Zero made its firing pass. This time Harry Ferrier was hit in the wrist by a bullet. In the next firing pass a Zero bullet creased Harry Ferrier's head and he lapsed into unconsciousness. The Zero's bullets severed the elevator control cables, and Earnest found himself not only effectively alone, but trying to control a plane fast losing all hydraulic power and with elevators not functioning. Describing the loss of control of his TBF bomber, Earnest later said: "The elevator controls went limp in my hands".
Ensign Earnest had also been hit in the last firing pass and was bleeding from a wound in his neck. He still had rudder control and looked around desperately for a target. Seeing a light cruiser, he kicked hard on the rudder control and managed to turn his TBF towards it. He was able to launch his torpedo in its direction from an altitude of about 200 feet, but was too busy wrestling with the controls of his crippled bomber to see whether the torpedo made contact. Earnest was now down to about 30 feet above the water and bracing himself for impact when he discovered that his elevator trim tab control was still functioning and was sufficient to lift or lower the nose of the badly damaged bomber. The Zeros pursued him and continued to fire at his plane until he was well clear of the Japanese fleet. Then they disappeared. They had either been recalled to meet another threat or had run out of ammunition.
Ensign Earnest found himself alone over the ocean in a crippled bomber with the vast expanse of the Japanese carrier fleet between him and Midway. The engine was still working, but his electrical and hydraulic systems had been knocked out. How to find Midway without compass, instruments, and radio was exercising the mind of this inexperienced teenage pilot. Reckoning that Midway lay somewhere to the south-east, Earnest worked his way around the Japanese fleet and pointed his plane in the direction of the morning sun. He was eventually rewarded by the sight of a towering column of smoke from the burning oil tanks on Midway. He was further cheered by Harry Ferrier regaining consciousness and crawling up to keep him company.
The landing on Midway at 0940 on one wheel fell well short of elegant, but those who examined the badly damaged TBF were amazed that the young pilot had been able to land the plane in one piece. Harry Ferrier was helped out of the crashed TBF by First Lieutenant Jim Muri (see below) who had shortly before piloted a badly damaged B-26 Marauder bomber back to Midway after making his own attack on the Japanese carriers. The TBF detachment had been savaged by the Zeros and only Albert Earnest and Harry Ferrier survived to return to Midway. There is no record of any damage to the Japanese carrier fleet from the TBF attacks.
The attack by four US Army Air Corps B-26 Marauder torpedo bombers
Captain James Collins could see the Navy TBFs carrying out their low level torpedo attacks ahead of him as he led his four B-26 Marauder bombers in a diamond formation directly towards the carriers that he could see at the centre of the Japanese fleet. The carriers were already scattering to evade the TBF torpedoes. Swerving his bomber, first left and then right, to avoid intense anti-aircraft fire, and diving close to sea level in an attempt to frustrate the swarming Zeros, Collins focussed on a large carrier that turned out to be Vice Admiral Nagumo's flagship Akagi. Under intense fire from both Zeros and warships, the Marauders piloted by Captain Collins and First Lieutenant Jim Muri broke through the protective cordon of Zeros at about 200 feet above sea level and launched their torpedoes at Akagi. To evade the B-26 torpedoes, Akagi swung sharply, first to starboard and then to port. Neither torpedo struck home, but Jim Muri left a US Army calling card by strafing the flight deck of the admiral's flagship at 0712. Nagumo's action report notes that the Number 3 anti-aircraft gun was damaged and two sailors were injured in Muri's daring attack on Akagi. With every gun on Akagi pouring fire on it, one crippled B-26 passed very close to the flagship's island structure before dipping and plunging into the ocean. At this point, the only damage inflicted on the Japanese carrier fleet was that produced by Jim Muri's strafing of Akagi's flight deck.
First Lieutenant Jim Muri's remarkable attack on Vice Admiral Nagumo's flagship is described later.
Captain Collins and First Lieutenant Muri were both able to nurse their badly damaged bombers back to Midway. Jim Muri's B-26 was found to have more than 500 bullet holes in it. Although commending his bomber's leakproof fuel tanks and protective armour, Captain Collins reported bitterly that his rear and waist (dorsal) turret guns had jammed repeatedly during the heat of the action over the Japanese fleet. The guns in the tail turret had to be fed by hand when the motors proved incapable of pulling the ammunition belts. Once again, the lives of young Americans had been put at risk, and sacrificed, by neglect of defence spending during peacetime.
The attack by sixteen Dauntless SBD-2 dive-bombers of US Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241 (VMSB-241)
The two waves of torpedo bombers from Midway were followed by a third wave of sixteen Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless dive-bombers from Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241 (VMSB-241). The dive-bombers were led by the squadron commander, Major Lofton R. Henderson. Because most of his young pilots lacked experience with the SBD-2 dive-bomber and in the highly skilled technique of dive-bombing, Major Henderson decided to resort to a gliding approach to the Japanese carriers rather than the normal steep dive associated with dive-bombing. Unfortunately, a glide approach would render the SBD-2s more vulnerable to attack by defending fighters and to anti-aircraft fire from warships. The plan was to maintain tight squadron formation in a fast glide from 8,000 to 4,000 feet and then allow each pilot to separate and attack the most accessible carrier target. After the attack, each of the SBDs would retire by seeking cloud cover or hugging the water until clear of the Japanese fleet. The eleven Vindicator dive-bombers would be led as a separate group by Major Benjamin W. Norris. The heavily patched Vindicators were too slow to fly in formation with the newer and faster SBDs.
The first of Major Henderson's SBDs cleared Midway at 0610, and they assembled at a pre-arranged rendezvous about twenty miles from Midway. They could hear on their radios that Midway was under bombing attack from Lieutenant Tomonaga's level bombers. Then came the order from the commander of Marine Air Group - 22, Lieutenant Colonel Ira E. Kimes:
"Attack enemy carriers bearing 320 degrees, distance 180 miles, course 135 degrees, speed 25 knots".
They sighted the Japanese carriers at 0755, and Major Henderson's voice came over the radio:
"Attack two enemy CV on port bow."
Corporal Eugene Card was gunner to Captain Richard E. Fleming, the squadron navigator. Through a gap in the clouds he saw four Japanese carriers. Card watched fascinated as the carriers turned into the wind and began launching fighters to engage the unwelcome visitors. Captain Fleming shouted over the intercom to him: "Here they come!" A Zero flashed past in a steep climb, and now the Zeros were swarming around them like angry hornets.
Second Lieutenant Harold G. Schlendering could not help but admire the agility of the Zeros and the combat skills and teamwork demonstrated by their pilots. Particularly unsettling, was the calculation employed by Zero pilots who waited until an SBD gunner was reloading before diving in for a kill. The Zero pilots quickly identified Major Henderson as the squadron commander, and concentrated their fire on him. With one wing in flames, Henderson's SBD was observed plunging towards the sea. At least one parachute was seen to blossom, but it would make no difference. No American airman survived capture at Midway. Captain Fleming immediately assumed command of the Marine SBD squadron and led his planes into a low cloud bank.
The Marine SBDs had been sighted first aboard carrier Soryu at 0748. After launching additional Zeros to augment their combat air patrols, the four Japanese carriers scattered. Despite this rapid dispersal of the carrier fleet, Captain Fleming found himself almost directly over a carrier at a height of about 2,000 feet when he led his SBD squadron out of the cloud cover. The Marine pilots were surprised to see that no camouflage had been applied to the carrier's yellow flight deck and a large red rising sun insignia painted on the flight deck provided them with a natural aiming point. By using cloud to screen their approach, the Marine SBDs had broken through the outer cordon of Zeros and were able to bracket the carrier Hiryu which disappeared behind a cloud of smoke and spray. Several sailors were killed and wounded when Captain Fleming strafed the Japanese carrier. The Kaga was also lucky to evade three bombs that exploded close to her stern. Both carriers escaped without damage.
The Marine SBDs came under intense fire from Zeros and warships throughout their attacks on the Japanese carriers, and only ten bullet-riddled SBDs cleared the Japanese fleet and headed back to Midway. Only eight of the SBDs reached Midway, and only two of these planes were fit for further service. 1st Lieutenant Daniel Iverson, Jr. braved a storm of anti-aircraft fire to score one of the three near misses on the stern of the carrier Kaga. Inspection of his SBD back at Midway revealed 210 holes in the plane.
Captain R. L Blain was one of those whose engine failed on the return flight to Midway. He was forced to ditch in the ocean. After forty-eight hours on a tiny inflatable raft, he and his gunner were rescued by a PBY Catalina searching for downed airmen.
Lieutenant Schlendering's engine failed when he was still several miles from Midway, and he and his gunner, Private First Class Edward O. Smith, were forced to bail out over the ocean. Lieutenant Schlendering could see a reef some distance away and decided to swim for it, but when he looked around for Private Smith, he found that the unfortunate gunner was nowhere to be seen. At about 1000 on that same morning, a Midway torpedo boat found and rescued Schlenderling. A search of the area failed to locate Private Smith.
Major Henderson's name would later be immortalised when assigned to the strategically vital American airfield on the northern coast of Guadalcanal.
Midway-based air attacks force a heavy increase in the Japanese Zero fighter screen and exhaust Zero reserves
Although no direct hits on carriers were scored, Major Henderson's SBDs made their own important contribution to the ultimate American victory at Midway. The Marine SBDs succeeeded in further scattering both the carrier formation and its screening Zeros. To protect the scattered Japanese carriers adequately, the commander of the Zero combat air patrol was forced to supplement the fighter screen above the carriers by drawing on reserves intended to support a second wave attack on Midway Atoll. When he was satisfied that there were enough Zeros aloft to protect the now widely dispersed carriers, there were none left to escort immediately and protect either a second wave attack on Midway or a warship strike if an American carrier threat should materialise. This grave danger appears not to have registered with Vice Admiral Nagumo. It appears likely that the unaccustomed pressure of being under intense and sustained air attack by an enemy was now affecting the judgment of Nagumo and his senior staff officers.
The attack by Midway-based Army Air Corps B-17 heavy bombers
A fourth wave of fifteen US Army Air Corps B-17 heavy bombers from Midway led by Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney, Jnr. arrived over the widely scattered Japanese carriers at about 0814. Their initial mission had been to attack Japanese troop transports approaching Midway from the south-west when Captain Simard redirected them by radio to attack Nagumo's carrier force. The menace of the B-17 heavy bombers produced more frantic evasive manoeuvres by the Japanese carriers. The B-17s dropped their bombs from 20,000 feet on Hiryu and Soryu. Although both carriers were bracketed by bombs and disappeared behind huge columns of water, they emerged unscathed. The B-17s captured some excellent high-level photographs of Japanese carriers engaged in evasive manoeuvres, but scored no hits. The Zeros showed little inclination to engage the high flying and heavily armed B-17s, and all B-17s returned safely to Midway.
In this Stan Stokes painting a Vindicator lumbers into the air from Midway's Eastern Island with its 500-pound bomb load on 4 June 1942. The SB2U-3 Vindicator dive-bomber was already obsolete when eighteen of these US Navy carrier cast-offs were assigned for front-line service with Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 241 (VMSB-241) on Midway. The Marine pilots jokingly called their elderly planes "vibrators". They were slow moving targets for the swarms of deadly Zero fighters that protected the Japanese carrier force that attacked Midway on 4 June 1942.
A fifth wave of eleven obsolete and heavily patched Vought Vindicator SB2U dive-bombers from Midway's VMSB-241 was led by Major Benjamin W. Norris. Norris had no illusions about the ability of his lumbering Vindicators to reach the Japanese carriers. He directed his squadron to attack the battleship Haruna at 0820, but scored only near misses. By this time, all of the Japanese Zeros including those reserved for the second Midway attack wave were aloft protecting Nagumo's widely dispersed carrier fleet. The Zeros attacked the slow moving Vindicators but appeared to lack the enthusiasm and sharpness displayed in repelling the earlier Midway-based attacks. This is perhaps not surprising considering how long the Zero pilots had been in the air screening the fleet, battling incoming enemy bombers, responding to false alerts from all sectors of the now widely dispersed Japanese carrier fleet, and returning to their carriers to refuel and rearm before taking to the air again. It is also possible that the Zeros were more concerned to protect the more vulnerable and widely dispersed carriers.
Seven of the elderly Vindicators somehow managed to return to their base. Midway now had nothing left to throw at the Japanese invaders.
The sacrifices made by the Midway-launched bombers had not been in vain
The sacrifices of the gallant US Navy, Army, and Marine squadrons from Midway had not been made in vain. Although failing to score any significant hits on the Japanese carriers, these attacks pressed home courageously without fighter escort by successive waves of American bombers compelled the Japanese carriers to undertake frantic evasive manoeuvres that broke up their tight battle formation, scattered the Japanese warships, and used up all of the Zero reserves as fighter patrols to protect the scattered fleet. The Japanese were now more vulnerable to an American carrier attack. Vice Admiral Nagumo was facing pressure of a kind that he was unlikely to have experienced before. The First Carrier Striking Force had been thrown off balance by the successive attacks from Midway, and Nagumo needed time to regroup.
Captain James Collins and his Army aircrews had been sleeping beside their four B-26 Marauder bombers when the alert sounded at 0530 hours to signal the approach of a Japanese carrier force. The engines of the four B-26 bombers were being warmed up on the Eastern Island runway when the Army liaison officer arrived to deliver to Captain Collins the order to attack the Japanese carriers and provide him with details of bearing, distance, and speed of the carriers. First Lieutenant Jim Muri was sitting in the cockpit of his bomber "Susie-Q" wondering what this mission was all about. There had been no time for pre-flight briefing. He had no idea what his target was to be. All he knew was the location of the target.
A powerful Japanese aircraft carrier strike force has just attacked America's Midway Atoll on the morning of 4 June 1942. This dramatic image by artist Roy Grinnell captures the moment when First Lieutenant Jim Muri, flying the B-26 bomber "Susie-Q", strikes back at the Japanese invaders. He has left an unwelcome US Army calling card by strafing the flight deck of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's flagship Akagi. The bombing attacks from Midway Atoll contributed to the great American victory by scattering the Japanese carrier force and its Zero fighter screen, and thereby, rendering it more vulnerable to dive-bomber attack.
The last of the US Navy TBF torpedo bombers had barely cleared the runway, when Captain Collins led his four B-26 Marauders into the air. There had been no plan for a coordinated attack. Captain Collins only knew that their primary target would be Japanese carriers at the centre of a protective screen of warships and Zero fighters.
First Lieutenant Muri's first impression of the Japanese carrier fleet was the sighting of wisps of smoke on the horizon, and then he was over the destroyer screen and saw the vast array of the First Carrier Striking Force spread across the sea. This was certainly not going to be the easy mission that he had been expecting, and he reached for a cigarette in the can at his feet. He was still fumbling with a match to light it when the Zeros struck viciously at the small formation of Army bombers.
Jim Muri did his best to follow closely as Captain Collins swerved his bomber, first to the left and then to the right, looking for the clearest line of approach to one of the leading carriers. With his concentration focussed on the movements of his commander's B-26, Muri had no time to keep an eye on the B-26 bombers piloted by 1st Lieutenant Herbert C. Mayes and 1st Lieutenant William S. Watson on his left and right wings respectively. Facing a veritable storm of anti-aircraft fire from the Japanese warships, Collins alternately climbed and dropped his B-26 to throw off the aim of the gunners. Muri was still following closely as Collins dived close to sea level in an attempt to frustrate the swarming Zeros. Master story teller Walter Lord (see note below) vividly evokes the situation as Jim Muri piloted his B-26 into the boiling cauldron that was the First Carrier Striking Force:
"Now they were in the middle of the formation; as Muri's co-pilot Lieutenant Pete Moore glanced quickly around, every ship seemed a solid sheet of gunfire. The Japanese gunners would shoot at the water to see where the bullets hit. Using the splashes as tracers, they would "walk" their fire right into the B-26s.
"But they came on anyhow. Collins finally released at 800 yards and zoomed away to the right. Muri came hard behind, with the Zeros flying right into their own fleet's line of fire in a desperate effort to stop him. Bullets smashed the Plexiglas turret; a ricochet clipped Sergeant Gogoj's forehead. Muri shouted to Moore to release the torpedo. But the improvised switch was something that Rube Goldberg might have invented - a trigger, a cable, a plug with innumerable prongs. Moore frantically squeezed the trigger, twisted the plug, still couldn't tell whether the torpedo was gone. "Is it away?" Muri kept shouting. "How the hell do I know?" Moore answered."
They would find out later that the torpedo had indeed been released; but now looming in front of them was the vast bulk of the carrier at which they had been aiming. They would find out later that this carrier was none other than Vice Admiral Nagumo's own flagship Akagi. Walter Lord continues:
"Banking hard, Muri flew straight down the middle of the flight deck. His bombardier Lieutenant Russ Johnson grabbed the nose gun and strafed in all directions. They had a brief, vivid glimpse of white-clad sailors scattering for cover."
As he flew at low level down the length of the great carrier's flight deck, two things impressed themselves very clearly on Jim Muri's memory. First, was the large Japanese battle flag streaming from the mast. The second was the sudden cessation of heavy anti-aircraft fire produced by the need for the Japanese gunners to avoid hitting their own ship.
Speaking of this attack by Midway's B-26 bombers on his flagship, Vice Admiral Nagumo recorded in his Midway action report:
"Akagi notes that enemy planes loosed torpedoes. Counters with AA machine-gun fire. Enemy machine-gun strafing seriously injures two men manning the No.3 AA gun. Revolving mechanism of said gun damaged (repaired half an hour later. Both transmitting antennas cut."
What was missing from the admiral's report was the devastating psychological impact that this bold attack, pressed home resolutely by American Army bombers without fighter support, must have had on Japanese Navy officers taught to believe that Americans lacked courage, fighting skills, and discipline.
As he pulled out of his attack on Akagi, Jim Muri caught a fleeting glimpse of a B-26 that narrowly missed colliding with the island structure of Akagi before plunging into the sea. No one saw what happened to the fourth B-26. There was no time to look. As soon as they had cleared the flight deck of Akagi, the Zeros swooped again, riddling the B-26 with bullets in each firing pass. Once clear of the Japanese fleet, the Zeros disappeared, and Jim Muri now had time to assess the damage. His radio and hydraulic system had been knocked out. The leakproof fuel tanks of the B-26 had been repeatedly pierced by Zero bullets. Although wounded and bloodied himself, Corporal Frank L. Mello, Jr. crawled up to the cockpit from the waist gun turret to report that the plane was on fire and that all three gunners had been wounded. Lieutenant Moore left his co-pilot's seat and made his way quickly to the site of the fire. After putting it out, he treated the worst wounds, and then manned a gun.
Somehow Lieutenant Muri's heavily damaged B-26 held together, and having located the equally battered B-26 piloted by Captain Collins, the two Army pilots nursed their crippled bombers back to Midway. On the return flight, Jim Muri had time to wonder what had happened to the unlit cigarette that had been in his mouth when the Zeros struck. In the heat of the action, he had bitten it in half and swallowed the half in his mouth.
On landing, Muri found that his left tire had been shot off, all propellor blades had been damaged, and there were more than 500 holes in his plane. He complained in his report that his turret guns had jammed repeatedly during the action over the Japanese carrier fleet, and that he had missed opportunities to fire at Zeros owing to the the absence of fixed forward-firing guns.
Lieutenant Muri was allowed to cut out the name "Susie-Q" from the riddled B-26 fuselage to keep as a souvenir.
Vice Admiral Nagumo faces his first problem
Vice Admiral Nagumo's first attack wave commander had reported at 0700 hours that the airfield at Midway was still operational and that anti-aircraft fire had been intense. This was bad news for the Japanese commander because one of his primary tasks was to knock out this airfield so that the transports of the Midway Invasion Force could approach safely and land Japanese troops on the American atoll. The attacks by Midway-based bombers on his carrier force from 0705 that morning convinced Nagumo that a second strike at Midway was essential to render the airfield unusable for attacks on Japanese troop transports. The Kate level bombers bombers held back from the first strike at Midway were still parked in their hangars below the flight decks of Akagi and Kaga, and these bombers were armed with torpedoes that were useless for a strike at land installations such as those on Midway. Nagumo now faced his first difficult decision of this day. Should he launch a second attack on Midway as soon as possible? That would involve replacement of all torpedoes on his level bombers with fragmentation bombs, and tie up his flight decks for about an hour while the aircraft of the second attack wave were rearmed, moved up to the flight decks, and prepared for launching at Midway.
VICE ADMIRAL CHUICHI NAGUMO
Between 0705 hours and 0814 hours on the morning of 4 June 1942,five successive American air attacks from Midway Atoll put the commander of Japan's First Carrier Striking Force under pressure of a kind that he is unlikely to have experienced before. Those five attacks formed part of a continuing sequence of eight American air attacks that combined to throw Japan's First Carrier Striking Force off balance, and keep it off balance and vulnerable from 0705 to 1022 when the Dauntless SBD dive-bombers from Enterprise and Yorktown were able to exploit that vulnerability.
Another alternative was to hold the Japanese bombers on their carriers in readiness to repel a possible American naval counter-attack, and await the return of the first attack wave. The aircraft of the first attack wave could then be refuelled and rearmed for a second strike at Midway. Although warships of the United States Pacific Fleet were not expected by Admiral Yamamoto to arrive at Midway in response to the Japanese attack before 6 June at the earliest, Nagumo was still concerned that Japanese intelligence had provided him with no information on the whereabouts of American aircraft carriers.
After weighing the alternatives, Vice Admiral Nagumo made a fateful decision to use the torpedo and dive-bombers held back on his four carriers for a second strike at Midway. At 0715, as the second American torpedo bomber attack from Midway was ending, Nagumo ordered the rearming of all torpedo bombers with fragmentation bombs. In the hangars of Akagi and Kaga, the sweating crewmen worked frantically to replace torpedoes with fragmentation bombs because Nagumo intended to launch his second attack wave at Midway before the first wave returned to the Japanese carriers. If normal Japanese practice was followed, the dive-bombers would have their fragmentation bombs fitted after they had been lifted to the flight decks and while their engines were being warmed for take-off.
Continuing American torpedo and bombing attacks prevent Nagumo "spotting" strike bombers on his flight decks
Although Nagumo intended to launch the bombers in his hangers in a second strike at Midway as soon as possible, there was a major impediment to those bombers being lifted to the flight decks and prepared for launching at Midway or anywhere else. On Japanese carriers in 1942, the process of moving fully armed strike bombers from hangar to flight deck and preparing them for take-off normally required a minimum of forty minutes. It was simply not possible for Nagumo to "spot" a bomber strike on his flight decks while the four Japanese carriers were under continuing attack by American aircraft. The flight decks had to be kept clear of strike bombers in order to allow the combat air patrol Zeros to be recovered, refuelled, rearmed, and relaunched to defend their carriers.
Author's Note
Assuming the Japanese carrier level bombers were already armed with torpedoes, preparation for a strike involved moving aircraft in their hangars to the lifts, "spotting" them on the flight deck, unfolding wings, warming up the engines, final briefings for pilots, and pre-flight checks. The dive and level bombers would be armed with bombs on the flight deck while their engines were warming up. The Midway volume Midowei Kaisen (1971) of the official Japanese war history Senshi sosho declares at page 289 that this procedure "would have taken no less than forty minutes.." Between five to ten minutes would have to be added for the launch of the full strike.
The critical impact of the continuing American torpedo and bombing attacks in frustrating Nagumo's ability to "spot" strike bombers on his flight decks between 0705 and 1022 hours has been acknowledged by Jon Parshall, an internationally recognised expert on Imperial Japanese Navy operational doctrine:
"Taken together, it is apparent that spotting a twenty-one plane strike for launch would take around forty minutes total, and another five to ten minutes would be required for the launch....Thus if Nagumo was to attack the American strike force, he needed to find an unbroken forty-five minute window of opportunity on all four flight decks during which to spot and then launch his strike".
"Doctrine Matters: Why the Japanese Lost at Midway", published in the Naval War College Review 2001 (at pages 2-3 of the web version).
First news from the cruiserTone's scout seaplane
While the Japanese Kate level bombers were being rearmed with fragmentation bombs in their hangars, the following signal was received at 0728 from scout seaplane Number 4 from the cruiser Tone:
"Sight what appears to be ten enemy surface ships, in position 10 degrees distance 240 miles from Midway. Course 150 degrees, speed over 20 knots".
The Tone scout seaplane had located a fleet of warships about 240 miles (384 km) north of Midway Atoll and heading in a south-easterly direction. Vice Admiral Nagumo had no doubt that the warships were American and he was alarmed to learn that enemy warships were positioned so close to his carriers. He discussed with his staff officers the best course of action. Lieutenant Commander Ono, the staff intelligence officer, plotted the position of the enemy fleet and placed it only 200 miles (320 km) from the Japanese carriers. The neutralisation of Midway Atoll had been fixed by Admiral Yamamoto as being Nagumo's top priority, and the continuing attacks by Midway-based aircraft reinforced that priority. The second wave attack on Midway had to go forward as planned, but it was decided that the First Carrier Striking Force should also prepare to meet a threat from an American fleet. At 0745, Nagumo issued the following order to his carriers:
"Prepare to carry out attacks on enemy fleet units. Leave torpedoes on those attack planes which have not as yet changed to bombs."
This compromise would leave about half of the Kates in the hangars of Akagi and Kaga equipped with torpedoes and the rest of the Kates in those hangars equipped with fragmentation bombs for the second wave attack on Midway. At 0747, Nagumo tersely ordered the Tone scout to identify the American warship types and maintain contact.
At 0748, Soryu signalled the arrival of another attack wave from Midway. This attack was launched by Major Lofton R. Henderson's Dauntless SBD-2 dive-bombers of VMSB-241. Again, the Japanese carriers were forced to scatter and take their protective Zero screen with them.
At 0758, Nagumo received the following message from the Tone scout:
"...the enemy is on course 80 degrees, speed 20 knots".
At 0809, the Tone scout reported:
"Enemy ships are five cruisers and five destroyers".
American cruisers and destroyers posed no significant threat to the powerful carriers and battleships of the First Carrier Striking Force, and Nagumo's fears were eased.
The B-17 heavy bombers from Midway had arrived over the Japanese carrier fleet at 0814, and dropped their bombs on Hiryu and Soryu. During the B-17 attack, returning aircraft from the first Midway attack wave began arriving over the Japanese carriers and were waved off as the carriers undertook frantic evasive manoeuvres. Both Hiryu and Soryu had been bracketed by the B-17 bombs, but emerged unscathed from the attack. Vice Admiral Nagumo was feeling more confident as each attack from Midway was repulsed. They had easily fended off several attack waves by American bombers from Midway, and his ships had suffered no significant damage. However, other matters were beginning to trouble the commander of the First Carrier Striking Force at this moment.
Vice Admiral Nagumo finds himself under pressure
The resolute American counter-attacks from Midway had placed the powerful First Carrier Striking Force and its commander under pressure of a kind that they were unlikely to have experienced before when slaughtering poorly trained Chinese pilots in Japan's unprovoked and brutal war against China. To Japanese Navy officers, the American torpedo pilots were not behaving as they were suppose to. It had been drilled into them that Americans were poor fighters and lacked discipline. And yet, the American torpedo pilots had attacked them, and pressed home their attacks resolutely without fighter protection. It must have seemed to them that the American torpedo pilots had sacrificed themselves with the selfless courage of samurai. This was extraordinary behaviour from a despised enemy, and likely to be very unsettling for the Japanese.
Although failing to inflict any significant damage on the Japanese carriers, the attacks pressed home by successive waves of American bombers from Midway had forced the Japanese carriers to undertake evasive manoeuvres that broke up their tight battle formation and scattered the Japanese warships and their protective fighter patrols. With his fleet now in disarray, Vice Admiral Nagumo needed time to regroup his scattered carriers and their protective fighter patrols. He needed time to prepare and launch a second attack wave at Midway to put the airfield out of action. The aircraft from his first attack wave were returning. Many of these aircraft were low on fuel and some were badly damaged. Nagumo needed time to recover these aircraft, and that was impossible while the Japanese carriers were manoeuvring wildly to avoid American air attacks. Nagumo and his staff officers were off balance and unsure of the direction from which the next attack might come.
Alarming news from the cruiserTone's scout aircraft
At 0820, the Tone scout reported again, and this time the news was electrifying for those on Akagi's bridge:
"Enemy force accompanied by what appears to be aircraft carrier bringing up the rear".
Deeply alarmed by the presence of an American carrier so close to his own force, Nagumo ordered the arming of all bombers with torpedoes and armour-piercing bombs. Being crammed with torpedoes, bombs, and aircraft fuel, carriers were highly combustible. A quick first strike against the American carrier was imperative. However, protecting the bombers in that strike from American carrier fighters had become a problem. To protect his four carriers against a succession of attacks from Midway, Nagumo had allowed a massive combat air patrol of almost fifty Zero fighters to be placed above his widely dispersed fleet. Nagumo had started with eighty-four Zeros on his four carriers, and now he had none in reserve to escort bombers on an immediate strike at the American carrier reported by the Tone scout. He could recover some of the Zeros defending the carriers, but they would have to be refuelled and rearmed before they could escort bombers.
Vice Admiral Nagumo faces a second difficult decision
Vice Admiral Nagumo's next difficult decision on this day was whether to launch a strike at the American carrier force as soon as all bombers aboard his carriers had been rearmed and were ready to attack warships, or delay the launch until the aircraft from the first Midway strike had returned to his carriers and been recovered. While considering these alternative courses of action, Nagumo's deliberations were interrupted by Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, the aggressive commander of Carrier Division Two, comprising carriers Hiryu and Soryu. Yamaguchi had followed closely the reports from the Tone scout seaplane. He had thirty-six Type-99 Val dive-bombers in his hangars and he believed that it was extremely dangerous to delay launching an attack on the American carrier sighted by the Tone scout. Yamaguchi signalled Nagumo:
"Consider it advisable to launch attack force immediately."
Nagumo was under pressure to make a decision quickly. Some aircraft from his first attack wave had returned from Midway, and were circling their carriers. The fighters were running low on fuel and some of the planes were badly damaged. To permit the returning attack wave to be recovered, he would have to keep his flight decks clear. It would take him at least forty-five minutes to "spot" a bomber strike on his flight decks and launch it at the American carrier. During that time, many of his first attack wave aircraft would run out of fuel and have to ditch in the sea. For Nagumo, the clinching argument against an immediate bomber strike was the lack of any readily available Zero fighters to escort them to the American carrier. The heavy toll inflicted by his fighters on the unescorted American bombers from Midway convinced Nagumo that sending out strike bombers without a fighter escort was unacceptable.
Vice Admiral Nagumo now made a second fateful decision, which was to delay launching an attack on the American carrier task force until he had recovered his aircraft from the first Midway strike.
When all of the aircraft of the first attack wave had been recovered, Nagumo intended to retire northwards to avoid further air attacks from Midway. This would enable him to regroup his scattered carriers and prepare a massive attack to destroy the American carrier and its escort warships. At 0837, Akagi began to recover aircraft from the first Midway attack wave. When the last returning aircraft from Midway had touched down on its carrier at 0917, the First Carrier Striking Force immediately made a 70-degree change in course to the north-east. On all four Japanese carriers frantic preparations were under way to launch a massive strike at the American carrier force discovered by the Tone scout seaplane. Those preparations were fated never to be completed. At 0920, preparations for the Japanese strike were interrupted by the arrival of fifteen American Navy torpedo bombers that had been launched from the carrier USS Hornet. Torpedo Squadron Eight (VT-8) was led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, USN.
Admiral Fletcher searches for Nagumo's Carriers
At about 0700 hours on 4 June 1942, Rear Admiral Fletcher had reduced the distance between his carrier task forces and the Japanese carriers to about 155 miles (248 km). Fletcher and Spruance intended to operate their task forces separately, but never far apart.
Rear Admiral Spruance knew that the first wave of Japanese carrier aircraft had struck Midway about 0630, and he believed that these aircraft would be likely to return to their carriers about 0830. Although he would have preferred to reduce the range still further, he ordered the Enterprise and Hornet air groups to launch at 0700. The Hornet began launching its strike group at 0700, with the torpedo bomber squadron (VT-8) last to leave the carrier. Enterprise began launching thirty-three Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive-bombers at 0706. The SBDs circled above Enterprise and wasted precious fuel for half an hour while waiting for the fighters and torpedo bombers to join them.
A number of factors caused the lengthy delay in the launch of the Enterprise torpedo bombers and fighters. Spruance had decided to hit the Japanese hard with his full air groups, but only half of a carrier air group could be on the flight deck at the same time. After the SBDs were launched, the torpedo bombers and fighters had to be brought up from the hangar and prepared for launching. A torpedo plane broke down. Ordnance had to be switched on some planes. Spruance was so eager to catch the Japanese by surprise, while their flight decks were congested with aircraft landing, and being refuelled and rearmed, that he finally ordered his airborne dive-bombers to head for the expected position of the Japanese carriers at 0745 without waiting for their Wildcat fighter escorts to take off from the carrier. If the American aircrews had been as experienced and as battle-toughened as their Japanese opponents, it would not have been a risky decision. The American torpedo and dive-bombers aboard the carriers at Midway were underpowered and slow and, in theory at least, the Wildcat fighters should have been able to overtake and escort their bombers to the Japanese carriers.
The attack groups from Hornet and Enterprise set course for the anticipated position of Nagumo's carriers on the assumption that he was unaware of the presence of American carriers so close to him, and was continuing on his south-easterly course for Midway. However, after recovering all of his Midway strike aircraft at 0917, Nagumo had made a 70-degree change in course to the north-east, and was making preparations to attack the American carrier sighted by the Tone scout seaplane.
The commander of the Hornet Air Group failed to rendezvous with his own Torpedo Squadron Eight (VT-8). He also failed to locate the Japanese carriers, and his dive-bombers and fighters either flew on to Midway or returned to their carrier.
While it was clearly imperative for the Americans to strike, if possible, before Vice Admiral Nagumo was able to launch his own air strike at their carriers, the American Navy had a history of problems in coordinating torpedo, dive-bomber and fighter strikes, even when those aircraft were all launched from the same carrier. This flaw in American naval aviation training, when combined with obsolete aircraft, defective torpedoes, lack of combat experience, and rushed aircraft launches on this particular day, would all combine to produce tragic consequences for American Navy torpedo bomber aircrews and bring the United States very close to a major defeat on this morning of 4 June 1942.
The courage of American pilots proves a match for Japan's overwhelming naval power
Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, leading his squadron of fifteen obsolete Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers from USS Hornet (Torpedo Squadron VT-8), responded to the failure of the fighters and dive-bombers of the Hornet Air Group to rendezvous with his squadron by leading his bombers away from their original course in a north-westerly direction. He was troubled by the fact that his torpedo squadron had not been joined by its Wildcat fighter escorts from Hornet. He knew that the Devastator was slow and very vulnerable to attack by the fast and nimble Japanese Zero fighter. However, he saw his duty as being to find the Japanese carriers and sink them if he could, and he pressed on. Waldron found Nagumo's carriers at 0920, and ordered his aircraft to attack even though they had no fighter escorts.
Although the attack was pressed home with great courage, the Japanese Zero fighters guarding the carriers overwhelmed the low-flying American torpedo bombers and shot them all down before torpedoes could be launched. Only one American airman survived this attack. The attack by Hornet's VT-8 was over by 0936, and no damage was caused to any of the Japanese ships.
Two further waves of American Navy TBD Devastator torpedo bombers followed Waldron in low-altitude attacks on the Japanese carriers, and although these attacks were also pressed home with great courage, most of the American bombers were shot down by the swarming Zeros or by intense anti-aircraft fire.
Torpedo Squadron VT-6 from USS Enterprise, led by Lieutenant Commander Eugene E. Lindsey, attacked the carrier Kaga with fourteen TBDs at 0940. At twenty miles out from the big carrier, Lindsey split his squadron into two groups with the intention of attacking Kaga from both sides. It took almost twenty minutes for the lumbering TBDs to catch up with the fast moving Japanese carrier, and during that time, the deadly Zeros took their toll. Lindsey was himself an early casualty. Owing to a failure of radio communications, calls for help from VT-6 failed to reach the Enterprise Wildcats which were flying high above the deadly action at sea level. Ten TBDs were shot down during their approach to the carrier, and the remaining four TBDs launched their torpedoes at about 0958. No hits on Kaga were registered. The four surviving TBDs cleared the Japanese carrier force shortly after 1000.
Yorktown's Air Group attacks Hiryu and Soryu
The performance of USS Yorktown's Air Group on this morning was exceptional. Assisted by highly professional staff work on Yorktown, the three squadrons of the Air Group were guided by their commanders almost directly to the Japanese carrier force. Led by Lieutenant Commander Lance E. Massey, the twelve torpedo bombers of Torpedo Squadron Three (VT-3) took off from Yorktown at 0845. The Yorktown TBDs were escorted by six Wildcat fighters of Fighter Squadron Three (VF-3) led by the renowned Lieutenant Commander John S. "Jimmy" Thach. Massey sighted the Japanese carriers at about 1005. At 1010, the Yorktown torpedo bombers were sighted by the Japanese screen warship Chikuma, and at 1015, Massey's torpedo squadron came under heavy attack from the swarming Zeros.
Thach's Wildcat fighter escort was attacked by Zeros at the same time, and the Wildcats were so heavily outnumbered that they could do nothing but defend themselves. Lieutenant Commander Thach described the Zero attack on his fighters:
"Several Zeros came in on a head-on attack on the (Yorktown) torpedo planes....a number of Zeros were coming down in a string on our fighters. The air was just like a beehive. I was utterly convinced that we weren't any of us coming back because there were so many Zeros."
Commander Tom Cheek (then a Warrant Machinist) was flying in Lieutenant Commander Thach's Fighter Squadron VF-3 and following the progress of VT-3 closely. He provides a gripping story of his encounter with the agile Zero fighters protecting the Japanese carrier fleet:
"We were approaching an area of tall cumulus clouds, rising from fifteen-hundred feet bases in towering, grayish-white columns across our course, when Yorktown's torpedo formation made an abrupt change of course to the right. I followed, penciling the time and new compass heading on the left sleeve of my flight jacket. Adrenaline began to flow. Something was about to happen! I also had a decision to make. My TBD formation was now on course between two of the large cumulus build-ups that were joined at their bases by a shelf of cloud. The shelf extended from the cloud base to at least five hundred feet above my altitude. Should I climb over the shelf or drop down to the formation’s level and go under the cloud deck as it appeared they would do.
Moments later the question was of no consequence as black puffs of anti-aircraft fire blossomed below and ahead. Then an object I thought to be a belly tank whirled down in the path of the TBD formation. Looking up, I saw my first enemy aircraft, a Zero fighter. Silhouetted against the cloud shelf, the Zero was in a shallow dive and making a head-on run at the lead TBD. Puffs of white spouted from the Zero’s engine cowling as, at extreme range, the pilot tripped off a short burst from his 7.7mm guns. Without hesitating, the Zero rolled into a steep climbing left turn, then leveled off in a wide, sweeping flat turn to the right.
I was momentarily spellbound watching the fighter's clean, seemingly effortless maneuvers. Within seconds, the Zero was in position to make a firing run on the last plane on the TBD formation's right flank. Nosing down slightly, the pilot continued his curving approach, five hundred feet above and slightly to my right, as though I had not yet been seen. I moved my engine controls into combat power range, and pushed the throttle to the forward stop. Easing back on the control stick until the F4F was hanging on the prop, I brought the gunsight pip to an almost full deflection lead on the Zero's nose. The index finger of my right hand squeezed down on the gun trigger set in the molded grip of the control stick. The six .50 caliber wing guns rumbled. I held the trigger down just long enough to see the red stream of tracers converge into the Zero's engine and start to drift back into the fuselage. The thought flashed through my mind, right down the target sleeve's throat. But this was no target sleeve!
The Zero's nose bucked up momentarily, dropped back, then the plane came diving down in my direction. At the moment, my guns were firing and the tracers were curving up and into their target. I was literally hanging in air. The muzzle blast and recoil of the six fifties was all that was needed to push my overloaded, underpowered F4F over the edge into a control sloppy stall. As I let my fighter's nose drop, and started a recovery rolling to the left, the Zero swept past on my right with black smoke and flames spewing from the engine, and a river of fire trailing back along its belly. Clearly visible, the pilot sat rigidly facing straight ahead. "He is dead!" flashed across my mind. Alive, he would have been watching me, looking for any movement of my control surfaces, anticipating my next move. Teruo Kawamata, PO3c, Imperial Japanese Navy, would be listed as missing in action that night."
This short extract is drawn from Commander Cheek's story of the action of Yorktown's Fighting Squadron Three at Midway on 4 June 1942 called "A Ring of Coral". The full story of Commander Cheek's battle with the Zeros at Midway can be viewed on this web-site.
Although deprived of support from their fighter escort, Massey's TBDs courageously pressed home their attack on the Japanese carrier force. Massey was one of the first casualties. He was observed standing on the wing of his burning plane as it plunged towards the sea. The remaining TBDs focussed their attacks on the carrier Hiryu, and dropped several torpedoes between 1020 and 1030. The captain of Hiryu skilfully evaded all of the American torpedoes. VT-3 lost all but two TBDs in this gallant but hopeless attack. The two surviving planes of VT-3 cleared the Japanese carriers and their screening warships at about 1035.
The few torpedoes that were launched from American torpedo bombers at the Battle of Midway were either evaded by skilful handling of the Japanese ships or failed to explode on impact. Despite these failures, the Japanese were deeply impressed by the bravery, discipline and self-sacrifice of the American airmen.
Can we explain the disarray produced in the Japanese carrier force by the American torpedo and B-17 attacks?
Japan's First Carrier Striking Force (Kido Butai) had built up a reputation for invincibility during the first six months of the Pacific War, and yet this powerful carrier force was repeatedly scattered and reduced to a disorganised shambles by successsive attacks launched by American torpedo planes and one high-level B-17 bomber attack. None of those eight attacks caused significant physical damage to a Japanese carrier. Perhaps it is time to consider how this could have happened before passing on to the next phase of the Battle at Midway.
The serious flaws in the Japanese planning of their Midway offensive have already been mentioned under Preparations. The operation was too complex; the huge Japanese fleet was dispersed too widely. The Japanese Navy planners believed that Japan was invincible in war, and made the fatal mistake of underrating American military capabilities and response. They believed that Americans lacked courage, fighting skills, and discipline. They compounded this mistake with an over-confident belief that the Japanese strategy would take the United States completely by surprise, and that Japan would retain the initiative throughout the complex Midway offensive. The assumption that the Japanese attack would take the Americans by surprise led to Japan's First Carrier Striking Force (Kido Butai ) being assigned two major missions at Midway. The first was to neutralise the defences of the two small Midway islands by aerial bombardment. When the first mission had been completed, the second, and more vital mission, was to lie in wait off Midway for the expected arrival of aircraft carriers of the United States Pacific Fleet on or soon after 6 June, and destroy the American fleet. The Japanese appear to have failed to appreciate that both missions could be compromised if unforeseen circumstances forced them to be undertaken simultaneously.
The management of the Japanese carrier force at Midway by Vice Admiral Nagumo left a lot to be desired. The Japanese created a major operational problem for themselves by drawing aircraft from all four carriers for the first strike at Midway. This meant that the operational status of all four Japanese carriers was going to be compromised by recovery operations when the first attack wave returned from Midway. During that recovery operation, it would be almost impossible to launch strike aircraft quickly from any of the Japanese carriers if danger suddenly threatened from an American carrier force. If the Japanese had assembled and launched their first attack wave from only two carriers instead of four, that would have left the remaining two Japanese carriers fully operational to repel an American carrier attack and strike back at the American carriers.
Organisational chaos in the management of his carriers almost certainly contributed to the pressure on Nagumo, but other factors probably contributed to the shambles that occurred. The Japanese feared torpedo attack more than dive-bombing, or any other form of bombing. This fear was almost certainly attributable to their own possession of the deadliest torpedo in the Pacific in 1942. Their Type 93 "Long Lance" torpedoes were fast, reliable, and deadly over very long distances.The Americans had no similar torpedo, and this was largely owing to "penny-pinching" by Congress during the 1930s. The American Mark XV torpedo lacked all of the features of the Japanese torpedo mentioned above. Perhaps the most alarming feature of the American torpedo was its unreliablity. It freqently failed to explode on contact with a target. However, the Japanese were unlikely to know at Midway how little they had to fear from American torpedoes.
It is also likely that fear of American torpedoes was compounded by the resolute manner in which the American airmen pressed home their torpedo attacks without protection from fighter escorts. It would normally be unthinkable for Japanese carrier bombers to attack without fighter escorts. The Japanese had been taught that Americans were poor fighters who lacked courage and discipline. It must have been very disquieting for the Japanese to see American airmen sacrificing themselves in a manner that they would equate with the selfless courage of samurai. The Japanese could not have known that most of the young American airmen had no combat experience and that many were under-trained in torpedo attacks.
All of these factors probably combined at Midway to place the First Carrier Striking Force under pressure of a kind that it had never experienced before. The Japanese carriers had experienced their first combat training off the coast of China. Since 1937, Japanese carrier pilots and aircrews had been honing their combat skills by slaughtering civilians in poorly defended Chinese cities and shooting down poorly trained Chinese pilots in mostly obsolescent aircraft. This was made easier by their possession of the Zero which was the finest fighter in the Pacific during 1941 and 1942.
The sneak attack by Nagumo's carriers on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, in peacetime and on a Sunday morning, can be compared with stabbing a sleeping man in the back. The massive air attack on the lightly defended port of Darwin by Nagumo's carriers on 19 February 1942 was also equivalent to stabbing a sleeping man in the back. Finally, we have the foray into the Indian Ocean by Nagumo's carriers in April 1942. Faced with this threat, the British Eastern Fleet chose to withdraw to the west, and Nagumo had to be satisfied with sinking the elderly British light aircraft carrier Hermes and two heavy cruisers. These three warships had each been operating independently when attacked by the Japanese carrier fleet. Coral Sea was real carrier combat at last, and that fierce action deprived Admiral Yamamoto of the services at Midway of two of his six best fleet carriers, Shokaku and Zuikaku, and one light carrier Shoho.
The Japanese believed themselves to be invincible, but that belief was not based on really tough combat experience. When faced with determined American opposition of the kind that they experienced at Midway, the Zero fighter could not save the Japanese. They appear to have lacked the toughness required to meet the American challenge and fell into disarray.
Enterprise and Yorktown SBD dive-bombers destroy Akagi, Kaga and Soryu
At 1020 hours on 4 June 1942, the flight decks of Akagi, Kaga, Soryu,and Hiryu were still wholly devoted to recovering, rearming, refuelling, and relaunching more than forty Zero fighters that were protecting Japan's First Carrier Striking Force (Kido Butai) against successive attacks by American Navy torpedo squadrons that had begun with Lieutenant Commander Waldron's VT-8 attack at 0920. Below the flight decks, the hangar decks of the four Japanese carriers were crowded with bombers loaded with anti-ship bombs and torpedoes, and fuelled for an impending strike at an American carrier force. Fragmentation bombs that had been intended for a second attack on Midway had been carelessly stacked about the hangars instead of having been returned to the magazines. All four Japanese carriers could fairly be described as floating powder kegs.
At this critical stage of the battle, when America appeared to be losing, thirty Dauntless SBD dive-bombers from the carrier USS Enterprise suddenly appeared high in the sky above the scattered Japanese carrier fleet. These Dauntless SBDs were led by Lieutenant Commander C. Wade McClusky, and had been the first aircraft launched from Enterprise by Rear Admiral Spruance at 0706 that morning.
Wade McCluskey found Vice Admiral Nagumo's carriers by an extraordinary stroke of luck. He had been engaged in a fruitless search for the Japanese carriers when he observed the Japanese destroyer Arashi speeding in a north-easterly direction. McCluskey suspected that the destroyer was one of Nagumo's carrier force screening warships and decided to follow it in the hope that the destroyer would lead him to the Japanese carriers. His SBD dive-bombers had already been in the air for almost three hours and their fuel situation was reaching critical. The prospect of all of McClusky's SBDs failing to return to Enterprise was a very real one. Despite this grave risk, McClusky was determined to find and attack the Japanese carriers if he could.
At 1005, McClusky's hunch was rewarded by the sight of the multiple wakes of the Japanese carrier fleet about 35 miles ahead of him. As his SBDs closed with the carrier fleet, McClusky could see that two of the carriers were in fairly close proximity to each other. These would prove to be Akagi, and Kaga. Another carrier (Soryu) was further to the east. A fourth carrier (Hiryu) was a long way off on the northern horizon. The critical fuel situation facing his aircrews became apparent to McClusky when the engine of Ensign Tony Schneider's SBD suddenly coughed and died. The unfortunate pilot was forced to veer sharply away and glide as far as he could from the Japanese fleet before ditching in the sea.
Through his binoculars, McClusky could see that the three closest Japanese carriers were manoeuvring frantically to avoid an attack by American Navy torpedo bombers. The attacking aircraft were in fact Yorktown's Torpedo Squadron Three (VT-3). McClusky was amazed to find no Zeros barring their path to the Japanese carriers. There was not a moment to lose, and McClusky broke radio silence to assign targets. He assigned one carrier (Kaga) as his target and another (Akagi) to Lieutenant Richard H. "Dick" Best's Bombing Six. At 1022, McClusky pushed over his SBD and plunged like a vengeful thunderbolt on Kaga. Twenty-six of his SBDs followed him in the dive on Kaga.
Captain N. J. "Dusty" Kleiss (then Lieutenant (j.g.) Kleiss in Scouting Six) describes the extraordinary experience that changed the course of the Pacific War:
"We went into echelon formation. McClusky and his two wing men dived first, then Gallaher and two wing men, then me, and then the rest of Scouting Six, all heading for the Kaga. Dick Best and Bombing Six dived for the Akagi. The Yorktown dive-bombers dived for the Soryu. The situation was a carrier pilot's dream. No anti-aircraft; all three carriers heading straight into the wind. McClusky and his two wing men missed. Earl Gallaher's 500-pound bomb hit squarely on a plane starting its take-off. His two 100-pound incendiaries hit just beside it. Immediately the whole pack of planes at the stern were in flames fifty feet high. I couldn't see the bombs landing from the next two planes, but flames had spread to the middle of the ship. My bombs landed exactly on the big red circle forward of the bridge. Seconds later, the flames were 100 feet high. Walter Lord * later learned from the Japanese that my bomb splashed a gasoline cart, throwing its flaming contents into the Kaga's bridge. A fighter attacked us as I pulled out of my dive. John Snowden, my gunner, disposed of him in five seconds. A second fighter came at us. John disposed of him. Then it was a survival to escape anti-aircraft fire while passing near a dozen ships until I'd reached ten miles toward Midway. Ten minutes after the attack, I saw a large explosion amidship on the Kaga. Rockets of flame, pieces of steel bolted upward to about three or four thousand feet high. Dick Best's squadron had bombed the Akagi and the Yorktown bombers hit the Soryu. Both were burning fiercely."
* Note: Walter Lord is the author of "Midway: The Incredible Victory", 1967.
Lieutenant Commander McClusky had breached dive-bombing doctrine by diving on Kaga instead of the more distant Akagi. As the trailing squadron, Lieutenant Dick Best's Bombing Six should have dived on Kaga. McClusky's Scouting Six, which was the leading squadron, should have flown further on and dived on Akagi. Dick Best did not receive McClusky's assignment of targets by radio, and followed doctrine by preparing to dive on Kaga. He was startled when McClusky and Scouting Six flashed past him in their own dive on Kaga. With commendable presence of mind, Best retrieved the potentially dangerous situation by closing his dive-flaps and signalling Bombing Six to follow him towards Akagi. It was too late! McClusky's error caused all of Bombing Six except Best's two wing men to follow McClusky and Scouting Six in their dive on Kaga. The seriousness of McClusky's error can only be fully appreciated when it is realised that it could have led all of the Enterprise SBDs to attack Kaga and leave the Japanese flagship Akagi untouched!
Lieutenant Best then led his two wing men in an independent attack on Akagi at 1026. Best was equally amazed to find no Zeros barring his dive on the Japanese flagship.
Many years later, Lieutenant Commander Richard H. "Dick" Best, USN (Ret.) described the attack that he led on the Japanese flagship Akagi during the " famous five minutes" that turned the tide of the Pacific War against the Japanese invaders:
"....when we sighted the Japanese carriers I was 5, 000 feet under (Wade McClusky). He assigned targets by radio, which I didn't receive. When abreast of the nearest carrier, I called him to say that I was attacking according to doctrine (i.e., leading aircraft take the far target and trailing planes take the nearer targets) and thus share the surprise. I turned toward the nearest carrier (Kaga), split to either side of my second and third divisions. When nearly over the target with my division in column, I started to open my dive flaps when right in front of me, and from above, the AGC (McClusky) and Scouting Six came pouring in. Furious at the foul-up, I tried to cause my squadron to rejoin, but without success, and I took my first section of three planes toward the next carrier (Akagi).
I was at full throttle nose down so that when I approached the push over point, I was going too fast to open my dive flaps. Horsed up on the stick, I was at 14,000 feet before I slowed down sufficiently to open my flaps. With all of the violent manoeuvring, we were not detected and there was no AA fire or any other sign of awareness. We came in at a 70-degree dive angle, released at 2,000 feet, and were cocked back at a steep climb angle to observe the bombing results. The first bomb hit forward of the bridge and tore up the deck. The second bomb hit the lead fighter on the fan tail of a group of six or seven Zeros, which were in the process of launching (the first Zero ran through my bomb sight as I put my eye to the telescope at 3,500 feet). The third bomb hit among the Zeros, and probably was the bomb that jammed the rudder and had the Akagi mindlessly circling as long as she stayed afloat.
As we exited, we flew through a covey of Zeros on the reverse course and apparently attempting to get in position ahead of a torpedo squadron still in tight formation. (note: this was Yorktown's VT-3 attacking Hiryu). Our exit course was taking us directly to the carrier Soryu further to the east, which was under attack from Bombing Three (VB-3) from the Yorktown. The Japanese only credit four or five hits, though I think it was nine or ten. It was completely engulfed in smoke and flames and erupting explosions as the bombs hit."
The full account by Lieutenant Commander Best of his dive-bombing attacks on the Japanese carrier fleet at Midway can be viewed on this web-site.
At 1028, Lieutenant Commander Maxwell F. Leslie arrived over the carrier Soryu leading the sixteen dive-bombers of Bombing Squadron Three (VB-3) from Yorktown. Leslie was surprised to find no Zeros barring the path of his dive-bombers to the Japanese carrier far below. Seizing the extraordinary opportunity, Leslie pushed his SBD over into a steep dive on the carrier and was followed by his squadron.
MIDWAY: THE TURNING POINT
A powerful Japanese aircraft carrier strike force has just attacked America's Midway Islands on the morning of 4 June 1942. This dramatic image depicts the Japanese carrier Soryu under attack by SBD Dauntless dive-bombers from the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (CV-5). USS Yorktown played a vital role in stemming Japanese military aggression at Coral Sea and Lae in early 1942, and turning the tide of the Pacific War at Midway. However, the infuriated Japanese struck back during the afternoon of 4 June, and eventually were able to sink this gallant ship.
The Zero fighters that should have been above the Japanese carriers Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu, and guarding them from high-altitude dive-bomber attacks, had all been drawn down close to sea level to intercept and destroy the slow, low-flying TBD torpedo planes from Yorktown that had been attacking the separated Japanese carrier Hiryu between 1020 and 1030. The American dive-bombers hurtling down from a great height on the three Japanese carriers had only to be concerned about intense anti-aircraft fire.
The American bombs struck the flight decks of Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu, and penetrated to the hangars below that were crammed with fuelled and armed bombers. The exploding bombs triggered massive chain reaction explosions fuelled by the Japanese bombers and fighters waiting to be launched at the American carriers. Within minutes all three carriers were reduced to fiercely burning hulks.
The unforgetable sight of the attack by Yorktown's Bombing Squadron Three (VB-3) on Soryu was witnessed by Lieutenant Commander John S "Jimmy" Thach of Yorktown's Fighting Squadron Three (VF-3):
"....then I saw a glint in the sun that looked like a beautiful silver waterfall. It was the (Yorktown) dive-bombers coming in. I could see them very well because they came from the same direction as the Zeros. I'd never seen such superb dive-bombing. After the dive-bomber attack was over, I stayed there. I could only see three carriers, and one of them was burning with bright pink flames and sometimes blue flames. I remember gauging the height of those flames by the length of the ship, the distance was about the same. It was just solid flame going skyward and there was a lot of smoke on top of that. Before I left the scene, I saw three carriers burning pretty furiously."
An equally dramatic picture of the destruction of the Japanese carriers is provided by Commander Tom Cheek in his own Yorktown Wildcat:
"As I broke free of the cloud base, I searched to the right and ahead for my torpedo planes. There were no aircraft in sight. As two puffballs of AA blossomed in the direction I was searching, I looked closer - still nothing in sight. Then one, two, three more puffs of black popped up, each successively closer to me. Realizing I was the target, I glanced down to the left and found a large cruiser of a design I had never before seen. With its bow splitting the water in a foamy white wave ("a bone in its teeth"), whatever its destination, the ship was wasting no time getting there.
I pushed over and rolling right, dove for the ocean, leveling off at a hundred feet above the water. Swinging back to the left, I found what the clouds had kept hidden from me. There before me was the target, the First Carrier Striking Force. Ahead, and on a course to my left, were three large carriers, all with bow waves and stern wakes that indicated a high rate of speed. These were later identified as Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu. The fact that there should have been a fourth carrier, Hiryu, failed to register in my memory.
Kaga was in the lead, with Akagi not more than three miles broadside to and directly ahead of me. Soryu, which I compared to Enterprise in size, was a mile beyond and to the right of Akagi, and appeared to be just starting a hard turn to starboard. Flashes of gunfire spotted the decks of nearby escorts, but I saw no shell burst or possible targets. It appeared I had the sky to myself.
A brief thought flashed across my mind: should I make a strafing run on the nearest carrier? Then as I looked back to Akagi, hell literally broke loose. First, the orange-colored flash of a bomb burst appeared on the flight deck, midway between the island structure and the stern. Then in rapid succession, followed a bomb burst midship, and the water founts of near misses plumed up near the stern. Almost in unison, on my left, Kaga's flight deck erupted with bomb bursts and flames. My gaze remained on Akagi as an explosion at the midship waterline seemed to open the bowels of the ship in a rolling, greenish-yellow ball of flame. A black cloud of smoke drew my attention to Soryu, still in a turn to starboard. She too was being heavily hit. Dense black smoke billowed from the entire length of her hull. All three ships had lost their foaming white bow waves and appeared to be losing way.
I circled slowly to the right; awe-struck; my mind trying desperately to grasp the full impact of what I had just witnessed, and the scene still in motion. In reading the script, the briefing team had voiced this destructive happening as only a hoped-for possibility. The infernos I now watched in creation were not being viewed from a comfortable seat in a movie, but from atop a parachute pack in a Grumman fighter."
This extract is also drawn from "Ring of Coral" and can be viewed on this web-site.
If McCluskey's dive-bombers had not arrived over the Japanese carriers at the same time as the single dive-bomber squadron from Yorktown, and joined the Yorktown squadron in almost simultaneous attacks on Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu, there is a very real possibility that the Battle of Midway could have ended quite differently. In battles, luck can often be as important as sound planning and judgment. If Lieutenant Best had not had the presence of mind to switch target quickly from Kaga to Akagi, the Japanese flagship Akagi would almost certainly have survived the attack at 1022. Again, the Battle of Midway could have ended differently.
Unfortunately for the Americans, Admiral Nagumo's fourth fleet carrier Hiryu was steaming far ahead of the other three Japanese carriers and escaped the American dive-bomber attack. Aboard Hiryu at this time was the commander of Carrier Division 2 of the First Carrier Striking Force, Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi. Yamaguchi was one of Japan's most able and daring commanders of carrier air operations. Undeterred by the fate of Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu, Yamaguchi held course for the expected location of the American carriers, and prepared to launch his own air strike against them. At this stage, he only believed that he was facing Enterprise and Hornet. The Japanese would not have expected that Yorktown could have been repaired in time to participate in the battle at Midway.
Did the sacrifice of US Navy, Army and Marine squadrons between 0705 hours and 1022 hours make a significant contribution to the American victory at Midway?
Between 0705 hours and 1022 hours on 4 June 1942, five Midway-based US Navy, Army, and Marine bomber squadrons and three US Navy carrier-launched torpedo bomber squadrons made eight separate attacks on Japan's First Carrier Striking Force at the Battle of Midway. None of these attacks inflicted significant physical damage on the Japanese carriers, and lacking fighter escorts, the dive-bomber and torpedo-bomber squadrons from Midway and all carrier-launched torpedo squadrons were savaged by Zero fighters and few returned. The question is sometimes asked, "Did those lost aircrews make any significant contribution to the American victory at Midway?" It is an important question that deserves a considered response because some military historians have failed to appreciate the significance of these attacks in laying the foundation for the American victory.
The correct answer to the question is "yes". I believe that it is a mistake to separate and compartmentalise the five successive bombing attacks from Midway and the three US Navy carrier-launched torpedo attacks. Those eight separate attacks formed a sequence of events that combined to throw the First Carrier Striking Force off balance, and keep it off balance between 0705 and 1022. The unaccustomed pressure appears to have produced serious command decision errors. The attacks prevented the Japanese launching their own air strikes and, by scattering their carriers and diffusing the protective Zero screen over those carriers, rendered the First Carrier Striking Force highly vulnerable to attack by the high-flying US Navy SBD dive-bombers that accompanied the Navy torpedo planes from Enterprise and Yorktown.
The resolute American counter-attacks from Midway, pressed home courageously without fighter escort by successive waves of American bombers, compelled the Japanese carriers to undertake frantic evasive manoeuvres that broke up their tight battle formation and scattered the Japanese warships and their protective fighter patrols. To protect the scattered Japanese carriers adequately, the commander of the Zero combat air patrol was forced to supplement the fighter screen above the carriers by drawing on reserves intended to support a second wave attack on Midway Atoll. When he was satisfied that there were enough Zeros aloft to protect the dispersed carriers, there were none left to escort an anti-ship strike when the proximity of an American carrier force was reported to Vice Admiral Nagumo at 0820. Having been deprived by the Midway-based attacks of a capacity to launch a strike at the American carrier force, Vice Admiral Nagumo elected instead to recover his first attack wave between 0837 and 0917.
The determined attacks by the three US Navy carrier torpedo squadrons between 0920 and 1022 also forced the Japanese carriers to take frantic evasive action that scattered the fleet and turned its battle formation into a shambles. By 1022, Hiryu was out of sight of the flagship Akagi and well to the north of the main formation. Kaga and Soryu were still within sight of Akagi, but the distance between the carriers had widened from the prescribed 1,500 yards to a distance ranging from 4,500 to 6,000 yards. The wide scattering of the Japanese carrier fleet also increased the dispersal of the protective Zero fighter cover that normally patrolled at varying heights above the carriers in their normal compact battle formation.
The successive attacks by these three US Navy torpedo squadrons, pressed home resolutely and with appalling losses, kept the Japanese carrier flight decks fully occupied with activities related to recovering, rearming, refuelling, and relaunching about fifty Zero fighters that were protecting the carriers. This point has been made by Jon Parshall, an internationally recognised expert on Imperial Japanese Navy operational doctrine:
"Taken together, it is apparent that spotting a twenty-one plane strike for launch would take around forty minutes total, and another five to ten minutes would be required for the launch....Thus if Nagumo was to attack the American strike force, he needed to find an unbroken forty-five minute window of opportunity on all four flight decks during which to spot and then launch his strike".
See: "Doctrine Matters: Why the Japanese lost at Midway", Naval War College Review, 2001.
A close examination of the sequence of eight separate torpedo and bombing attacks between 0705 and 1022 does not indicate the existence of that "unbroken forty-five minute window of opportunity on all four flight decks". During that time, the successive American torpedo and bombing attacks made it impossible for the Japanese to move bombers from the hangars to the flight decks and prepare them for launching either at Midway or the American carrier fleet detected by the Tone scout at 0820.
The Yorktown's torpedo squadron VT-3 focussed its attack on the far distant Hiryu. VT-3 drew the protective Zero screen down to sea level and away from their stations above Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu. By doing so, VT-3 opened the door for the devastating attacks on Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu by the dive-bomber squadrons from Enterprise and Yorktown. In my opinion, it is no exaggeration to assert that the heroism and sacrifices of the US Navy, Army and Marine torpedo and bombing squadrons between 0705 and 1022 made a vital contribution to the American victory that was ultimately secured by the dive-bomber squadrons.
The Japanese strike back at USS Yorktown
Hiryu's commander, Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, was not a man to be deterred by the disaster that had befallen the other three Japanese carriers of the First Carrier Striking Force. He was enraged by the loss of Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu, and bent upon vengeance. At 1054 hours*, about thirty minutes after he had evaded the last torpedo aimed at his carrier by Yorktown's torpedo squadron VT-3, Yamaguchi began launching a retaliatory strike to search for the American carriers. Hiryu's first strike comprised eighteen Val dive-bombers and six escorting Zero fighters, and was led by Lieutenant Michio Kobayashi, a veteran of every Nagumo Force campaign. Kobayashi's aircraft overtook American aircraft returning to Yorktown, and stealthily shadowed them to their carrier which was still separated from Enterprise and Hornet.
The USS Yorktown battles for her life as the gallant ship takes the full brunt of the Japanese counter-attack at Midway.
The first Japanese Attack leaves USS Yorktown dead in the Water
Just before noon on 4 June, Admiral Fletcher launched ten Dauntless dive bombers from Yorktown to search for Hiryu. These aircraft had only just been launched when the approaching Japanese strike force from Hiryu was detected on Yorktown's radar. Wildcat fighters of Yorktown's combat air patrol were launched to defend their carrier. Although the defending American fighters were able to shoot down ten of the incoming Japanese dive bombers, eight breached the American fighter screen. Heavy anti-aircraft fire from Yorktown and her escorting warships downed another two Japanese bombers, but six penetrated the lethal fire-storm to launch their attack and Yorktown was struck by three bombs. One bomb exploded on impact with the flight deck, producing a large hole and killing or wounding many crewmen. Another bomb hit and penetrated the forward elevator, but caused no serious damage. However, the third bomb penetrated the flight deck and exploded deep within the carrier, putting most of the boilers out of action, and leaving the ship dead in the water. Only five Japanese dive bombers and three Zeros returned to Hiryu. Lieutenant Kobayashi was among those who failed to return.
Yorktown was now highly vulnerable to attack. The holes in her flight deck prevented launching and recovery of aircraft. Yorktown's aircraft returning from the attack on Soryu were either diverted to Enterprise or forced to ditch in the sea if they were running out of fuel. With his ship immobilised, Rear Admiral Fletcher was forced to move his flag to one of his escort cruisers USS Astoria. In a selfless and patriotic act, he also passed overall command of both American task forces to Rear Admiral Spruance, thereby ensuring that Spruance would get the major credit for a great victory that had largely been won by Fletcher.
With the threat of further Japanese air attacks a real possibility, the crew of Yorktown worked frantically to repair the damage to the flight deck and get their ship fully operational. By about 1400, Yorktown was under way again, but could only manage about 20 knots speed.
The Japanese launch a second Strike at USS Yorktown
Meanwhile back aboard Hiryu, Rear Admiral Yamaguchi had received startling news from the pilot of a Japanese reconnaissance plane. Hiryu was facing not two American aircraft carriers, but three. Yamaguchi was stunned to learn that Yorktown had survived the Battle of the Coral Sea and was one of the three American carriers pitted against him. Although taken aback by this news, the commander of Hiryu was determined to continue attacking the American carriers regardless of the cost to his own ship and aircrews. Shortly after 1245, Yamaguchi launched ten Nakajima Type 97 torpedo bombers (Allied code name "Kate") and six Zero fighter escorts towards the American carriers. The second strike was led by Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga who had earlier that day led the strike against the Midway islands. Tomonaga's torpedo bomber had returned from Midway with a damaged fuel tank and he knew that the attack on the American carriers would be a one-way trip for him. Despite this knowledge, he insisted on leading the second strike in his damaged aircraft. At 1426, Hiryu's second attack group sighted an American carrier moving with its escorting warships. The survivors of the first attack on Yorktown had reported that the carrier had been left badly damaged and dead in the water. When he ordered his torpedo bomber crews to disperse and attack this operational carrier from different directions at 1432, it did not occur to Tomonaga that they were attacking Yorktown again.
Yorktown was indeed operational, and with advance radar warning, had managed to launch several fighters to meet the Japanese torpedo bombers. Despite heavy anti-aircraft fire, and the best efforts of American combat air patrol fighters, some Japanese torpedo bombers were able to penetrate the carrier's protective screen and deliver a skilfully coordinated attack from both sides of the carrier simultaneously. Yorktown's commander skilfully evaded two air-launched torpedoes, but the damaged carrier was eventually struck by two torpedoes at 1442. The torpedoes ripped open the hull of the carrier, and as seawater flooded in, the ship developed an alarming 24 degree list. The Commanding Officer , Captain Elliot Buckmaster, became concerned that Yorktown would capsize, and ordered his crew to abandon their ship.
Lieutenant Tomonaga was seen to fly his damaged bomber directly into a storm of anti-aircraft fire, and drop his torpedo. A moment later, his aircraft exploded. Only five Japanese torpedo bombers and three Zero fighters returned to Hiryu. When the last aircraft returned to the Japanese carrier at 1630, Rear Admiral Yamaguchi found that his air group was reduced to six Zero fighters, five dive-bombers and five torpedo bombers. Despite having so few aircraft left, Yamaguchi was determined to launch a third attack on the American carriers at dusk when the prospect of breaching the American carrier defences with such a small attack group would be greater.
The Americans find and attack Hiryu
Rear Admiral Spruance was determined to ensure that Hiryu did not escape unscathed, and launched forty Dauntless dive bombers from Enterprise and Hornet at Hiryu . The American dive bombers found Hiryu at 1703 on the afternoon of 4 June. The American aircraft had approached from the south-west with the sun behind them. Without the benefit of radar, the Japanese failed to detect the American bombers until they were overhead. Thirteen of the American dive bombers singled out Hiryu for attention. The rest attacked the escorting warships. Four bombs struck Hiryu and inflicted very heavy damage on the Japanese carrier. The deck surface of the forward elevator was blasted upwards. Fuelled and armed aircraft on the flight deck exploded, and the resulting fires cut off all access to and from the carrier's engine rooms where crew members were trapped. By 2123, the fires were raging out of control and Hiryu was dead in the water. When it became apparent that the carrier could not be saved, Rear Admiral Yamaguchi ordered his crew to abandon their ship at 0230 on 5 June. Admiral Yamaguchi and Captain Kaku both elected to remain on Hiryu and die with their ship. At 0510, Japanese destroyers fired torpedoes at their crippled carrier. Believing that Hiryu would quickly sink, the commander of the Japanese destroyers then ordered his ships to withdraw.
Crippled and burning, after an attack by American SBD Dauntless dive bombers, the Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryu would finally be sunk by Japanese destroyers.
The derelict Hiryu was still afloat shortly after sunrise on the following morning when a Japanese scout aircraft from the light carrier Hosho, which was attached to Admiral Yamamoto's Main Force, photographed the sinking carrier, and provided the dramatic photograph above. Hiryu finally sank a few hours later.
Yamamoto attempts to save face by Night Attacks on the American Carriers and Midway
With the loss of Vice Admiral Nagumo's four fleet carriers, Admiral Yamamoto realised that his Midway offensive had turned into a disaster for the Japanese Navy. He believed that he could still save face by concentrating his battleships and cruisers and launching night attacks on the Midway military installations and the two surviving American carriers and their warship escorts. The advantage in night actions would lie with the Japanese who had developed a high degree of technical skill in night fighting at sea, and Yamamoto was aware that the American carriers would be hampered by the difficulty of launching and recovering aircraft at night.
However, Rear Admiral Spruance had foreseen the possibility of a night attack on his carriers by Japanese warships, and had temporarily withdrawn his ships to the east. Shortly after midnight, on 5 June, when there was no longer a question of a night action, Spruance turned back in the hope of closing with the Japanese warships in time for a daylight air strike.
Fleeing from the Japanese defeat at Midway, the Japanese heavy cruiser Mikuma was hit by Dauntless SBD dive bombers from American carriers on 6 June 1942.
At 0300 hours on 5 June, Yamamoto realised that his face-saving gamble had failed, and cancelled the Midway operation. His decision came too late to prevent another disaster for the Japanese. The heavy cruisers Mogami and Mikuma had been approaching Midway to shell the installations and airfield runways when the Midway operation was cancelled. As the cruisers were withdrawing at high speed, an American submarine was sighted. While taking evasive action in the darkness, the two heavy cruisers collided and suffered serious damage. Leaving two destroyers as escorts for the slower-moving damaged cruisers, the rest of the Japanese Midway invasion force withdrew rapidly to the west. The two Japanese cruisers were bombed and further damaged by aircraft from Midway on 5 June. On 6 June, the two crippled Japanese cruisers were attacked on three occasions by Dauntless dive bombers from Enterprise and Hornet. Mikuma was turned into a shattered wreck, but Mogami, despite major damage, managed to reach safety in Japanese waters. Later that same day, an aircraft from Enterprise took the photograph of the sinking Mikuma which introduces this section. The Japanese Navy left the crew of Mikuma to die in the sea. Only two survivors were found alive when an American Navy ship reached the area three days later.
Rather than risk damage to his carriers from bombers based on Japanese-occupied Wake Island, Rear Admiral Spruance called off the chase on 6 June 1942 and set course for Pearl Harbor.
The Death of USS Yorktown
Despite her very severe battle damage, USS Yorktown refused to die. When the Americans found their carrier still afloat on the morning of 5 June, they hoped to tow her back to Pearl Harbor for repairs. The tug Vireo took Yorktown under tow. Despite efforts to lighten the carrier, the old tug could barely make headway. At daybreak on 6 June more destroyers arrived with Yorktown's crew members, who set to work jettisoning heavy moveable objects and taking counter-flooding measures to reduce the list. The destroyer USS Hammann tied up alongside Yorktown to provide the crippled carrier with power and other assistance.
Crippled by Japanese torpedoes, the USS Yorktown has been abandoned, but refuses to sink.
However, the angry Japanese had other ideas. On the morning of 5 June, a seaplane from the Japanese cruiser Chikuma had spotted the derelict carrier and reported that Yorktown was still afloat. When the Japanese discovered that Yorktown was still afloat, they were determined to exact revenge for the loss of four of their best fleet carriers. The Japanese submarine I-168 was ordered to sink the crippled aircraft carrier. Yorktown was being towed slowly back to Pearl Harbor on the afternoon of 6 June when torpedoes from the Japanese submarine hit the carrier and the USS Hammann. Both American ships received fatal damage in this attack, and many of the crew of Hammann were killed or severely injured.
American destroyers kept a respectful vigil over the stricken USS Yorktown during the night of 6-7 June. At 0458 on 7 June, as day was breaking, Yorktown finally succumbed to her massive battle injuries. Those members of her crew, who had remained to assist with the salvage operation, manned the rails of the carrier's guardian destroyers and many wept as their proud ship rolled over and slipped beneath the grey waters of the Pacific with her battle flag still flying.
There are few sights that are sadder than the death of a proud ship. USS Yorktown is about to slip beneath the grey waters of the Pacific. Young Australians and Americans should know that this ship and her gallant crew helped to save Australia, Hawaii and the chain of islands between them from Japanese occupation in 1942.
The Cost of Japan's Midway Offensive
The Japanese lost four of their best aircraft carriers, one heavy cruiser, and 322 aircraft. Another heavy cruiser was severely damaged. The Japanese lost at least one hundred highly skilled airmen, and hundreds of skilled air group support staff. Exact numbers are not known because the Japanese Navy went to extraordinary lengths to conceal the magnitude of its defeat at Midway, even to the extent of isolating survivors from their families.
The Americans lost Yorktown and its escort destroyer Hammann in the same torpedo attack by a Japanese submarine. The Americans lost 307 servicemen. The American dead included airmen who were recovered from the sea by the Japanese. After interrogating these American survivors of the battle, the angry Japanese promptly and brutally executed them. The damage to Midway installations was quickly repaired.
The Japanese remained in occupation of the islands of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians until May 1943. On 11 May 1943, American troops finally landed on Attu to oust the Japanese invaders. In the bloody Aleutians campaign, Japanese troops again exhibited the brutality towards non-combatants that characterised their military aggression. On 29 May, the Japanese launched a suicide attack on the American beachhead at Massacre Bay. The screaming Japanese troops, with fixed bayonets, overran the American defences and reached a field hospital where they murdered unarmed patients, medical staff and a chaplain.
Midway was the most important battle of the Pacific War
In the great naval battle at Midway between 4 and 6 June 1942 the three American aircraft carriers Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet won a remarkable and pivotal victory over the Imperial Japanese Navy. The loss by Japan of four of its six best aircraft carriers and several hundred of its most experienced and skilful aircrews marked the turning of the tide against Japan in the Pacific War. The crushing defeat inflicted on the Japanese Navy by the very much smaller United States Pacific Fleet put an end to Japan's ambition to dominate the whole of the western and central Pacific regions. The defeat at Midway threw the Japanese Navy on the defensive for the first time in World War II, and it would never again exercise naval supremacy in the Pacific Ocean. The boldness that characterized Japan’s renowned fighting Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was replaced by caution after his disastrous defeat at Midway.
The Americans won their remarkable victory against the far more powerful and battle-toughened Japanese Navy by a combination of superior planning and code-breaking, plain good luck, and ultimately, by the extraordinary heroism displayed by American aircrews. The victory is all the more astonishing for the fact that the air groups of Enterprise and Hornet failed to co-ordinate their attacks on the Japanese carrier fleet. Many of the American aircrews were untried in battle; the American torpedo planes were obsolete; their torpedoes were unreliable; and the American F4F Wildcat fighter planes lacked the speed and agility of the deadly Japanese Zero fighter.
Few battles in history can match Midway for high drama. As a result of excellent leadership, Yorktown’s Air Group had no difficulty locating and destroying the Japanese fleet carrier Soryu. Of Hornet’s Air Group, only that ship's torpedo squadron VT-8 found the Japanese carriers, and lacking fighter escort, launched a gallant but doomed attack on them. The Enterprise SBD dive-bombers would probably not have found the Japanese carriers but for an extraordinary stroke of luck that caused them to sight and follow a Japanese destroyer that was returning to the Japanese carrier force, and led the SBDs directly to it. The result is history. The Enterprise dive-bombers destroyed two of Japan’s most powerful carriers. Many of Enterprise’s aircraft failed to return to their carrier. If chance had not intervened at this critical stage of the battle, the three American carriers would have had to face powerful attacks by combat-toughened aircrews from three of Japan’s best carriers. Yorktown was superbly commanded and this carrier and its escort warships had more combat experience than Enterprise and Hornet. Despite this advantage, Yorktown was crippled by two successive attacks from one Japanese carrier – the Hiryu. With greatly depleted air groups, and mostly inexperienced aircrews, the odds would have been heavily against the survival of Enterprise and Hornet. Any surviving crippled or badly damaged American carriers would have been very lucky to survive Japanese submarine attack on the long journey back to Pearl Harbor.
Speaking of his extraordinary victory over Napoleon at Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington made the famous comment: "The nearest run thing you ever saw in your life, by God!" The Iron Duke’s comment can fairly be applied to Midway. The odds at Midway were stacked so heavily against the Americans that the distinguished military historian Walter Lord felt compelled to describe the battle in his book as "Midway: The incredible victory". Lord went on to say of the battle:
"They had no right to win. Yet they did, and in doing so they changed the course of the war. More than that, they added a new name - Midway - to that small list that inspires men by example – Marathon, the Marne, the Somme, and Rorke’s Drift. Even against the greatest odds, there is something in the human spirit – a magic blend of skill, faith, and valour that can lift men from certain defeat to incredible victory."
In addition to the introductory quote at the beginning of this chapter, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was moved to say of Midway:
"This memorable American victory was of cardinal importance, not only to the United States, but to the whole Allied cause…At one stroke, the dominant position of Japan in the Pacific was reversed…"
Despite acknowledgment from distinguished historians such as Churchill and Lord that Midway ranks as one of the great battles in world history, this Pacific War battle has been allowed by governments most benefited by the American victory to largely slip from public consciousness. The United States Navy is a notable exception in so far as it commemorates Midway every year.
Perhaps it is the sheer drama of Midway and the fascination that extraordinary heroism is capable of producing in those who study history that has caused its pivotal role in the Pacific War and its potential to alter the course of World War II to be neglected by many military historians.
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto intended to destroy at Midway what remained of the United States Pacific Fleet after his treacherous attack on its base at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. The destruction of the US Pacific Fleet at Midway would almost certainly have resulted in Japan taking control of the whole of the Pacific Ocean west of Hawaii, including Australia and all of the islands between Hawaii and Australia. The American counter-offensive at Guadalcanal in August 1942 would not have been possible. The Japanese would have been able to establish their planned major airbase on Guadalcanal and disrupt the movement of troops and materiel between Australia and the United States. With its lifeline to the United States severed, it is likely that the eastern coast of Australia would have been invaded and occupied by the Japanese before the end of 1942. By losing Australia to the Japanese, the United States would have lost the base that provided its springboard for recapture of the Philippines.
There are those who argue that the Guadalcanal Campaign was equal to, or more important than Midway in shaping the course of the Pacific War, but that argument is logically flawed. It puts the cart before the horse because Midway laid the foundation for Guadalcanal. Without the American victory at Midway, the Guadalcanal Campaign as we know it could not have taken place.
For these reasons, Midway can fairly be assigned the status of the most important battle of the Pacific War.
A compelling reason to re-assess the status of Midway in World War II
Although Midway’s importance to the course of the Pacific War is beyond question, many military historians appear to have given little thought to assessing the place of Midway in the overall context of World War II.
For three decades after the end of World War II, Japan’s massive Midway Operation was believed to have had only two aims – completing the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet that had begun at Pearl Harbor, and capture of America’s Midway Atoll outpost in the central Pacific. We are indebted to the research of Professor John J. Stephan of the University of Hawaii for disclosing that the Japanese Midway Operation in 1942 had a very important third aim. Japan’s Admiral Yamamoto intended to use a Japanese victory at Midway as the foundation for a major assault on the Hawaiian Islands, beginning in October 1942 and peaking in March 1943. Yamamoto believed that total destruction of the US Pacific Fleet and the placing of a Japanese ring of steel around the Hawaiian Islands might persuade the United States to agree to peace talks with Japan.
Although not widely known until the publication of Professor Stephan’s "Hawaii under the Rising Sun: Japan’s Plans for Conquest after Pearl Harbor" (University of Hawaii Press, 1984), Yamamoto’s hope for a negotiated resolution of the Pacific War, by attacking Hawaii and using the fate of its population as a bargaining chip, was supported at the highest levels of the Japanese Army General Staff following the Doolittle Raid on Japan (at pages 113-115). This extraordinary aspect of the Japanese Midway Operation is covered in another chapter of this history of the Battle of Midway.
The research findings of Professor Stephan provide a compelling reason to re-assess the place of Midway in the Pacific War and to examine how the destruction or crippling of the US Pacific Fleet at Midway could have affected the course of World War II.
To achieve this, it is necessary to look at the broad context in which the Battle of Midway was fought, including the consequences of two decades of neglect of America’s defence forces after World War I, and the political and strategic situation of the United States in mid-1942. In examining the possible consequences of an American defeat at Midway, and to avoid an exercise in alternative history, it is necessary to look at real possibilities and not fanciful ones, and to be constrained by knowledge of Japan’s strategic intentions in mounting the Midway operation and the possible limitations imposed by the Midway battle on Japan’s military capabilities.
For our purposes, it is necessary to bear in mind that (a) at the start of World War II, the American regular army was no larger than that of tiny Belgium’s, and its equipment was mostly obsolete; (b) at the start of World War II, the US Navy had been starved of funds by Congress for two decades, and all of its battleships and many of its smaller warships were relics of the World War I era; (c) after Pearl Harbor, and two decades of neglect by Congress, it took the United States almost two years to rebuild its naval strength, that is to say, until late 1943; (d) during 1942, President Roosevelt came under intense pressure from the American people and Congress to combat the Japanese menace in the Pacific more vigorously; and (e) even the industrial strength of the United States was being severely strained in 1942 and the first half of 1943 by the very heavy Allied shipping losses produced by U-boats in the Atlantic.
These are large topics and important matters of American history because they affected the course of World War II significantly. They are too long to include in this chapter, but they have been covered in detail on this web-site in chapters dealing with the path to Pearl Harbor and the Battle of the Atlantic.
The effect of an American defeat at Midway on the Pacific War
For Japan's purposes in mid-1942, the planned destruction of the fighting capability of the US Pacific Fleet in the central and western Pacific would have been achieved by the sinking or crippling of the three American carriers Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet at or immediately following the Battle of Midway. If that had happened, and assuming that at least two of Yamamoto's Midway fleet carriers were still operational, I believe that he would have ordered all of his operational carriers (including Junyo and Ryujo in Alaskan waters) to pursue and destroy any crippled or badly damaged American carriers withdrawing to Pearl Harbor. I draw this conclusion based on Yamamoto’s character as an aggressive admiral prior to Midway, the confidence that his hero status in Japan bestowed, and his willingness to take risks to achieve his ends. One of those ends was the total destruction of the US Pacific Fleet, and Emperor Hirohito and his Imperial General Headquarters expected Yamamoto to achieve this during the course of the Midway Operation. Based on the same considerations, I would expect Yamamoto to appreciate the need to destroy the submarine servicing facilities at Pearl Harbor before withdrawing temporarily from Hawaii.
If the three US Pacific Fleet carriers had been either destroyed or crippled at Midway, I think it is unlikely that the Commander in Chief of the US Navy, Admiral Ernest King, would have allowed the last remaining Pacific Fleet carrier Saratoga to remain at Hawaii. Admiral King believed that the Japanese would be likely to attack Hawaii, and possibly the West Coast of the United States, if the US Pacific Fleet was defeated at Midway. He was wrong about the existence of any significant threat to the West Coast, but Professor Stephan has provided grounds to justify Admiral King’s fear for the safety of Hawaii. Saratoga would have been very vulnerable to destruction by air attack if berthed at Pearl Harbor and very vulnerable to air and submarine attack in waters off Hawaii. I believe that Admiral King would have felt obliged to withdraw America's last operational Pacific Fleet carrier to join the smaller carrier Wasp in protecting the West Coast of the United States. If Midway had been an American defeat, it is likely that political pressure for Saratoga to return and contribute to the defence of the West Coast would have been irresistible.
As I have indicated above, a Japanese victory at Midway would almost certainly have enabled Japan to take control of the whole of the Pacific region west of Hawaii before the end of 1942. The destruction of the US Pacific Fleet at Midway was also intended by Yamamoto to lay the foundation for a sustained attack on the Hawaiian Islands, beginning with an invasion of the sparsely populated large island of Hawaii in October 1942. We know that Yamamoto hoped to use Hawaii as a bargaining chip to secure peace talks with the United States. There is no evidence that Yamamoto intended to launch an early invasion of Oahu even if the US Pacific Fleet had been destroyed or crippled at Midway. The Japanese admiral was not a fool. It is far more likely that he would have gone about achieving his ends by placing a tight naval blockade around the Hawaiian Islands, including Oahu, with the intention of bombarding and starving the population of the islands into surrender. With 2,200 miles of unbroken ocean separating Hawaii from the American West Coast, providing support for the defence of Hawaii from the West Coast would have been a logistical nightmare.
How would the United States respond to an imminent Japanese threat to Hawaii?
During the six months following Pearl Harbor, the war news for Americans had been uniformly grim. A succession of defeats for the Allies had occurred in the Pacific theatre. Hong Kong and Singapore had fallen. The Japanese had conquered Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and most of Burma and New Guinea. The American army in the Philippines had surrendered to the Japanese after a desperate but doomed resistance. Even Coral Sea was difficult to view as an Allied victory, as indeed it was, when the United States had lost far more carrier tonnage than Japan. The Germans were striking deeper into the Soviet Union and were poised to seize the strategic Caucasian oil fields. In North Africa, Rommel had pushed into Egypt and was threatening to drive Allied forces back to the Suez Canal.
Off the eastern seaboard of the United States, German submariners had found a killing ground and their U-boats sank 675,000 tons of American shipping in the first three months of 1942. The rapid build-up of the US Navy that began in 1940 did not include escort vessels for convoys, or development of sophisticated anti-submarine equipment and tactics of the kind developed and used by the British Navy. The situation was so desperate that Britain and Canada had to provide the United States with ninety-five escort vessels to protect American shipping in the Atlantic.
On top of this unrelieved succession of Allied disasters, how would the American people have responded if their Pacific Fleet had been defeated at Midway and this had created a grave threat to the population of Hawaii from the powerful Japanese Navy? Most present-day Americans would probably say that their fellow Americans in 1942 would have united behind their President, as they did after Pearl Harbor. However, American history does not appear to offer such an assurance. Citing examples as far back as the War of 1812, the distinguished American historian, Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has shown that American voters have repeatedly declined to unite behind their President and his party in time of war. Referring to 1942, Schlesinger said:
"Pearl Harbor had galvanized the republic more completely even than the recent terrorist outrage (September 11). Yet in the mid-term elections held eleven months after Pearl Harbor, the Democrats lost fifty seats in the House and eight in the Senate". See: Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. "Politics after September 11".
Why did so many American voters turn against President Roosevelt’s Democratic Party in November 1942 despite the great American victory at Midway five months earlier? Assistant Professor of History at Ashland University, John Moser, has rejected as myth suggestions that Americans in World War II had stoutly backed President Roosevelt through the dark six months of continuing defeat that followed Pearl Harbor.
"A spate of propaganda over the past ten years about the 'greatest generation' has contributed to a widely-held belief that during World War II Americans accepted such developments stoically, without complaint, and that bad news only intensified their resolve to see the fight through to a successful finish. In fact, the reverse was true. Americans were stunned by these reversals, and were quick to look for someone to blame. For a while the British appeared to be a convenient target….Nor was the administration immune to criticism, particularly for its commitment to defeating Germany first. Given that it had been the Japanese who had attacked Pearl Harbor, Americans found it difficult to understand why in the first months of the war more U.S. troops were being sent to the United Kingdom than to, say, the Philippines, where they might help General Douglas MacArthur to stop the invading Japanese forces. A Gallup poll showed that a substantial majority of the population believed that Japan was the nation’s 'chief enemy', and therefore, that most of the country’s resources should be committed to the Pacific. In fact, as late as mid-1943 a bipartisan group of senators—all of whom, it should be noted, had a history of opposition to the President’s policies—were accusing the administration of an almost criminal neglect of the war against Japan."
If Midway had been an American defeat, with the implications that have been addressed above, I believe that Americans would have faced the greatest defence crisis in the history of their republic. This defence crisis would almost certainly have produced a political crisis of a magnitude never before experienced by Americans since 1776. In this situation, I believe that President Roosevelt would have been placed under enormous political pressure to alter America’s strategic priorities by diverting substantial military resources from the war against Germany to the onerous and urgent tasks of defending Hawaii and holding the Japanese war machine at bay. The pressure to do so would have been even greater when the full extent of the Japanese threat to the Hawaiian Islands became apparent in October 1942 with the Japanese invasion of the large island of Hawaii.
The effect of an American defeat at Midway on the war against Germany
An American defeat at Midway would almost certainly have required massive diversion of American resources to strengthen the capacity of the Hawaiian Islands to resist a lengthy Japanese siege. This would have required transportation of troops, military equipment, and food by convoy across 2,200 miles of open ocean likely to have been infested by Japanese submarines and surface raiders.
Vast quantities of American military resources, food, and oil had been moving in convoy to Britain, the Soviet Union, the Mediterranean, and North Africa across the Atlantic. Many of the ships engaged in moving those resources across the North Atlantic were sunk by U-boats in 1942 and the first half of 1943. The loss of merchant shipping and cargoes was so heavy that even the massive industrial resources of the United States were strained by the U-boat war until mid-1943. The impact of a substantial diversion of American resources to the Pacific from Europe and North Africa, and especially, from the Battle of the Atlantic, does not bear thinking about. Even with the massive help provided by the United States, the British were struggling to survive in the Battle of the Atlantic until mid-1943 when the tide finally turned against the German U-boats.
It is impossible to exclude the very real possibility that any major diversion of American resources from Europe, the Atlantic, and North Africa to the Pacific during the critical second half of 1942 and the first half of 1943 could have led to Britain’s defeat, and consequently, an Allied defeat in the European theatre. D-day could not have happened if Britain had succumbed to Nazi Germany.
Even if the British had managed to survive the U-boat menace in the Atlantic that peaked in March 1943, a major diversion of American military resources to the Pacific would almost certainly have delayed the sequence of Allied invasions of North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy. That diversion to the Pacific would also have slowed and sharply reduced the build-up in Britain of the massive military resources that were necessary for D-Day to take place in 1944. It is impossible to exclude the very real possibility that an American defeat at Midway could have delayed D-Day until June 1945 at the earliest. That would have given Field Marshal Rommel an extra year in which to strengthen the coastal defences of Normandy and make successful Allied landings even more difficult.
It is a great pity that more historical analysis has not been devoted to the truly frightening consequences for the Allies of an American defeat at Midway.
James Bowen
15 June 2005
The Causes of Japan's Defeat at Midway
A major flaw in the Japanese Midway strategy was the complexity of the operation. The Japanese assembled an invasion force of over two hundred ships. The warship component for the combined Midway and Alaskan offensives included eleven battleships, eight aircraft carriers, twenty-three cruisers, and sixty-seven destroyers. Against this awesome armada, the Americans could only field three aircraft carriers (one still damaged from the Battle of the Coral Sea), eight cruisers, and fourteen destroyers. If the Japanese had concentrated their massive naval power and focussed it against the United States Pacific Fleet at Midway, instead of dispersing it in a wide arc between Alaska and Midway, Japan would almost certainly have overwhelmed and destroyed the much smaller American fleet. When the complex plan began to break down, the Japanese warships were too widely dispersed for Yamamoto to concentrate his forces and regain the initiative.
Another major flaw in Japan's Midway strategy was the attitude of the Japanese Navy planners. Believing that Japan was invincible in war, the Japanese planners made the fatal mistake of underrating American military capabilities and response. They compounded this mistake with an over-confident belief that the Japanese strategy would take the United States completely by surprise, and that Japan would retain the initiative throughout their complex offensive.
Based solely on the comparative size and strength of the contending forces, the Japanese should have easily defeated the United States at Midway. The Americans faced seemingly overwhelming odds. It appears quite clear that the United States snatched victory from the jaws of defeat by a combination of better intelligence gathering, clever planning, extraordinary good luck, and the heroism of American air and ship crews.
The Significance of the Battle of Midway for the United States
In the great naval battle at Midway between 4-6 June 1942 the three American aircraft carriers Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet won a remarkable and pivotal victory. The loss by Japan of four of its best aircraft carriers and several hundred of its most experienced and skilful aircrews marked the turning of the tide against Japan in the Pacific War. The crushing defeat inflicted on the Japanese Navy by the very much smaller United States Pacific Fleet put an end to Japan's ambition to dominate the whole of the western Pacific region. The Imperial Japanese Navy would never again exercise naval supremacy in the Pacific Ocean or threaten Hawaii, Alaska and the western coast of the United States. After Midway, the United States Pacific Fleet was able to go on the offensive against the Japanese at Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. Japan lacked the capacity to replace the lost carriers and aircrews in time to resist the American counter-offensive.
Although Japan never recovered from the defeat at Midway, it still possessed a powerful navy, and many more tough naval battles would be fought before Japan released its grip on the countries it had conquered in the South-West Pacific.
The fate of Hawaii in the event of a crushing Japanese victory at Midway remains today a topic of some interest and lively debate. As we have seen in Midway Overview, the Japanese intended that the capture and occupation of Midway Atoll would be the first stage for an attack on the Hawaiian Islands. At the highest levels of Japan's Combined Fleet, the attack on Hawaii was known as Eastern Operation.
There have been suggestions from time to time that a crushing Japanese victory at Midway might have led to an immediate attempt by Admiral Yamamoto to invade Oahu. It is usually suggested that such an attempt would have been doomed to failure in the face of strong American resistance. However, such a scenario can be dismissed as fanciful. Yamamoto was too wily to attempt to storm Oahu while the island's defences were strong, and he had no intention of doing so.
If the extent of the Japanese victory at Midway had enabled Eastern Operation to proceed, the scenario may have developed along the following lines.
The Japanese would almost certainly have appreciated the need to isolate Oahu from the United States and destroy its defensive capability. With Japanese naval supremacy in Hawaiian waters established, and a powerful and efficient long-range submarine force available to block reinforcements and supplies to Hawaii from the United States, the Japanese Navy could then have placed Oahu under siege with top priority given to destruction of fuel storage tanks, ship and submarine servicing facilities, ammunition and fuel dumps. By July 1942, the fleet carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku would have been fully operational again and able to join the attack on Oahu. Yamamoto's Hawaii plan provided for the capture of America's Johnston Island in August 1942. This small island is located 710 miles from Pearl Harbor and contained a naval air station and airfield in 1942. Japanese medium bombers based at Johnston island would have been able to join the carrier-launched air attacks on Oahu. On their approach to Oahu, these bombers could have been protected by Zero fighters launched from the Japanese carriers.
The Battles of Midway and Coral Sea demonstrated that besieging Japanese warships would have faced little risk from B-17 bombers, and American Army Air Force fighter aircraft were no match for the Japanese Zero in 1942. Someone may say "but what about the threat to the Japanese warships from American submarines?" If facilities to fuel and service American submarines somehow survived a full-scale Japanese assault on Oahu, the Japanese warships blockading Hawaii still had little to fear from American submarines. In 1942, American torpedoes almost invariably ran erratically or failed to explode on impact with Japanese ships.
To those who suggest that this is a fanciful scenario, I can only say that I have received an opinion from a retired US Navy admiral who was serving on Hawaii during WW II. He has expressed the view that a major American disaster at Midway, followed by an immediate and sustained Japanese attack on the fuel tanks and other installations that serviced the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, could have made continued operations by the fleet in Hawaiian waters very difficult.
The next step in the Eastern Operation would have been to establish air and naval bases on the large island of Hawaii to increase the pressure on Oahu. With Japanese submarines and surface warships patrolling the eastern approaches to Hawaii, and two thousand miles of unbroken ocean separating Hawaii from the American West Coast, the defence of Hawaii would be a logistical nightmare and there would be little short-term prospect of succour for the beleaguered garrison of Oahu.
It has been suggested that if Japan succeeded in capturing Oahu, sustaining the population of the main Hawaiian island would have been beyond the logistical capabilities of the Japanese. In support of this contention, reference is often made to the study made in January 1942 by Captain Shigenori Kami of the Imperial Navy General Staff. See Dr John J. Stephan's "Hawaii under the Rising Sun" at page 99. Kami's logistical study was undertaken at a time when Navy General Staff was opposed to Eastern Operation, and the study was produced for the express purpose of opposing Combined Fleet's planned Hawaiian operation. Kami formed the view that Hawaii could be captured by Japan, but he also concluded that Japan lacked the shipping tonnage to maintain the importation of food and other supplies to Hawaii at 1941 levels. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Yamamoto ever intended to accept the responsibility of ensuring that the population of Oahu continued to enjoy steak and eggs for breakfast once a Japanese blockade was in effect or in the event that Oahu was surrendered to the Japanese. If Japanese practice in other conquered territories can be taken as a guide, it is almost certain that the Japanese would have required the American population of Oahu to feed themselves or starve.
It appears from those close to Admiral Yamamoto in 1942, that he planned to tighten a noose around Oahu, and hopefully, use the fate of the population of Oahu as a bargaining chip to draw America into peace talks that would lead to a negotiated end to hostilities between Japan and the United States, and American acceptance of Japan's dominance of the central and western Pacific regions, including the Philippines and Australia. Placing the inhabitants of Oahu under threat of starvation could well have been part of Yamamoto's plan to place pressure on the United States to talk peace.
Three Japanese divisions, and they are named in "Hawaii under the Rising Sun" at pages 117-118, were already training for a landing on the island of Hawaii when the Japanese were defeated at Midway, and the Hawaii invasion plan was then shelved.
There is no evidence to suggest that Yamamoto had any intention to attack the West Coast of the United States. He would have been well aware of the enormous logistical difficulties that would have faced the Pacific Fleet in defending Hawaii in 1942 if it was forced to withdraw to the American West Coast. He would have been even more acutely aware of the logistical nightmare that would have faced Japan if he had sought to carry the war to the American West Coast.
We know what Admiral Yamamoto hoped to achieve in Hawaii, but it is somewhat pointless to speculate upon whether or not he could have achieved it. There are simply too many variables. It should be sufficient to give thanks that Midway was an American victory, and an extraordinary one at that!
The Significance of the Battle of Midway for Australians
The importance of the Battle of Midway for Australians lies in the fact that the loss of four powerful fleet aircraft carriers deprived Japan of the capability to mount a full-scale invasion of the Australian mainland and to support with those carriers its aggression against Australia and her territories to the north of the mainland. If those four powerful Japanese aircraft carriers had been available to support Japan’s invasion of Australia's Territory of Papua in July 1942, the fate of Australia may well have been sealed in that same year.